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Abstract 
The adage that there is ‘no security without development and no development without 
security’ (commonly referred to as the security–development nexus) has become the 
dominant discourse of Western donor engagement with the developing world since the 
2001 terrorist attacks in the United States (US). This thesis argues that the existing 
literature on the nexus, as seen from a critical neocolonial and securitisation lens, is 
Western-centric in its parochial attention to the conceptual, policy and programming 
concerns of the Western donors. As a result, the literature excludes the voices of the 
local recipient countries on this subject, robbing them of their agency and subjecthood. 
By doing this, the literature is inadequate in explaining the deeper level politics of the 
nexus that are present on the ground in the recipient countries. Therefore, this thesis 
takes a decolonial approach, using a case study of the Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act in 
Pakistan to explore the politics of the security–development nexus with regard to the 
issues of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘agency’. 
The thesis argues that the security–development nexus activates a dialectical power 
struggle between donor and recipient countries and between different actors within the 
recipient countries that use the indivisibility of security and development to advance 
their strategic interests over each other. For instance, the nexus has enabled the US to 
influence the national security policies and civil–military relationships of Pakistan, 
challenging its sovereignty. However, the local actors in Pakistan, notably the political 
and military stakeholders have not been passive bystanders; they, too, have exerted their 
agency to co-produce the nexus and use it to their own advantage, such as by 
modernising their armed forces or promoting civilian supremacy in the country. 
The thesis demonstrates that the security–development nexus is not only a Western 
donor construct but also actively constructed by recipient countries like Pakistan, which 
mould it to serve their own interests. Recognising this co-constitutivity allows the 
prevailing understanding of the security–development nexus to be simultaneously 
enriched and challenged. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
The Obama administration has sought to influence the strategic considerations of 
Pakistani leaders, convincing them that Pakistan is better off expanding its counter 
terror and counterinsurgency operations … Improving bilateral cooperation and 
contributing to Pakistan’s economic, political and military stability are all essential 
elements of this effort.1 
—US Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan (2010) 
 
In dealing with Great Powers one must resist their pressures by all possible means 
available.2 
—Zulfikar Ali Bhutto 
 
The KLB Act reads more like a wish list of the PPP government than of the Americans.3 
—Pakistan Army Official 
  
 
1 ‘US Strategy for Pakistan and Afghanistan’, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington DC: CFR, 2010, 
8. 
2 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (New York: Oxford University Press 1969), 4. 
3 Former Brigadier of the Pakistan Army, Rawalpindi, interview, 14 May 2016. 
2 
1.1 Background 
On 13 August 2011, eight armed militants of al-Qaeda abducted Warren Weinstein, a 
senior American development aid worker, from his house in an upmarket residential 
neighbourhood in Lahore, Pakistan.4 In his statement claiming responsibility for the 
abduction, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri demanded an end to American drone 
strikes in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.5 In addition, he demanded the 
release of al-Qaeda prisoners such as Omer Abdel-Rahman (known as the ‘Blind 
Sheikh’), Ramzi Yousef and the family of Osama bin Laden. Al-Zawahiri argued, ‘Just 
as the Americans detain all whom they suspect of links to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, 
even remotely, we detained this man who is neck-deep in American aid to Pakistan 
since the ’70s’,6 a hint that Weinstein was suspected by some of working for the US 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The fact that Weinstein worked with numerous 
development aid agencies, including the United States Agency for International 
Development7 (USAID), spoke six languages and had projects operating in the border 
regions between Afghanistan and Pakistan compounded that suspicion. Such 
suspicions were fuelled because they coincided with the Raymond Davis case (in 
which a CIA contractor killed two Pakistanis in broad daylight)8 and the revelation 
that the CIA used a fake vaccination campaign to track down and assassinate Osama 
bin Laden. 9  As a result, Pakistan banned several international development 
organisations, including Save the Children, and arrested one of its local officials, Dr 
Shakil Afridi,10 who ran the vaccination campaign for the CIA. In addition, Pakistan 
 
4 ‘Al-Qaeda Takes Credit for Kidnapping US Development Expert Warren Weinstein’, The National Post, 
1 December 2011. 
5 During the Obama Administration there was a surge in drone strikes in conflict zones, which disrupted 
the al-Qaeda network but also led to a deep anti-American sentiment in those countries. The reliance on 
drone strikes has thus been a matter of debate, with critics arguing that while drone strikes may help in 
the short term, they create more insecurity for the US in the long term. See Bob Woodward, Obama’s 
Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011). 
6 ‘Al-Qaeda Says It Kidnapped Warren Weinstein in Pakistan’, BBC News, 1 December 2011. 
7 In Pakistan, USAID is widely viewed with suspicion as a CIA front by both policymakers and the 
public. 
8 Raymond Davis was a CIA contractor who on January 27 2011 shot dead two Pakistani men in a broad 
daylight in Lahore and tried to escape the crime scene but was arrested by the police. The incident 
sparked a major diplomatic row between the US and Pakistan. The US called for the immediate release of 
Davis under diplomatic immunity. However, Pakistan argued that Raymond Davis had no diplomatic 
immunity and instead, was a CIA spy working as a development aid worker in Pakistan.  
9  Saeed Shah, ‘CIA Organised Fake Vaccination Drive To Get Osama Bin Laden’s Family DNA’, 
Guardian, 11 July 2011. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jul/11/cia-fake-vaccinations-osama-
bin-ladens-dna 
10 Shakil Afridi was a medical doctor working for Save the Children and ran the fake hepatitis vaccination 
campaign for the CIA. He was arrested after the bin Laden raid on 2nd May 2011 and was sentenced to 33 
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expelled dozens of development aid workers and US officials from the country and 
tightened its visa policies.11 
The 2011 diplomatic crisis did not occur in a vacuum; it had been brewing since the 
Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act (KLB)12 was signed into law by the United States (US) in 
2009. The Act was embraced by the civilian government of the Pakistan Peoples Party 
(PPP) but resented by the Pakistan Army. The US commitment to provide $7.5 billion 
development assistance to the civilian government under the KLB Act was seen by the 
Army (and some opposition political parties including PMLN, PMLQ and JUI-F) as 
an attempt to curb the powers of the Army and influence Pakistan’s national security 
policy and civil–military relations under the guise of promoting democracy and 
development.13 Thus, Warren Weinstein was seen as being no different to Raymond 
Davis or Shakil Afridi, and his abduction became part of the larger discursive power 
struggle between the US and Pakistan. 
For instance, capturing the political opportunity presented by the crisis, Rana 
Sanaullah,14  a senior member of the major opposition political party, added to the 
suspicion about Weinstein’s profession, claiming, ‘We suspect that he was involved in 
intelligence gathering because we offered him a police escort, deployed police at his 
house, but he resisted our attempts’.15 This statement by a senior official sent local 
media and blog commentators spiralling into debate about whether Weinstein was 
truly an aid worker or a CIA spy working undercover, putting the US Government 
under pressure in its delicate relationship with Pakistan, which complained that its 
sovereignty was under threat from a covert US war. The US responded by blaming the 
pro-al-Qaeda elements within the security establishment of Pakistan for being behind 
the abduction of Warren Weinstein, criticising Pakistan for its double dealing in the 
 
years in a Pakistani prison. In a protest over his sentencing, the US Senate Panel decided to cut $1 million 
in aid to Pakistan every year. 
11 Jon Boone, ‘Pakistan Orders Save the Children Foreign Workers to Leave’, Guardian, 6 September 
2012. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/12/pakistan-shuts-down-save-the-children-offices-in-
islamabad 
12 Alternatively known as the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 2009.  
13 Claude Rakisits, ‘Pakistan’s Military Riled by the Kerry-Lugar Bill’, World Politics Review, 9 October 
2009. https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/4424/pakistans-military-riled-by-the-kerry-lugar-bill 
14 Rana Sanaullah, a senior member of the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML-N), was the Minister 
for Law in the Punjab Government.  
15 Shafiq Sharif, ‘Sanaullah Says Weinstein Was a Mysterious Individual’, Pakistan Today, 18 August 
2011.https://www.pakistantoday.com.pk/2011/08/18/sanaullah-says-weinstein-was-a-
%E2%80%98mysterious%E2%80%99-individual/ 
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war on terrorism. Four years later, on 14 January 2015, Warren Weinstein was killed 
by a US drone strike in the FATA region of Pakistan bordering with Afghanistan.16  
Weinstein’s abduction and death highlights the blurred lines between security and 
development in countries that are of strategic interest to the US. This blurring maybe a 
result of the security–development nexus, a powerful discourse that integrates security 
and development as a way to achieve US foreign policy goals in the developing world, 
sometimes at the expense of the lives of development aid workers such as Warren 
Weinstein. The nexus is based on the widely held assumption, in the policy and some 
academic literature, that ‘development and security go hand in hand’ 17  and that 
underdevelopment and poverty in the developing states pose a direct threat to the 
security of Western developed countries.18 This ‘inextricable link’ between security and 
development has become a dominant discourse in donor circles to solve the problems 
associated with underdeveloped states that are undergoing conflict or are recovering 
from a conflict. As such, for the purpose of this study, the security-development nexus 
is about traditional security and development centred around the state and not about the 
human security and human development.19  
At a deeper level, the Weinstein episode highlights a lot more than simply the 
securitisation of development. It draws attention to the politics of the nexus between 
donor and recipient countries and between different actors within the recipient 
countries, reflected through the discursive power struggle. For instance, while the 
security establishment of Pakistan is critical of US use of the purported nexus between 
security and development to achieve its security and military interests, arguing that it 
challenges Pakistan’s sovereignty,20 it not only embraces the nexus but also reinforces 
the indivisibility of security and development to argue for continued US foreign 
 
16 A signature strike is one launched on the basis of behavioural evidence around a site that suggests 
the presence of a high-value target, without knowing the exact identity. 
17 Richard Youngs, ‘Fusing Security and Development: Just Another Euro Platitude?’, CEPS Working 
Document No. 277/October 2007, 1. 
18 White House, National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: United States Printing 
Office, 2002). 
19  Department for International Development (DFID), Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A 
Strategy for Security and Development (London: Department for International Development, 2005); 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Canada’s International Policy Statement: A Role 
of Pride and Influence in the World, (Ottawa: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, 
2005).  
20  Daniel S. Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
5 
assistance to Pakistan.21 Similarly, the US has repeatedly complained about Pakistan’s 
support of terrorism against US forces in Afghanistan while simultaneously providing 
Pakistan with ‘billions of dollars’ in aid through the nexus, challenging the conventional 
wisdom on what the nexus is and what it is supposed to achieve.22 More importantly, 
the Weinstein episode highlights the civil–military power struggle in Pakistan, in the 
context of a security–development nexus in which the civilian government of the PPP 
allied closely with the US, promising to recover Weinstein, while the security 
establishment and opposition political parties acted to the contrary, using the occasion 
to counter the overwhelming presence of the US in Pakistan. For instance, by 
capitalising on the kidnapping of Weinstein at a critical time in the US–Pakistan 
relationship, the security establishment and the Pakistan Muslim League-N deliberately 
added to the suspicion of Weinstein being a CIA official through its print and electronic 
media outlets. In doing this, it generated an anti-American narrative that, first, put the 
US under pressure in its negotiations with Pakistan’s security establishment and, 
second, weakened the government of PPP by targeting it over its close alliance and 
concessions to the US.23 The Weinstein episode therefore highlighted the ability of 
different actors in Pakistan to exert agency through the security–development nexus to 
achieve their own strategic interests.  
This thesis argues that the literature on the security–development nexus does not reflect 
these deep political insights, which are present on the ground. The literature tends to 
overlook the way the nexus is seen by aid recipients because the scope of the discussion 
is set by its overarching focus on the politics of (Western) donor states and agencies. As 
a result, much of the analysis in the critical literature pivots around the Western donor’s 
conceptual,24 policy and programming25 aspects of the nexus, even in its attempt to flesh 
 
21 Nisar Ali Khan, the Federal Minister of Interior, Government of Pakistan (National Assembly speech, 
Islamabad, 30 August 2017). 
22 See White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia’ (Fort 
Myer, Arlington, VA, 21 August 2017). 
23 The security establishment was outraged at the PPP government over its issuing of hundreds of visas to 
development aid workers, without due security clearance, as part of the concession under the KLB Act. 
The security agencies believed that hundreds of US spies were operating in Pakistan under the guise of 
development aid workers. See Staff Report, ‘Pressed by visa scandal, PPP launches counteroffensive’, 
The Nation, March 25 2017. https://nation.com.pk/25-Mar-2017/pressed-by-visa-scandal-ppp-launches-
counteroffensive 
24 See Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal, ‘Mapping Security Development: A Question of Methodology?’, 
Security Dialogue 42, no. 1 (2010): 5–29; Bjorn Hettne, ‘Development and Security: Origins and Future’, 
Security Dialogue 41, no. 1 (2010): 31–52. 
25  Sasha Jesperson, Rethinking the Security-Development Nexus: Organised Crimes in Post Conflict 
States (London: Routledge, 2017). 
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out the politics of the nexus through a neocolonial and securitisation lens. 26  For 
instance, the most prominent critical literature, including that of Duffield and Chandler 
is mute on the way the nexus is seen by the recipient countries as a threat to their 
sovereignty that serves the US strategic interests—a predominant concern of the 
officials in the recipient countries that were interviewed for this thesis. In addition, the 
literature neglects the way the actors in the recipient countries are able to exert their 
agency in terms of co-producing the security–development nexus and moulding it to 
serve their own regional and domestic interests. The thesis argues that this is because of 
the critical literature’s donor-centric Western lens, which not only regards the views of 
recipient countries as irrelevant in the study of the nexus but also treats recipient 
countries as an object of the nexus, undermining their agency and subjecthood. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that in its neglect of the co-constitutivity of the security–
development nexus, the literature is inadequate in explaining the politics of the nexus 
that were highlighted through the Weinstein episode. 
The central aim of this thesis is to explore the politics of the security–development 
nexus and, in doing so, enrich the critical literature on the subject. It does this by taking 
the nexus as a discourse and applying a decolonial approach—one that problematises 
the Western-centric approach in the literature on the nexus to identify its deficiencies 
and examines the local voices in the recipient countries as subjects of the nexus. The 
thesis argues that the security–development nexus activates a dialectical power struggle 
between donor and recipient countries and between different actors within the recipient 
countries, which use the indivisibility of security and development to advance their 
strategic interests over each other. For instance, the nexus enables the US to influence 
the national security policies and civil–military relations of Pakistan, challenging its 
sovereignty. However, the local actors in Pakistan are not passive bystanders; they exert 
their agency to co-produce the nexus and use it to their own advantage, such as by 
modernising the armed forces or promoting civilian supremacy in the country. The 
 
26 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security 
(London: Zed Books, 2001); Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War: Governing the 
World of Peoples (Cambridge: Polity, 2007); Mark Duffield, ‘Development, Territories, and People: 
Consolidating the External Sovereign Frontier’, Alternatives: Global, Local, Political 32, no. 2 (2007): 
225–246; Mark Duffield, ‘The Liberal Way of Development and the Development–Security Impasse: 
Exploring the Global Life-Chance Divide’, Security Dialogue 41, no. 1 (2010): 53–76; Stephen 
Keukeleire and Kolja Raube, ‘The Security–Development Nexus and Securitization in the EU’s Policies 
Towards Developing Countries’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 26, no. 3 (2013); Stephen 
Brown and Jorn Grävingholt, The Securitization of Foreign Aid (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 
10. 
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thesis essentially demonstrates that the nexus is not only a Western donor construct but 
is also actively constructed by the recipient countries, which mould it to serve their own 
interests. Recognition of this co-constitutivity allows the prevailing understanding of the 
nexus to be simultaneously enriched and challenged. 
To provide evidence to substantiate this argument, this thesis uses the case study of the 
KLB Act as the most significant enactment of the security–development nexus, asking 
two main questions with regard to the issues of ‘sovereignty’ and ‘agency’ to explore 
the politics of the nexus in depth:  
1. In what ways did the KLB Act, as an enactment of the security–development 
nexus, serve the strategic interests of the US and challenge Pakistan’s 
sovereignty?  
2. To what extent was Pakistan able to exert its agency and mould the KLB in its 
own favour, from a position of weakness?  
The aim of the first question is to build on the existing critical literature and expand it 
by exploring the way the security–development nexus challenged Pakistan’s 
sovereignty in terms of influencing its national security policy and civil–military 
relations, to serve US strategic interests in the region. The aim of the second question 
is to challenge the critical literature by studying the way a recipient country such as 
Pakistan is able to exert its agency under the practices associated with the security–
development nexus. Together, these two questions allow an exploration of the politics 
of the security–development nexus in detail as present on the ground in a recipient 
country, allowing for a more nuanced study on the subject.  
1.2 Importance of the Study 
This study is significant for two key reasons. First, it aims to enrich the literature on the 
security–development nexus, which has been criticised for its relatively weak empirical 
footing27 and yet is central to Western donor policy engagement with the developing 
world. Given that billions of dollars of taxpayers’ money has been spent by donor 
organisations and years of development has been carried out in developing countries, 
 
27 Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal, ‘Mapping the Security Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, 
Cacophony, Convergence?’, Security Dialogue 41, no. 5 (2010): 24. 
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the evidence suggests that developing countries are not only falling behind in achieving 
their development goals but also struggling with instability.28 It is thus important to look 
deeper into the subject, to investigate the politics of the security–development nexus in 
a way that not only contributes to the literature on the subject but also is relevant to 
policy practice. The thesis, therefore, takes a decolonial approach to the study of the 
nexus, using the case study of the KLB Act in Pakistan. Essentially, the decolonial 
approach means that the study relies on extensive interviews of the civil–military elite 
in Pakistan and reviews, in each chapter, the historical presence of the local actors, to 
help to bring out the voices of the stakeholders in the recipient country. In doing this, it 
not only accords subjecthood and agency to the local actors but also, in the process, 
allows a developing-world perspective on the debate to surface, to help in explaining the 
politics of the nexus. 
Second, this study is important because it uses the case study of the KLB Act to 
examine and understand the tumultuous US–Pakistan relationship and its effect on 
Pakistan’s civil–military balance, from a unique vantage point. Much has been 
published on the US–Pakistan relationship from either a security or development 
background,29 but this study is (to the best of my knowledge) the first to examine US–
Pakistan relations in the context of the security–development nexus. This approach will 
help to fill a gap in the analysis of bilateral relations between the two countries and the 
effect on local politics inside Pakistan. For instance, the analysis of the KLB Act 
reflects the level of agency that Pakistan, as a weaker partner, is able to exert in its 
relations with the US. In addition, it provides insights into the way small powers are 
able to adjust and manipulate their relationships with stronger powers through 
discourses on insecurity, underdevelopment and terrorism.  
Why studying the security–development nexus as a discourse matters, and what it 
means for this thesis, is discussed in the next section. 
 
28 See Fund for Peace, Fragile States Index (Washington, DC: Fund for Peace, 2017). 
29 See A. Z. Hilali, US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2017).  
Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of 
Misunderstanding (New York: Public Affairs, 2013); Markey, No Exit; De Andre Whitley and Keith Noel, 
Pakistan-US Relations and Foreign Assistance (Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers, 2012); Christine 
Fair, Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges (Pittsburgh: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). 
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1.3 Security–Development Nexus: An Overview 
The exact nature of the security–development nexus is a matter of critical debate. As 
Duffield observes, the nexus ‘remains underresearched and its study has yet to establish 
its own conceptual language’.30 He notes that as ‘both development and security are 
extremely broad and elusive concepts, the call for integrating them often leads to a 
policy enigma: what should be integrated with what?’31 This is evident in Stern and 
Öjendal, who in their attempt to map the nexus, argue that ‘a nexus can be understood 
as a network of connections between disparate ideas, processes or objects; alluding to a 
nexus implies an infinite number of possible linkages and relations’. 32  Through a 
discussion of what they call ‘familiar stories’ on security and development, they suggest 
that there is not simply a ‘nexus’, but instead ‘nexuses’ that reflect the multiple 
discourses within the broader discourse of nexus.33  Essentially, this means that the 
security–development nexus serves as what Shah calls ‘a framing discourse’ within 
which the contribution of various sub-discourses merge, including the discourses of 
‘state failure’, ‘civil wars’, ‘liberal peace thesis’, ‘state building’ and ‘good 
governance’.34 
Despite this lack of clarity, the nexus has continued to be discussed in both the policy 
and academic debate over the years. In fact, as Duffield points out, the idea of ‘no 
security without development and no development without security’ has been asserted 
by the donor and policy community to a ‘point of monotony’.35 Waddell believes this 
link between security and development has become an ‘article of faith’.36 That is, if we 
repeat anything enough times, it becomes accepted as common sense even if it is not 
true. This is the story of the security–development nexus, which through its repeated 
 
30 Duffield, Global Governance, 9. 
31 Necla Tschirgi, ‘Security and Development Policies: Untangling the Relationship’ (Paper presented at 
the European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes (EADI) Conference, Bonn, 
September 2005) 2. 
32 Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal, ‘Exploring the Security-Development Nexus’, in The Security-
Development Nexus: Peace, Conflict and Development, eds. Ramses Amer, Ashok Swain and Joakim 
Öjendal (London: Anthem, 2013), 11. 
33 Stern and Öjendal, ‘Exploring the Security-Development Nexus’, 6. 
34 Kamil Shah, ‘The Security-Development Nexus and Fragile States’, in Politics of Development: A 
Survey, ed. Heloise Weber (London: Routledge, 2014) 338. 
35 Duffield, ‘Liberal Way’, 5. 
36 Nicholas Waddell, ‘Ties That Bind: DFID and the Emerging Security and Development Agenda’, 
Conflict, Security and Development 6, no. 4 (2006): 531. 
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usage in the policy and academic world as a ‘given’ phenomenon has become a 
powerful discourse of Western donor engagement with the developing world.  
The linkage of security and development is not a new phenomenon and has its roots in 
both the colonial era37 and in Cold War, in terms of the Marshall Plan.38 However, the 
shock of the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks and the challenge of international 
terrorism from weak and underdeveloped states pushed the security–development nexus 
into being a dominant discourse of international development and international security. 
In other words, it is the assumed threat to Western countries from underdevelopment 
and poverty in the developing world, and their purported links to global terrorism, that 
has led Western donors to embrace the security–development nexus as a dominant 
discourse to engage with the developing world. Therefore, for the purposes of this 
thesis, the nexus is essentially understood as meaning ‘security and development go 
hand in hand’ and ‘security of the global North is tied to the security of the global 
South’. In that sense, the KLB Act, taken as a case study for this thesis, is the enactment 
of the security–development nexus discourse in Pakistan, as discussed in detail in the 
next section.  
1.4 The Kerry-Lugar-Berman (KLB) Act 
Given that Pakistan is characterised by the international security and development 
community as being a weak state with poverty and a struggling democracy, as well as 
being a safe haven for terrorist groups that threaten the global community, it presents a 
classic example of US foreign engagement through the security–development nexus. 
Since 2001, Pakistan has received over $33.4 billion39 from the US in a mix of security 
and development aid, making it one of the highest recipients of US foreign assistance in 
the world.40 Despite that, Pakistan has never been included as a case study to provide 
empirical evidence in the study of the security–development nexus. Most of the focus 
 
37 Stern and Öjendal, ‘Exploring the Security-Development Nexus’. 
38 Hettne, ‘Development and Security’, 31–52. 
39 There is a debate over the exact amount of aid, given the way aid is calculated. For instance, Pakistan 
does not count the Coalition Support Fund as aid since it is a repayment for Pakistan’s services in the war 
on terrorism. 
40  Shahbaz Rana, ‘War on Terror Aid: Pakistan Received $33.4bn from US’, Express Tribune, 6 
September 2016. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1498815/war-terror-aid-pakistan-received-33-4bn-us/ 
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has been on states undergoing conflict, or post-conflict states,41 generally overlooking 
countries that are not officially in a state of war (e.g., Pakistan), even though they are 
crucial to the conduct of global wars, including the war on terrorism, and provide 
counterintuitive evidence on the politics of the nexus. 
In that context, the KLB Act of 2009 offers a suitable case study for examining the 
politics of the security–development nexus. Under the KLB Act, the Obama 
Administration promised to provide Pakistan $1.5 billion in development assistance 
annually from 2010 to 2014, with the potential to extend for another five years to 
promote development, democracy and security in Pakistan. However, it is the basis for 
this extensive aid package that qualifies it to be studied as an enactment of the security–
development nexus. First, the text of the KLB Act reflects the core assumption of the 
nexus that ‘security and development go hand in hand’ and that ‘the security of the 
global North is linked to the security of the global South’. This is evident in the opening 
section, entitled ‘Findings’, which states: 
According to a Government Accountability Office report (GAO-08-622), ‘since 2003, 
the [A]dministration’s national security strategies and Congress have recognized that 
a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power—diplomatic, 
military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement 
support—was needed to address the terrorist threat emanating from the FATA’.42 
The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region (now part of Khyber 
Pakhtunkhua province) of Pakistan has long been pointed to by the US as a safe haven 
for al-Qaeda and the Taliban, but military action alone was not enough to remove the 
terrorists from the region. Hence, as outlined by the aforementioned statement, the KLB 
Act was a comprehensive response to tackle the terrorist threat emerging from inside 
Pakistan.  
Second, the KLB Act is a useful case study since it reflects the deeper level politics of 
the nexus in its promotion of democracy in Pakistan after a decade of military rule 
under General Pervez Musharraf. The ‘Statement of Principles’ section states:  
 
41 See Jesperson, Rethinking the Security-Development Nexus. See also Lars Buur, Steffen Jensen and 
Finn Stepputat, The Security-Development Nexus: Expressions of Sovereignty and Securitization in South 
Africa (Cape Town: HRC Press, 2007). 
42 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), (§) 3. 
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(5) The United States intends to work with the Government of Pakistan— 
(B) to support the people of Pakistan and their democratic government in their efforts 
to consolidate democracy, including strengthening Pakistan’s parliament, helping 
Pakistan reestablish an independent and transparent judicial system, and working to 
extend the rule of law in all areas in Pakistan.43 
The timing of Pakistan’s return to democracy aligned with a change in the US 
Government and Barack Obama becoming the President of the US. The general 
sentiment within the Obama Administration was that Pakistan’s situation was partially 
America’s fault, owing to that country’s (1) reckless support of military dictatorships in 
Pakistan, (2) abandonment of Pakistan after the end of Cold War and (3) overly short-
term, security-oriented engagement with Pakistan. 44  The American policymakers 
believed that these were the reasons for Pakistan’s mistrust of the US and its reluctance 
to provide full cooperation against terrorist organisations in the country. Therefore, the 
KLB Act, as an enactment of the nexus, aimed to make the US–Pakistan relationship 
more strategic and holistic, moving beyond the solely security lens that was prevalent 
during the GW Bush Administration. It sought to help Pakistan become a stable country 
through the promotion of democracy and development.45 Finding its roots within the 
nexus discourse, the Obama Administration believed that more progress in the 
development and security needs of Pakistan would make Pakistan a resilient and 
internationally responsible country that would not only act against terrorism but also 
stop using terrorism as a state policy.46 Hillary Clinton, in her congressional hearings as 
the newly appointed Secretary of State, confirmed this line of reasoning by the new 
Obama Administration, based on the nexus, which is discussed in detail in the 
discussion chapters of this thesis.47 
Third, the KLB Act, while taking direct aim at the Pakistan military and Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI), also spelled out the responsibilities under the KLB Act that Pakistan 
 
43 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), (§) 4. 
44 Interview with a senior American diplomat managing US foreign assistance to Pakistan from 2009 to 
2014, Washington DC, 20th September 2016.  
45 Chairman John Kerry and Chairman Berman on the KLB Act suggested this in a joint explanatory 
statement: John F. Kerry and Howard Berman, ‘Joint Explanatory Statement Enhanced Partnership with 
Pakistan Act of 2009, October 14, 2009’ (Washington, DC: United States Senate, 2009), 
http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/joint-explanatory-statementenhanced-partnership-pakistan-act-2009/p20422.  
46 Interview with a senior American diplomat managing US foreign assistance to Pakistan from 2009 to 
2014, Washington DC, 20th September 2016. 
47  Ahmed Ijaz Malik, US Foreign Policy and the Gulf Wars: Decision Making and International 
Relations (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2015). 
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was to deliver, reinforcing the notion that the security of the global North is 
interdependent with the security of global South. For instance, one of the 
responsibilities of the Pakistan military under the KLB Act included:  
Ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its 
intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that 
has conducted attacks against United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or 
against the territory or people of neighboring countries.48  
In other words, the KLB Act shifted the onus of responsibility and blame onto Pakistan 
for the US losses in the war on terrorism, in terms of not being able to curb Taliban-led 
insurgency in Afghanistan. Under the KLB Act, Pakistan was required to ‘do more’ in 
stopping the Taliban and other groups (including LeT) from conducting cross-border 
attacks on Afghan and Indian soil. By accepting the KLB Act, the PPP government 
essentially reinforced not only the nexus but also the discourse that the Pakistan Army 
and ISI were involved in supporting extremism and terrorism against US forces, NATO 
and regions in India and Afghanistan.  
The language of the KLB Act sowed the seed of its own failure. It infuriated the 
Pakistan Army, which saw the KLB Act as an American attempt to influence Pakistan’s 
national security policy by shifting the responsibility for the war on terrorism to 
Pakistan, along with the blame for US losses, as well as interfering in Pakistan’s civil–
military issues, deepening the civil–military divide within Pakistan. The Pakistan Army 
saw the civilian government’s approval of the KLB Act as a conspiracy to ‘cut the 
wings’ of the Pakistan Army by shaping the discourse around it and offering itself to the 
US as a better alternative in the war on terrorism, to discredit the Pakistan Army.49 This 
is discussed in detail in the discussion chapters of the thesis.  
Therefore, through the KLB Act, as an enactment of the security–development nexus, 
the US aimed to expand its influence over Pakistan in the hope of achieving its strategic 
goals in the region. Some Western academics and policymakers who were critical of 
Pakistan saw this as an attempt by the US to ‘appease’ Pakistan’s duplicity and warned 
successive US governments about Pakistan’s ability to exert its power from a position 
 
48 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), (§) 203. 
49 Markey, No Exit, 142. 
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of weakness.50 However, this criticism is absent in the literature on the nexus, which 
takes recipient countries such as Pakistan as passive actors under the nexus.51 This 
thesis aims to challenge that idea by demonstrating the level of agency that local actors 
in Pakistan were able to exert in co-producing the nexus and using it to serve their own 
strategic interests. 
1.5 Theoretical Framework 
This thesis is informed by discourse studies and postcolonialism, which together serve 
as an overarching framework for studying the politics of the security–development 
nexus. What exactly is a discourse and why does it matter? According to Epstein, 
discourse includes a ‘cohesive ensemble of ideas, concepts and categorisations about a 
specific object that frame the object in a certain way’.52 This could include words, 
actions, images or signals that construct and give meaning to reality. The more 
important question, however, is what does a discourse do? According to Jorgensen and 
Phillips, ‘discourse is a form of social action that plays a part in producing the social 
world—including knowledge, identities, and social relations—and thereby in 
maintaining specific social patterns’.53 This is based on the constructivist idea that the 
way we talk plays an active role in changing our world, identity and social formations. 
An important aspect of discourse is that in the process of shaping reality, it can 
influence behaviour in a dialectical process, whereby the behaviour, in turn, influences 
the discourse. This means that the discourse not only gives meaning but also exerts 
power through its ability to create the social world. This is one of the core arguments of 
this thesis: that as a powerful discourse, the security–development nexus allowed the 
US to achieve its foreign policy objectives by influencing the national security policy 
and civil–military relations of Pakistan, while at the same time allowing local actors in 
recipient countries such as Pakistan to exert their agency through the nexus. 
 
50 Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, ‘Pakistan and the Myth of “Too Dangerous to Fail”’, Foreign 
Affairs, 8 January 2018.  
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/pakistan/2018-01-08/pakistan-and-myth-too-dangerous-fail 
51 Meera Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention: International Statebuilding in Mozambique (London: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2017). 
52 Charlotte Epstein, The Power of Words in International Relations: Birth of an Anti-Whaling Discourse 
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2008), 2, 4. 
53 Marianne Jorgensen and Louise Phillips, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London: Sage, 
2002), 5. 
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As Epstein argues, ‘power and meaning, are fundamentally intertwined’ and ‘the 
ultimate product of a powerful discourse is common sense’.54 In other words, ideas are 
taken as a ‘given’, without much contestation: for instance, the linkage made between 
security and development. Therefore, discourse analysis is relevant to the study of the 
nexus because of its power and ability to generate unquestionable ‘truths’ on the 
subject, which then shape the reality. Given that discourse is dynamic and changes with 
new events or information that it cannot explain,55 it allows a discursive struggle to take 
place between different actors within the discourse, as this thesis will demonstrate in the 
case of US–Pakistan relations in the context of the nexus. This is because the discourses 
have fluid and unstable boundaries that are always articulating with other overlapping 
discourses.56 
Discourse is an ideational battlefield in which the power of words creates perceptions, 
defines realities and, in turn, influences behaviours and events on the ground for 
different participants. This means that understanding the recipient country’s perspective 
will both uphold and challenge the dominant understanding of the nexus, thereby 
bringing more nuance and a grounded approach to the nexus. In a way, the discourse 
study brings to light the alternative voices on the security–development nexus. This is 
important in determining the agency of local actors in Pakistan, especially in terms of 
their ability to co-produce the nexus. 
This thesis also takes postcolonial literature as a theoretical point of departure to situate 
the debate on the nexus and develop the research methodology. While postcolonialism 
is not a unified theory and has its share of criticism for reinforcing the colonial 
discourse that it aims to critique,57 the salient philosophical tenets of postcolonialism 
help this study in two distinct ways. 
First, it fleshes out the Western-centrism of the literature on the nexus. It gives sense to 
the nexus being a modern form of colonial discourse that relies on the Western 
conception of security and development to structure the world in an ‘us vs them’ binary, 
 
54 Epstein, The Power of Words, 4. 
55 Jacob Torfing, ‘Discourse Theory: Achievements, Arguments, and Challenges’, in D. Howarth et al. 
(eds.), Discourse Theory in European Politics: Identity, Policy and Governance (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), 16. 
56 Roxanne Lynne Dotty, ‘Imperial Encounters: The Politics of Representation in North-South Relations’, 
Borderlines 5 (1996): 6. 
57 See Aijaz Ahmed, In Theory: Classes, Nations and Literatures (London: Verso, 1994).  
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neglecting the co-constitutivity of the nexus. Edward Said describes the us-and-them 
binary social relationship as a way that allows the Western intellectual to categorise the 
world into the Occident and the Orient.58 Said argues that the knowledge of the East is 
essentially created through the lens of the West and, further, is used to suppress the East 
by depicting the Orient as being backward, irrational and wild in comparison to the 
superior, civilised and rational West. This is reflected in the constant US attempts, 
through the KLB Act, to change what it calls Pakistan’s ‘behaviour’ on terrorism and 
the extensive literature coming out of Western capitals depicting Pakistan as the ‘state 
sponsoring terrorism’. 59  In terms of the nexus, this is evidenced in a narrow 
characterisation of the nexus as a Western donor construct, bypassing the agency of the 
recipient countries as possible co-producers of the nexus. 
Postcolonial thought not only helps to reveal the Western bias in the literature on the 
nexus but also explains the way this bias is an aspect of power. In other words, 
postcolonialism talks about power and knowledge production being mutually 
reinforcing concepts. For instance, Michel Foucault argues that power and knowledge is 
intertwined in colonial discourses—power requires knowledge and, conversely, 
reproduces knowledge.60 Since this thesis takes nexus as a discourse, the postcolonial 
lens offers rigorous insights into understanding the dynamics between language, 
knowledge and power in global politics. Therefore, several donor-funded studies61 on 
the nexus have served the particular objective of creating a discourse through 
knowledge production that gives the West the power over the definitions and terms. The 
aspect of knowledge-power in postcolonialism reveals another important point—the 
tendency of the West to claim superiority over social scientific knowledge. 62 
Sabaratnam calls it an assumption that ‘the West knows best’ when it comes to critical 
 
58 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Pantheon, 1978). 
59 See Fair, Pakistan’s Enduring Challenges; C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: Pakistan Army’s Way 
of War (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014); Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and 
Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005).  
60 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Volume 1, An Introduction (New York: Vintage, 1990), 100. 
See also: Michael Foucault, The order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences (New York: 
Vintage, 1994).  
61  DFID, Fighting Poverty; Frances Stewart, ‘Development and Security’, Conflict, Security and 
Development 4, no. 3 (2004): 261-288; World Bank, World Development Report: Conflict, Security, and 
Development (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2011). 
62 Wallerstein, I. ‘Eurocentrism and Its Avatars: The Dilemmas of Social Science’, Sociological Bulletin 
46, no. 1 (1997): 21–39. 
17 
thinking. She notes, ‘such knowledge presents itself as a logically bounded totality’.63 
This shortcoming in Western knowledge, extracted through the postcolonial lens, is 
crucial in decolonising the literature on the nexus, which tends to cast the voices of the 
recipient countries as being insignificant in shaping the nexus. The next chapter 
discusses this in more detail. 
Second, given that this thesis explores the politics of the nexus in relation to the 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘agency’ of local actors, the postcolonial literature gives a framework 
to flesh out both of these in depth. For instance, in terms of ‘sovereignty’, one of the key 
threads within the admittedly diverse literature on postcolonialism is that despite the end 
of formal Western colonisation, the former colonies are still subject to forms of social, 
cultural, psychological, political and economic colonisation. This colonial legacy is 
deeply embedded in the social and institutional structures of the former colonies. Derek 
Gregory calls this the ‘colonial present’. 64  Gregory sees British and American 
colonisation as an ongoing process and emphasises the use of the present tense to 
discuss the ideas around colonialism; he sees events and the reaction of the West to the 
11 September attacks as modern-day colonialism. Therefore, postcolonial literature 
provides a critical lens that offers a useful way of understanding North–South relations 
between Western powers and postcolonial developing states such as Pakistan, which 
complains about its sovereignty being under threat by the US—threatened through the 
nexus.65 
Similarly, postcolonialism is useful in reviewing the history of the colonised people 
and, in the process, giving them political consciousness and agency. One of the core 
contributions of postcolonial thought is to unravel the way local history was supressed 
by the colonial ruler as irrelevant and, in some cases, ‘barbaric’. By robbing the local 
actors of their historical presence, subaltern research66 argues that the colonial project 
rewrote history with Europe as the centre of human society, development and progress, 
and an ideal for the rest of the world. Postcolonialism helps to identify the subtle ways 
 
63 Meera Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention: International Statebuilding in Mozambique (London: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), 22. 
64 Derek Gregory, The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq (Oxford: Wiley, 2004).  
65 Claude Rakisits, ‘Pakistan’s Military Riled by the Kerry-Lugar Bill’, World Politics Review, 9 October 
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in which academic and critical literature robs the recipient countries of their agency 
under the nexus by neglecting their significance in historical continuity and their ability 
to shape the world. More importantly, postcolonial thought helps to create a framework 
for studying the security–development nexus from a decolonial perspective by 
emphasising the local voices and recognising their ability to exert agency by co-
producing the nexus and using it to their own advantage.  
1.6 Research Methodology 
1.6.1 Research Approach 
I did not start this research project thinking about studying the agency of local actors. 
Rather, I wanted to study the agency of the Western actors and explore the hegemony 
that is activated through the nexus. I started my fieldwork expecting to find Pakistan as 
a passive victim of the nexus, with little room left for local agency. Instead, I found a 
dialectical power struggle in which state officials in Pakistan recognised American 
attempts to extend their hegemony through practices associated with the nexus and, at 
the same time, found a way of using the nexus for their own benefit. The reason I was 
able to reach different conclusions was that I took an interpretive approach, using 
grounded theory and a case study method, aiming to provide a more flexible structure 
and research context and to bring a subjective gaze to the politics of the nexus.67 This 
allowed the data to drive my research, rather than preconceived theories and notions 
being used to cultivate specific data. 
My earlier experience working with the Government of Pakistan and engaging with 
donor agencies on several projects gave me some good background insights into the 
politics of the security–development nexus. However, it was my experience of going 
back to the Pakistan Government as a doctoral researcher68 that enabled me to develop a 
more holistic view of the nexus beyond the ‘neocolonial’ political agenda of the 
Western donor countries. In doing this, I developed a more nuanced understanding of 
the ways that donor and recipient countries negotiate with each other and the level of 
agency that recipient countries are able to exert from a position of relative weakness. 
 
67 See Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin, ‘Grounded Theory Methodology: An Overview’, in Handbook 
of Qualitative Research, eds. N. Denzin and Y. Lincoln (Ann Arbor: Sage Publications, 1994). 
68 Primary fieldwork conducted in Islamabad and Washington DC between March 2016 and December 
2016.  
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The ability to develop this nuance was rooted in my past academic and work 
experience. Given that the interpretivist approach places the researcher as part of the 
research process that co-produces the reality and reinforces it, the ‘positionality’ of the 
researcher becomes important.69 As I was raised in a military family in Pakistan and 
studied in the US and the UK to develop my early academic ideas, I was able to broaden 
my intellectual horizons to a certain degree. Working in the Pakistan Government gave 
me an inside understanding of the functioning of Third World state machinery and the 
way it interacts with Western powers. However, it limited my understanding as well, 
owing to the proximity error.70 Enrolling for a PhD in Australia allowed me to reflect 
back on my work in the Pakistan Government and my academic studies, in the context 
of deep theoretical readings of postcolonial literature and exploring discourse analysis. 
More importantly, it allowed me to take a neutral stance, helping me to make sense of 
the ‘what’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ of everything that I knew so far. Therefore, my fieldwork 
as a doctoral researcher allowed me to capture in a different way the part of the picture 
that I was unable to see while working in the Pakistan Government. 
1.6.2 Data Collection and Analysis 
This research required a deep-level understanding of the way Pakistan perceives the 
security–development nexus and the politics around it. I was able to use qualitative 
interviews and deep observation of Government meetings and official interactions, as 
well as be part of the daily life of different arms of the Government for a year, which all 
helped to operationalise the research. For the purposes of data collection, I travelled to 
Pakistan and the US between February 2016 and December 2016, both countries in 
which I have had previous academic and professional experience in the security and 
development sector. Given the nature of the research, ethics approval was obtained from 
the Research Ethics Committee of University of Sydney prior to the commencement of 
the fieldwork.  
The thesis relies on extensive primary data collected through face-to-face, in-depth, 
semi-structured interviews in a semi-natural environment, involving key stakeholders in 
 
69  Timothy Pachirat, Among Wolves: Ethnography and the Immersive Study of Power (New York: 
Routledge, 2018). 
70 Working within a large organisation such as the Government of Pakistan leads to good but narrow 
insights on the functioning of the Government. However, one can easily confuse that with an 
understanding of the overall running of the state machinery. Being a researcher that can examine the 
Government from an outside perspective as a whole can help to remedy that. 
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the two countries. Eighty open-ended interviews were conducted with individuals from 
relevant government agencies and departments over the 10 months of the fieldwork. 
The departments were selected carefully, based on two indicators: their relevance to the 
security and development sphere and their significance to US–Pakistan relations. 
Convenience sampling and snowball sampling71 were used to select the interviewees, to 
ensure the sample was highly relevant and focused on the research project. Of the 80 
interviews, 60 were of Pakistani and US government officials, and 20 were civilians 
from both countries. 51 of these interviews were conducted in Pakistan and 29 in the 
United States. 5 interviews in the US were of Pakistani origin people working in the US, 
and 6 interviews of foreigners working in Pakistan were conducted inside of Pakistan. 
Interviews were conducted with former and current high-ranking officials in Pakistan’s 
military, civil bureaucracy and politicians, as well as other commentators (e.g., 
journalists) and the key donor organisations, local-level non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs) and development professionals. In the US, the interviewees included key 
relevant officials of USAID, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the US Congress. 
The table below gives a breakdown of the interview participants.  
 
71 Mark Easterby-Smith, Richard Thorpe and Paul Jackson, Management Research, 4th ed. (London: 
Sage, 2018), 229. 
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Background 
Total 
Interviews 
In Service/Out of 
Service  
Departments  
Pakistan 
Military 
Officials  
 
25 
 
 
 
     9/16 
Military Operations Branch  
Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) 
ISPR  
Military Intelligence 
Pakistani 
Civilian 
Officials  
20       13/7  
      
Ministry of Interior, 
Ministry of Planning, 
Development & Reform Economic 
Affairs Division, Foreign Office,  
PMLN, 
PPP 
PTI  
US 
Government 
officials  
15       7/8  Pentagon 
US State Department 
US Congress  
CIA  
Academics and 
think tank 
experts 
6  -  Johns Hopkins University 
University of Maryland  
United States Institute of Peace 
Quaid-e-Azam University 
Government College University 
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Given that Pakistan’s foreign policy to the US is deeply influenced by Pakistani military 
and intelligence agencies, the thesis heavily relies on their interviews for analysis. 
However, the study makes a conscious effort to ensure that the voices of civilian 
bureaucracy, politicians and even those of the US government officials are incorporated 
at the same time. The interview sample is a good indicator of the intent to have a well-
rounded and diverse data set on the subject. Because of the nature of the topic, many 
direct quotes used are from the military and intelligence officials because of their 
proximity to the subject. However, it is the data from the civil society actors, journalists, 
academics and civilian officials that allowed setting the research question and structure 
of the thesis to look at Pakistan beyond a passive bystander in the nexus debate. 
Therefore, while there may be a fewer direct quotes of the civilians in the thesis, the 
data extracted from the civil actors developed the nuance of identifying Pakistan to have 
co-produced the nexus.  
The second important component of data collection was going through the archives, 
reports and official government documents to match and compare for consistency with 
the interviews collected. In addition, secondary data were obtained through televised 
talk shows, parliamentary and congressional speeches, media sources, newspapers, 
books, journal articles and numerous other open-source outlets, which all helped to 
examine the politics of the security–development nexus under the KLB Act. The mix of 
primary and secondary data collection allowed for grounded analysis at both the 
‘agency’ and the ‘institutional’ level. 
FC College University  
Donors & 
NGOs 
9   -  DFID 
World Bank 
USAID 
NED 
UNDP  
IRI 
 Journalists 5  -  New York Times 
Express Tribune 
Geo Group 
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The data were analysed using critical discourse analysis (CDA), following Fairclough.72 
CDA provides a systemic way of extracting recurring themes from the texts, 
categorising these as discursive types, and allows a more ‘macro’ level of analysis of 
the way the social world is created. This is because CDA offers a fuller analysis of data 
along three levels including textual, discursive practices and social context. This is what 
sets CDA apart from other methods like Qualitative Content Analysis that neglect the 
social context and discursive practices as a way to interpret the data. Given, especially, 
that this study takes security-development nexus as a discourse employed as a tool of 
power in the context of foreign relations between the US and Pakistan, CDA offers the 
most comprehensive method to analyse the data and delve into the nuance of the 
subject. CDA is unique because of its emphasis on power and through text, specific 
words, practices and culture it allows for a deeper examination of power and agency in 
the foreign policy space.  
CDA, therefore, has been used extensively in this study to interpret the KLB Act, policy 
documents of the US government, and data from interviews in the context of the events 
and historical trends to better understand the dynamics of the nexus as not just a 
Western creation but co-produced as much by the recipient countries such as Pakistan. 
Another key characteristic of this semi-grounded approach to analysis is the 
involvement of subjective judgement by the researcher while conducting the analysis. 
Therefore, to make the process more transparent, the source text is quoted as much as 
possible, to put both the researcher and the reader in the same position to interpret the 
text. 
1.6.3 Reflections from the Fieldwork 
My fieldwork allowed me to reflect upon the deep insights that I captured, beyond the 
data gathered through the interviews. These insights are as important as, if not more 
than, the data themselves, because they help to give sense to the data and a complete 
picture of the local voices. 
 
72 Norman Fairclough, Critical Discourse Analysis: The Critical Study of Language (London: Longman, 
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1.6.3.1 Sovereignty is sensitive 
One observation I made was on the subject of sovereignty and the way it is a sensitive 
issue for the people in postcolonial states such as Pakistan. However, the issue of 
sovereignty is paradoxical. The members of the civil–military establishment that I 
interviewed defined sovereignty in a very specific and uniform way, as ‘the ability of a 
state to exert its authority over its people and territory through an independent and 
autonomous policymaking free of Western influence and interference’. 73  It was 
interesting to note that in their definition, the interviewees unconsciously saw external 
influence as being that of the West, more specifically the US and UK, ignoring the fact 
that sovereignty could be breached through other influences from the East, including 
China or India. However, none of the interviewees saw the growing presence of China 
and its ability to manoeuver policies in Pakistan as a threat or an act against that 
country’s sovereignty. In fact, the growing Chinese presence in Pakistan has been 
welcomed and celebrated across the country.74 Even the influence of Indian cinema, 
music and dance (the soft power) did not seem to bother the officials from civil and 
military institutions. To most of the interviewees, the idea of a coloniser was a gora75 
coming from the West; Asian people did not fit into the profile of a coloniser. 
Another interesting observation was that the conversation on sovereignty noted 
heightened sensitivities in Pakistan. For instance, one of the senior civil servants at the 
Economic Affairs Division mentioned:  
For the last 70 years, we are under an illusion that we are truly independent. Truth is 
that we are still ruled by the Western powers through their security and development 
aid. It is not the country that is dependent on aid; it is the Pakistan’s elite that is 
dependent on Western aid.76 
This was further corroborated by a military official that I interviewed who said:  
We never had an independence; we only had a change in masters from the British to 
 
73 Interview with a senior politician of Pakistan, Islamabad, 22 May 2016. 
74 Under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) initiative, China has invested over $60 billion in 
Pakistan in energy, infrastructure and numerous other projects. According to the Government of Pakistan 
estimates, around a million Chinese nationals have arrived since 2013 in Pakistan to work under the 
CPEC agreement. 
75 Gora is a term used for white people. The word literally means ‘fair skinned’.  
76 Interview with a former secretary of Economic Affairs Division, Islamabad, 10 June 2016. 
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the Americans.77  
These responses to the conversation on sovereignty do not come from nowhere. They 
are deeply tied into the region and its people’s historical experiences with, first, British 
colonisation and then, later, in the postcolonial setting, with American hegemonic 
policies throughout the Cold War and more so after the 11 September terrorist attacks in 
the US. Hence, it is no surprise that in my interviews with the officials of civil and 
military institutions of Pakistan, the issue of sovereignty was the main source of anxiety 
with regard to the KLB Act. 
1.6.3.2 The burden of history 
Another important observation I made during my fieldwork, which resonated with 
Meera Sabaratnam,78 was the sense of burden of history on the developing countries. 
For instance, the conversations on sovereignty in Pakistan covered from the British 
colonial era all the way up to the KLB Act. In contrast, my interviews on sovereignty 
with donor officials and officials of the US Government drew ahistorical and shallow 
responses. The US officials were not at all confident in their knowledge of Pakistan, 
which they repeatedly brought to the attention of the researcher during the interviews. 
The lack of in-depth knowledge of Pakistan was attributed to the fact that most of the 
officials had spent only a year in Pakistan, which allowed them to have only a 
superficial understanding of the country. 
Similarly, while the interviews with the officials of the Pakistan Government always 
started with an historical account of US–Pakistan relations and aid, the exact opposite 
occurred in interviews with US and other foreign officials. They could not place US–
Pakistan relations before the 11 September attacks and, in some cases, even before the 
Obama Administration took over the White House and drastically shifted its policy 
discourse over Pakistan. This difference in culture is very important because I believe 
that local actors in Pakistan are able to exert their agency from a position of weakness 
by clutching onto their historical experiences and integrating them into the institutional 
and public memory. Conversely, the local actors saw the suppression of their history by 
the foreign and donor countries as a deliberate attempt to undermine their misgivings 
 
77 Interview with a major general of the Pakistan Army, Rawalpindi, 1 August 2016. 
78 Meera Sabaratnam, Decolonising Intervention: International Statebuilding in Mozambique (London: 
Rowman and Littlefield, 2017). 
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about the past and to present a ‘new start’ to history, with same old exploitive colonial 
techniques under a new name. 
Despite their diverse views, the local actors in Pakistan tended to view the actions of the 
powerful countries through their historic lens, which brought them to the conclusion 
that they were being snubbed by the Western powers. This was particularly prevalent in 
Pakistan, where donor countries tend to discredit local voices that go against the 
colonial discourse as ‘delusional’ and ‘conspiracy theories’. In reality, there is a deep-
level truth in the so-called conspiracy theories, as discussed in more detail in the next 
chapter. For instance, for years the people in the tribal areas of Pakistan complained 
about unidentified flying objects hovering over their skies during the early years of war 
on terrorism. These voices were mocked as being wild conspiracy theories until both the 
US and Pakistan Governments revealed, years later, that the flying objects did exist and 
were actually the drones operated by the CIA inside Pakistan. Similarly, the presence of 
Blackwater, the notorious American private security firm in Pakistan, was a subject of 
controversy and rejected as a conspiracy theory in Pakistan, but was revealed years later 
to have conducted joint operations in Pakistan.79 Essentially, having the sense of history 
and ‘word on the street’ in Pakistan considered a conspiracy theory or irrelevant is 
significant in shaping the national discourse. 
1.6.3.3 Two-sided answers 
One issue that arose from my fieldwork and had a major effect on my research 
questions and the structure of the thesis was the two-sided responses of the 
interviewees. In my initial interviews with the officials of civil and military institutions 
in Pakistan with regard to the KLB Act, they went to great lengths to blame the US for 
attacking Pakistan’s sovereignty by influencing national security policies and meddling 
in civil–military relations. However, in second, and in some cases third, interviews with 
the same officials, I noticed a shift, with another aspect of the KLB Act starting to 
emerge, helping me to frame the question around the level of agency that recipient 
countries like Pakistan are able to exert in terms of co-producing and using the nexus in 
their own favour. For instance, at some point after learning that I worked in the 
 
79 Michael Kugelman, ‘Four Pakistani Conspiracy Theories that are less fictitious than you’d think’, War 
on Rocks, 25 March 2014.  
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Government, eight of the officials suggested that I should have told them earlier so they 
could have provided their candid opinions on the KLB Act. 
I believe this shift and nuance arose not only because of the comfort level developed by 
the officials but also because of their ability to relate to the researcher. In a society such 
as Pakistan, an individual is identified through family bonds, kinship and other 
associations. In my case, when the interviewees discovered that I had a military 
background and had worked in the Government, it was an ‘anchor point’ for them to 
develop the confidence and trust to present opinions that would otherwise not have 
surfaced with individuals with whom they had no common connections. This reveals 
that not only the interview sample but also the researcher’s own positionality has a 
significant effect on the nature of data extracted in interviews and the eventual research 
conclusions. 
1.6.3.4 Feelings of prejudice 
The interviews that I conducted in Pakistan with the officials of civil and military 
institutions revealed a very strong sense of discrimination and prejudice with regard to 
the way Pakistan is depicted and framed abroad. Words like ‘narrative’ and ‘discourse’ 
were repeatedly used to explain the way the conversation regarding Pakistan portrayed 
only negative images of the country. The civil–military officials in more than a dozen 
interviews compared the situation in Pakistan with that of India, suggesting that while 
both countries have similar problems, India is presented in the global media as ‘rising 
India’ and Pakistan is presented as a ‘failed state’. They complained that foreign 
journalists and researchers were only interested in writing about rape, murder, terrorism 
and brutalities in Pakistan and did not want to balance these stories with other good 
things happening in the country. Some of the interviewees suggested that Pakistan has 
recently been talked of as a place that is dangerous for women, yet Pakistan was one of 
the earliest countries in the world to elect a woman prime minister and National 
Assembly Speaker, as well as other important roles in which women have flourished. Of 
course, Pakistan does have issues; however, the officials of civil and military 
institutions complained that by amplifying the problems in Pakistan, Western media and 
academics have created a negative discourse on Pakistan that is reinforcing the dire 
conditions in the country by blocking the foreign direct investment, tourism and 
sporting events in the country that are necessary for economic and social progress. As a 
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result, the civil–military officials felt an automatic need to participate in the discourse 
and to counter it as the ambassadors of the country, from a personal sense of pride in 
presenting the good side of Pakistan. 
These reflections on my fieldwork served a useful purpose in placing the discussion in 
the discussion chapters and giving sense to the ways the government officials thought or 
felt about the security–development nexus. Essentially, they gave a context for 
understanding the voices of the local actors. 
1.7 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis has seven chapters including the introduction and conclusion that explore the 
politics of the security–development nexus. The first is the literature review, which 
exposes Western-centrism as a shortcoming in the critical literature on the security–
development nexus, which this thesis aims to correct through a decolonial approach to 
the subject. The other four chapters are discussion chapters structured around the two 
themes identified through the analysis of the data collected from the fieldwork. The first 
theme examines the security–development nexus in the context of the national security 
policy of Pakistan. The second theme examines the nexus in the context of the civil–
military relations in Pakistan. Each theme has two chapters that answer the two main 
research questions identified in the first section of the introduction: one exploring the 
security–development nexus as a challenge to Pakistan’s sovereignty to serve the 
strategic interests of the US, the other exploring the level of agency that local actors are 
able to exert through the nexus enacted in the form of the KLB Act. This split structure 
helps to explore the politics of the security–development nexus at a deep level by 
examining the way the nexus activates a dialectical power struggle between the donor 
and recipient countries and between the different actors within the recipient countries 
that use the indivisibility of security and development to achieve their own strategic 
interests. 
Chapter 2, ‘Decolonising the Nexus’, seeks to demonstrate the way the literature on the 
security–development nexus, even from a critical standpoint, displays Western-centrism 
in its neglect of the views of recipient countries, treating them as mere objects of the 
nexus rather than active subjects that have the ability to co-produce the nexus. In doing 
this, the chapter argues, the critical literature falls short on two accounts. First, it is 
28 
empirically weak and is thus unable to offer detailed insights on the politics of the 
nexus. For instance, the literature is mute on the way the security–development nexus is 
a challenge to Pakistan’s sovereignty, despite this being the most important issue for the 
local actors in Pakistan. Second, it views recipient countries as being passive actors, 
ignoring their ability to exert agency through the nexus. The chapter identifies ‘the 
neglect of local voices’ as a major gap in the existing literature on the nexus, which this 
thesis aims to cover. This chapter provides the decolonial framework that is used in the 
subsequent chapters to explore the politics of the nexus from Pakistan’s perspective. 
Chapter 3, ‘Not our War’, presents the first part of this discussion, National Security 
Policy. It answers the first question of the thesis (‘In what ways did the KLB Act serve 
the strategic interests of the US and challenge Pakistan’s sovereignty?’) to explore the 
politics of the security–development nexus in detail. This chapter examines the different 
ways the nexus enacted by the KLB Act influenced and dictated Pakistan’s national 
security policies in the war on terrorism. Deploying the decolonial approach developed 
in the previous chapter, this chapter studies the KLB Act in the historical context of 
US–Pakistan relations, instead of solely the post-11 September attacks, through the eyes 
of local actors in Pakistan, using their language and understanding of the world issues. 
The chapter argues that the KLB Act allowed the US to shift the responsibility for the 
war on terrorism and the burden of its blame onto Pakistan, forcing it to become 
Pakistan’s war. Essentially, the chapter shows that taking a decolonial approach to the 
study of the security–development nexus allows deeper insights into the way the US 
used the indivisibility of security and development to influence Pakistan’s national 
security policy to achieve its strategic interests while challenging Pakistan’s 
sovereignty. This nuance is missing in the critical debate because it ignores the 
perspectives of local actors in the recipient countries. 
Chapter 4, ‘Help Me, or Else’, picks up the discussion from the previous chapter to 
answer the second question of the thesis (‘To what extent was Pakistan able to exert its 
agency and mould the KLB in its own favour, from a position of weakness?’), which 
examines the agency of local actors in the security–development nexus. The focus of 
this chapter is the ways Pakistan’s security establishment has been able to use its image 
of being a weak and terror-stricken country, forced to fight the American war, to exert 
its own power. It examines the politics of the security–development nexus in two ways: 
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how Pakistan used its image of being a weak and fragile state to engage the US in a 
long-term relation through the security–development nexus enacted in the form of the 
KLB Act; and how fighting the American war on terrorism, albeit reluctantly, allowed 
Pakistan to benefit in terms of developing its armed forces and military in its power 
balance with India. 
In the light of the discussion in the previous chapter, this chapter argues that Pakistan is 
not a passive actor in the security–development nexus. Instead, it argues that recipient 
countries such as Pakistan play an important role in co-producing the nexus, as enacted 
through the KLB Act. This is why, despite all the outrage with regard to the way the 
KLB Act influences Pakistan’s national security policy, the military establishment 
actually embraced it and used it to its own advantage. It tied Pakistan’s stability to the 
US, knowing that the US would provide the necessary economic and development help, 
modernising Pakistan’s armed forces and playing regional politics at the same time, 
knowing that the US would come to save Pakistan in a crisis with India. In a way, the 
chapter argues that recipient countries such as Pakistan are able to exert their agency 
against the bigger powers, such as the US, from a position of weakness. This nuance 
explains the politics of the nexus at a deeper level than the extant critical literature is 
able to do, from the viewpoint of the recipient countries. 
Chapter 5, ‘Aiding the Civil–Military Divide’, aims to answer the first thesis question 
(‘In what ways did the security–development nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, 
challenge Pakistan’s sovereignty) in the context of civil–military divide in Pakistan?, to 
explore the politics of the nexus. This chapter helps to add depth to the critical literature 
on the security–development nexus, which because of its Western-centrism, fails to 
address the way the nexus challenges a recipient country’s sovereignty through 
interference in its civil–military relations. Hence, by describing the history of US–
Pakistan relations to bring context and triangulating the evidence through the study of 
local voices from Pakistan, this chapter draws attention to the link between the security–
development nexus and civil–military relations in the developing world, adding nuance 
to the critical study of the nexus. 
The chapter argues that the nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, has influenced 
Pakistan’s civil–military relations and this is seen by the local actors in the country as a 
challenge to Pakistan’s sovereignty. This is argued on three levels. First, by drawing 
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attention to the historical pattern of US interference in Pakistan’s civil–military 
equation, the chapter argues that the US influence in Pakistan’s civil–military has a 
recorded history that is otherwise forgotten in the Western discourse. Second, it gives 
evidence of the context of US difficulties with the Pakistan Army after the 
11 September attacks as a precursor to the nexus, enacted through the KLB Act: in other 
words, demonstrating the need to influence civil–military relations in Pakistan. Finally, 
the terms and condition of the KLB Act serve as clear evidence of an overt attempt by 
the US to interfere in Pakistan’s civil–military relations, in its own favour. Essentially, 
the chapter shows the way the KLB Act challenged Pakistan’s sovereignty through 
interference in that country’s delicate civil–military relations, highlighting the politics 
of the nexus. 
Chapter 6, ‘The Road to Civilian Supremacy’, continues the discussion from the 
previous chapter to explore the politics of the security–development nexus at a deeper 
level, to answer the second question of the thesis (‘To what extent was Pakistan able to 
exert its agency and mould the KLB in its own favour, from a position of weakness?’). 
Specifically, it examines the agency of the civilian political government of the PPP 
(2008–2013), which despite severe criticism from opposition political parties and the 
military establishment in Pakistan, embraced the nexus in the form of the KLB Act for 
its own political interests, to balance the civil–military relations in the country. 
By reviewing the history to give context and by studying the voices of local actors, this 
chapter aims to demonstrate that actors in recipient countries such as Pakistan are able 
to exert a great degree of agency in terms of co-producing the nexus and using it to their 
advantage in domestic civil–military affairs, highlighting the politics of the nexus. The 
chapter suggests that the civil–military power struggle in Pakistan has its roots in the 
colonial era and the early history of Pakistan’s security anxieties. It argues that, for 
decades, the Pakistan Army used foreign assistance and international endorsement to 
consolidate its power in the country. The civilian political leadership under the PPP 
government adopted the similar policy after the 2008 elections, the result of which was 
the KLB Act. In doing this, it aimed to exert its own power in the civil–military 
relations of the country. 
The evidence presented in this chapter challenges the critical literature on the security–
development nexus, which views recipient countries as passive bystanders in the nexus 
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debate, reducing them to mere objects of the nexus, insignificant in shaping it. This 
chapter demonstrates how, to the contrary, the nexus in the form of the KLB Act was a 
mutual product of the PPP government in Pakistan and the Obama Administration, with 
both seeing the Pakistan Army as a foe that needed to be contained. For the US, this was 
because of the war on terrorism. The civilian government of the PPP wanted to make its 
own space in an otherwise military-dominated state. 
Essentially, the chapter shows that actors in recipient countries such as Pakistan are not 
mute. They are effective actors that can co-produce the nexus and use it to their own 
advantage in their domestic power struggles against the Pakistan Army. This helps to 
bring nuance to the otherwise Western-centric critical debate on the nexus, which 
ignores the views and agency of the local actors. 
Finally, the conclusion chapter suggests answers to several key questions/assumptions 
related to the security–development nexus debate in the light of the new evidence from 
the data collected. This chapter suggests new avenues and areas of research on this 
subject and draws a link between the findings of this thesis and its significance to 
academic debate and policy work.  
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Chapter 2: Decolonising the Nexus 
 
 
History did not begin when the West started writing it.1 
—Pakistani military official 
 
The power of definition over ‘development’ and ‘security’ also implies power to define 
not only the relevant field of interest, but also the material content of practices, the 
distribution of resources, and subsequent policy responses.2 
—Stern and Öjendal (2010) 
 
Every single empire in its official discourse has said that it is not like all the others, that 
its circumstances are special, that it has a mission to enlighten, civilize, bring order and 
democracy, and that it uses force only as a last resort. And, sadder still, there always is 
a chorus of willing intellectuals to say calming words about benign or altruistic 
empires, as if one shouldn’t trust the evidence of one’s eyes watching the destruction 
and the misery and death brought by the latest mission civilizatrice.3 
—Edward W. Said 
  
 
1 Interview with a major general of the Pakistan Army, Islamabad, 9 August 2016. 
2 Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal, ‘Mapping the Security Development Nexus: Conflict, Complexity, 
Cacophony, Convergence?’, Security Dialogue 41, no. 5 (2010), 7.  
3  Edward Said, ‘A Window on the World’, Guardian, 2 August 2003, 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/2003/aug/02/alqaida.highereducation. 
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2.1 Introduction 
In November 2015, the Government of Pakistan and the United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) hosted a joint roundtable conference in Islamabad on the security–
development nexus. 4  I was one of the panellists included in the discussion. The 
conference had representatives from USAID, DFID, UNDP, the World Bank, the 
United States Institute of Peace (USIP), the Japan International Cooperation Agency, 
the US State Department and British Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials. The 
conference, which lasted for four hours, created more confusion than settlement on the 
exact nature of the nexus. 
There were two problems. First, there was no consensus on the security–development 
nexus, not even on its name and definition. USIP called it a peace-development nexus,5 
British officials called it a stabilisation project, 6  and USAID and the US State 
Department conceived of security and development under the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams (PRT).7  For the Pakistani officials that I interviewed in 2016, the security–
development nexus was a new discourse, indicating the indivisibility of security and 
development, which the donors were strongly advocating at every forum.8 However, 
beyond the basic idea of the security–development nexus, there was diversity of opinion 
even within the actors in Pakistan. The security establishment and opposition political 
parties that I interviewed were suspicious that the nexus was a discourse to talk about 
and define Pakistan in a way that fitted the interests of the Western powers, threatening 
Pakistan’s sovereignty. The civilian government of the PPP saw it as an opportunity to 
strengthen democracy and exert civilian supremacy over the military in the country. 
The second problem was the donor–recipient dissonance on the context, objectives and 
priorities of the security–development nexus. The Pakistani security officials that I 
 
4  I was already in Pakistan for my preliminary research trip and was invited to participate in the 
conference, based on my previous work experience in the Government of Pakistan on the subject of the 
security–development nexus. 
5 USIP helped establish a Peace-Development Unit in the Government of Pakistan, focusing on world 
peace rather than on security. 
6  In 2007, the British Government established a stabilisation unit to support fragile states through 
coordinated security and development efforts. 
7 The PRT was a unit developed by the US Government in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, with the purpose 
of combining military and development efforts in states undergoing conflict or in post-conflict states. The 
PRT included members of the US military, diplomats, USAID officials and members of numerous other 
agencies. 
8 Interview with a mid-ranking official of the Ministry of Planning, Development & Reform, Government 
of Pakistan, Islamabad, 2 August 2016.  
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interviewed were more interested in a nexus that was tailored to serve the national 
security and development interests of Pakistan, as seen through the lens of the officials 
of Pakistan. Essentially, this meant modernising the armed forces of Pakistan and 
assistance with the economic stability of the country. The civilian government was 
interested in development programs that would promote democracy and the credibility 
of the civilian government (e.g., visible projects relating to infrastructure, energy and 
spending on media and NGOs), to change the mindset of the society with regard to the 
civil–military issue. However, the donors, particularly the US State Department, 
concentrated specifically on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) and the FATA region, the 
primary focus for their security concerns in Afghanistan. This Western-centric approach 
to the security–development nexus was problematic for Pakistani Government officials, 
who were frustrated with the US imposing its security and development plans onto 
Pakistan with political agendas, while neglecting Pakistan’s security and development 
concerns. As a result, the actors in Pakistan pushed back and exerted their agency 
whenever they had the opportunity. Thus, the idea that security and development are 
indivisible became politicised, activating a dialectical power struggle between the US 
and Pakistan and within the civil–military actors in Pakistan, who tried to exert their 
agency through the nexus—that is, the politics of the nexus.  
The literature on this subject does not refer to this nuance in the politics of the security–
development nexus, even though questions of sovereignty and agency are so evident on 
the ground in the developing world. Instead, the key critical literature, including that of 
Duffield and Chandler, views the nexus as a Western political construct, seeing the 
recipient countries as passive bystanders that have no agency or ability to co-produce 
the nexus. With that as a starting point, this chapter demonstrates the way the literature 
on the security–development nexus, even from a critical standpoint, displays Western-
centrism in its neglect of the views of recipient countries, treating them as mere objects 
of the nexus instead of active subjects that have the ability to co-produce the nexus. The 
chapter argues that the relevant literature on the security–development nexus falls short 
on two accounts. First, it is empirically weak and lacking in detailed local insights on 
the ways the Western donor states achieve their strategic interests through the nexus, 
threatening recipient countries’ sovereignty in the process. Second, because it views 
recipient countries as passive actors, ignoring their ability to exert agency through the 
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nexus, the literature is unable to explain the politics of the nexus present on the ground 
in a recipient country such as Pakistan. 
The chapter begins with a discussion of Western-centrism to derive key themes that 
help to apply a decolonial approach to the literature on the nexus. This is essentially a 
critique of the relevant literature structured around context, actors, assumptions and the 
language of nexus, to demonstrate the deficiencies in the critical literature. The chapter 
concludes by establishing a decolonial approach for studying the security–development 
nexus, to substantiate the central argument of this thesis: that the politics of the 
security–development nexus is highlighted though a dialectical power struggle between 
the US and Pakistan, in which Pakistan is able to exert its agency in co-producing the 
nexus and using it in its own favour from a position of relative weakness.  
2.2 What is Western-centrism? 
The academic field of international relations, including its theories, teaching and 
research agendas, has often been criticised as being Western-centric.9 However, the 
perpetuation of deep Western-centrism in the literature on international relations and its 
sub-disciplines (e.g., security studies and development studies) remains undiminished. 
What does it mean to suggest that international relations as a study is Western-centric? 
Put simply, it means that the fundamental pillars of international relations as a subject of 
study are based on the West as a model of what constitutes ‘normal’ within the 
international system. In the context of international theory, Hobson argues that Western-
centrism is ‘to parochially celebrate and defend or promote the West as the proactive 
subject of, and as the highest or ideal normative referent in, world politics’.10 Western-
centrism in international relations takes the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) as the defining 
moment giving shape to ideas of sovereignty and secularism. 11  This focus on 
Westphalia, and its attendant emphasis on nationhood, is a product of the social, 
economic and intellectual evolution of the European world, which may be strikingly 
different from that of Eastern civilisations. For instance, in the Muslim world, 
nationhood is merely one form of identity, alongside strong attachments to religion (and 
 
9  See for instance Turan Kayaoglu, ‘Westphalian Eurocentrism in International Relations Theory’, 
International Studies Review 12, no. 2 (2010): 193–217; Branwen Gruffydd Jones, Decolonizing 
International Relations (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006); John Hobson, Eurocentric Conception of 
World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
10 Hobson, Eurocentric Conception, 1.  
11 Kayaoglu, Westphalian Eurocentrism. 
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the transnational umma) and tribe.12 In some cases, even the ideas of nationalism and 
democracy have been challenged by the Islamist movements in the Muslim world.13 In 
reifying the state and the nation, international relations theory marginalises alternative 
perspectives on the nature of global politics. For instance, Francis Fukuyama 
prematurely called the end of the Cold War the ‘end of history’ in the Hegelian sense, 
with no new system likely to emerge to challenge the Western free-market capitalism.14 
Kenneth Waltz’s dismissal of studying international relations from the perspective of 
‘Malaysia and Costa Rica’ is also part of this Western-centrism.15 Of course, we then 
saw the terrorist attacks on the US and around the world as a dismissal of Fukuyama’s 
thesis, but even more, as a revelation of the deeply embedded Western-centrism at the 
highest level of scholarly work in international relations. Essentially, Western events 
and experiences define and set the agenda of mainstream international relations, 
neglecting the co-constitutivity and relevance of the East in shaping the fundamentals of 
international relations.  
Second, Western-centrism takes the West as an exception to the ‘rest’ as a producer of 
knowledge, meaning that the rest of the world, especially the developing world, must 
adopt such influences.16 In a way, Western-centrism can be seen as a form of racism 
that creates a binary relationship between the East and the West, holding the Western 
world as being not just the torchbearer but also intellectually superior to the rest of the 
world. This not only reduces the non-West to being a passive bystander but also 
neglects the co-production of knowledge through the contributions of the East.17 During 
my freshman year in an international relations course at George Washington University 
in the US, this binary relationship was noticeable in that the course was primarily the 
study of Western civilisation as a ‘core’, with developing world states as ‘peripheries’ 
discussed parochially in the context of terrorism, poverty and civil wars. The West was 
where the ideas, changes and progress were made, while the East was seen as a host of 
 
12 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The search for a new Ummah (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2004) 
13 See Vali Nasr, Mawdudi and the Making of Islamic Revivalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1996) 
14 Francis Fukuyama, The end of history and the last man (New York: Free Press, 1989) 
15 Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: Addison-Wesley, 1979), 72. 
16 Immanuel Wallerstein, ‘Eurocentrism and Its Avatars: The Dilemma of Social Science’, Sociological 
Bulletin 46 (1997): 100. 
17 Arlene Tickner, ‘Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations’, European Journal of 
International Relations 19, no. 3 (2013): 627–46. 
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troubles.18 Within the East, the hopeful signs were states that were pushing a Western 
style of democracy, human rights and ethics, while states that resisted and implemented 
an alternative form of governance model (e.g., Iran or North Korea) were quickly 
delegitimised as ‘terrorist’ states. This meant that the dominant conceptions of what 
should be included in the study of international relations and the definitions of security, 
development, anarchy and terrorism were deeply rooted in the Western experience.19 
Essentially, non-Western experience or knowledge is often muted in the study of 
international relations, although there is a growing, broader movement attempting to 
decolonise the discipline.20 This thesis is part of that growing effort to study the local 
voices as active subjects that have the ability to exert agency and co-produce the debate 
on the nexus. 
Third, the study of international relations is Western-centric because it is studied in the 
West by Western scholars that exert a monopoly over the academic discourse, excluding 
the non-Western intelligentsia as having little relevance. The majority of scholars in 
international relations come from ‘core’ countries and, as Tickner demonstrates, have a 
monopoly on teaching, research and publications. To give a snapshot, he quotes the 
TRIP Survey (2011), which showed that over half of the international relations 
academics in the world were located in the US, followed by a large number in the UK, 
Canada and other European countries.21 The same trend exists in academic publishing, 
with more than 80% of publications on the subject between 1970 and 2005 being from 
US-based academics; when other Western countries are included as well, the number 
shows an obvious Western bias in academic publishing.22 A final problem is that to 
make their mark even in their home countries, non-Western academics are pursuing 
their doctoral degrees predominantly in Western academic institutions, reinforcing the 
superiority of Western academia over that of the East. While much of this is simply due 
to finances, as the US has a greater ability to fund PhD fellowships, research grants and 
academic conferences than the rest of the world, an important element is the language 
that is used in the study of international relations. 
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As the study of international relations is predominantly explored in the English 
language, Tickner suggests that the use of specialised language in these studies and the 
form of scholarly writing creates entry barriers in publishing activities. 23  The non-
Western scholars that are able to break down those barriers become more likely to 
engage in Western-centrism in terms of their scholarly writing and analytical styles. 
This is because for non-Western scholars to advance in their academic careers, or 
opportunities to publish in prestigious journals, it tends to be easier if they engage in 
Western-centric discourse, which means possibly compromising on intellectual pursuits 
if they wish to be successful in their fields.  
It should be noted that attempts have been made to decolonise or de-Westernise 
international relations as a theory or discipline. The ample space given to Edward Said’s 
Orientalism in many Western university syllabuses, for example, is evidence of a 
willingness to be self-critical and self-reflective, at least to some degree, about the 
Western-centric nature of international relations. Even so, Western-centrism remains 
deeply embedded in both international relations and its sub-disciplines, such as 
international security and international development. 24  The debate on the security–
development nexus is one example of Western-centrism being so deeply embedded that 
even the critical literature fails to identify it and, instead, remains in the ambit of 
Western-centric debate. Based on the above critique of Western-centrism, the next 
section uses the same four categories to flesh out the Western-centrism in the debate 
around the security–development nexus. 
2.3 Decolonising the Literature 
The literature on the security–development nexus is extensive in its opposition to the 
nexus as a concept, and its supposed objectives as a neocolonial political construct. 
Even so, the debate about the nexus has largely remained captive to a basic fundamental 
challenge to the Western-centrism of the nexus. For instance, while there is an entire 
canon of critical literature in development studies that questions Western-centrism, not 
one study questions the Western context, assumptions and knowledge of the debate 
specific to the nexus, or critiques Western actors that are perpetuating the debate and the 
way the language of the nexus reinforces Western-centrism. The result is that the critical 
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literature on the nexus is not only inadequate but also complicit in perpetuating the 
Western-centrism of the nexus by engaging in the discourse. As Bilgin argues, this 
absence or neglect of identifying the security–development nexus as Western-centric is 
no ‘blind spot’ but rather is constitutive of the nexus.25 
Bilgin makes this point specifically in relation to security studies, where he notes how 
the absence of non-Western insecurities and perspectives has fundamentally shaped the 
entire discipline.26 A similar point is made for international relations theory in general 
by Kang, especially its neo-realist strand. The fundamental premise of neo-realism is the 
existence of a condition of anarchy prevailing between sovereign states, but Kang 
observes that the history of international relations in Asia has more often been marked 
by hierarchy than by anarchy. 27  It is Western (specifically, European) historical 
experience that has been anarchical and violent; inter-state relations in Asia have, for 
most of history, been ‘more hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable’.28 Yet even 
now, international relations theory remains premised on the Western experience of 
anarchy. Further, the major challenges to neo-realism, in the form of liberalism and the 
English School, have been driven by ideas based on Western historical experience as 
well, notably the international institutions built up by Western states after 1945. 
Sabaratnam’s study on decolonising state-building interventions in Mozambique is the 
closest the literature comes to fleshing out Western-centrism in the literature closely 
related to the security–development nexus.29 Sabaratnam focuses on the many ways 
Western interventions in the developing world fail to achieve their stated objectives. 
Moreover, she links these failures to a colonialist mindset, whereby Western donors 
struggle to learn from their mistakes because they perceive themselves as superior to the 
recipient countries. This current thesis draws insights from Sabaratnam’s decolonial 
critique and framework to ‘study up’ the local voices on the security–development 
nexus. Sabaratnam’s work gives historical presence and political conscience to the local 
actors to explore ‘intervention’ in Mozambique. This thesis, therefore, builds on her 
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research and structure to study the local voices on the KLB Act in Pakistan with an aim 
to explore a perspective on the nexus that is more grounded. As for much of the 
literature specific to the security–development nexus, it can be critiqued for Western-
centrism according to the following categories: knowledge/assumptions, context, actors 
and language. 
2.3.1 Knowledge/Assumptions 
The debate on the security–development nexus is structured around several assumptions 
found in the nexus discourse. The first assumption is that ‘security and development go 
hand in hand’ and therefore, ‘there can be no security without development and no 
development without security’, establishing an inextricable link between the domains of 
security and development.30 A policy statement by the Danish Government makes this 
link clear:  
Security is a necessary precondition for development. A contribution to the 
reestablishment of the security and the promotion of peace, in countries and regions 
where there previously was systematic violence, crime and terror, is an investment in 
poverty reduction and growth.31 
The second assumption is that a more ‘secure world is only possible if poor countries 
are given a real chance to develop’.32 The same report states, ‘even people in rich 
countries will be more secure if their Governments help poor countries to defeat poverty 
and disease’. 33  These two quotations underline what Duffield called the 
‘interconnectedness’ of random global events—the notion that underdevelopment in the 
fragile states may affect the security of people in the Western developed world, 
establishing a link between the poverty and security of the global South with that of the 
global North. 34  This assumption about the security–development nexus essentially 
allows Western donor states to justify their direct or indirect intervention in the 
developing states on the pretext of securing themselves from the threats emanating from 
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the developing world. This is spelled out in the US National Security Strategy (2002), 
which argues, ‘The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states, like 
Afghanistan can pose as great a danger to our national interest as strong states’.35 In 
addition, this means that the global North essentially defines the stability, security and 
development of the global South. In other words, this assumed interconnection between 
the security of the global North and the global South is a product of Western 
conceptions of global politics and flows of insecurities, amplified especially through the 
experience of the 11 September terrorist attacks in the US. 
The third assumption is that intervention in underdeveloped states, based on the 
security–development nexus, is mutually beneficial for donor and recipient countries 
and can deliver results on the ground. This is argued by the US National Security 
Strategy, which states, ‘development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-
term threats to our national security by helping to build stable, prosperous and peaceful 
societies’.36 In the 2010 version, development was conceived as a ‘strategic, economic 
and moral imperative in US national security’.37 More clarity comes from the USAID 
Policy Report (2011):  
USAID Missions have developed close relationships with DOD [Department of 
Defense] country level counterparts to jointly plan and coordinate. In Afghanistan, 
joint interventions have been effective when USAID is involved in pre-operation 
planning for quick mobilisation of development resources alongside military 
operations. In many cases, coordinating while identifying distinct roles that maximise 
interagency comparative advantages is key.38  
Similarly, in the report Fighting Poverty to Build a Safer World: A Strategy for Security 
& Development, the UK’s DFID clearly espouses the aforementioned assumption:  
Wars kill development as well as people. The poor therefore need security as much as 
they need clean water, schooling or affordable health. In recent years, DFID has 
begun to bring security into the heart of its thinking and practice. But we need to do 
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more. As the Prime Minister said in his speech to the World Economic Forum this 
year, ‘it is absurd to choose between an agenda focusing on terrorism and one on 
global poverty’. This strategy shows how DFID, through its commitment to fighting 
poverty, can help tackle insecurity among the poor.39 
As with the previous assumptions, this assumption about the ability of the security–
development nexus to deliver mutually beneficial results and achieve positive objectives 
is without much empirical footing. It is based on Western donors assuming that they 
know what is beneficial for the recipient countries and that by enacting the indivisibility 
of security and development that is implied by the nexus, they can deliver positive 
changes on the ground. The major issue here, which is fleshed out in detail in the critical 
literature that is discussed below, is the assumption that the security–development nexus 
is a ‘positive’ construct, seen through the lens of securitisation and neocolonial politics. 
Most of the academic literature on the security–development nexus takes its cue and 
structures from the above assumptions, on both the conceptual and political levels, 
revealing deep Western-centrism through the neglect of the local actor’s voice and 
agency in co-producing the nexus. For instance, the most prominent work on 
conceptualising the link between security and development is that Stern and Öjendal, 
who refer to familiar stories on security and development. They argue the nexus to be 
‘many things’, defined primarily by the actor making claims about the nexus. 40 
Presenting six different narratives to map out the security–development nexus, Stern 
and Öjendal see the nexus as being ‘of the West and by the West’, neglecting the 
narrative of the recipient countries as if they were non-existent actors in the debate. For 
instance, the narrative of recipient countries such as Pakistan, as a postcolonial state 
using the nexus to advance its own security and development goals, does not enter into 
their otherwise useful critical mapping of the nexus. In fact, even in Reid-Henry, a key 
critique of the conceptual work of Stern and Öjendal, agency is specifically attributed to 
the Western donor countries by arguing that Stern and Öjendal’s mapping of the 
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security–development nexus ‘reinforces the way that nexus serves the interests of 
power’.41 
A similar tendency is evident in several other prominent works that attempt to 
conceptualise the nexus, including those of Stewart42 and Tschirgi,43 which provide an 
insight on the conceptual understanding of the nexus. In their attempts to bring clarity to 
the nexus, none of these works sees a requirement to include the views of the recipient 
countries or attribute them any agency in the conceptualisation of the nexus, which is 
ironic for the developing world. For instance, Stewart’s paper on understanding the 
security–development link identifies three possible connections between security and 
development: (1) the effect of security on development, (2) the effect of security on 
non-development issues such as economic growth and (3) the effect of development on 
security. Stewart argues in support of the security–development nexus, saying, ‘conflict 
has heavy development costs, and so that promoting security is instrumental for 
development’ and ‘inclusive patterns of development are an important element in 
avoiding conflict, so that development is instrumental to the achievement of security’.44 
In a reductionist attempt to theorise the nexus, despite her attention to developing 
countries, Stewart’s paper investigates security, development and causes of war through 
Western donor conceptions that are already set, essentially studying the developing 
countries as objects of the nexus, rather than as active subjects that have the ability to 
exert agency and co-produce the nexus. The result of this approach is that Stewart 
ultimately reinforces the Western-centric nature of the nexus. 
Similarly, while Tschirgi’s critique of the security–development nexus takes account of 
the policy debate being multi-layered, causing confusion about how to integrate security 
and development, it excludes the co-constitutivity of the nexus and entirely bypasses the 
fact that developing countries may be as important as the donor states in giving shape to 
the nexus. This is because the study has a narrow focus on evaluating the nexus through 
a donor-specific lens, reducing the debate to a donor policy, institutional and 
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implementation issue. This means it is unable to diversify the voices on the subject by 
including the recipient countries as a subject of the nexus, with the ability to be a 
meaningful part of the nexus discourse. 
This overwhelming attention of the literature on the Western donors as a way to 
conceptualise the nexus is deeply problematic and reflects the Western-centrism of the 
nexus debate. It means that in its exploration of the link between security and 
development, the academic literature mapping the security–development nexus 
embraces the nexus as a conception of the West that has no input from developing 
countries. This thesis aims to challenge that by arguing that the idea that ‘security and 
development go hand in hand’ and underdevelopment in the developing world affects 
the security of the developed states is, in fact, co-produced by recipient countries such 
as Pakistan, which use it for their own advantage, as discussed in the subsequent 
chapters. 
The critical academic literature assesses the security–development nexus on the political 
front by questioning whether the nexus is ‘positive’ or just a neocolonial political 
construct aiming to serve Western interests. It does this by asking ‘the security of 
whom: the global North or the global South’? While these are, indeed, important 
questions, it seems that the answers are obvious and do not require much analytical 
depth. It seems that the policy literature creates its own loopholes, creating a direction 
for the critical debate on nexus to follow. For instance, Duffield views the nexus as a 
manifestation of the global North–South divide, which is designed to provide security 
for the developed North against the underdeveloped South in an era of migration, 
shadow economies, terrorism, disease outbreaks and so on.45 He calls this ‘bio-politics’ 
a new form of racism dividing the world into ‘developed’ and ‘underdeveloped’ states. 
Similarly, Chandler is suspicious that ‘rather than clarity, the security–development 
nexus sets up a framework where any external regulatory or interventionist initiative can 
be talked up by the proposing government or institution as being of vital importance’46 
to hint at the neocolonial politics of nexus. Chandler goes on to describe the nexus as a 
framework for Western powers to shift the responsibility of decision-making to non-
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Western countries from a critical-theory/postcolonial perspective on foreign policy and 
development. Chandler raises the idea of an ‘anti-foreign policy’, a concept that focuses 
on the shift towards non-instrumental and non-strategic policymaking, where ambitious 
policy claims bear little relationship to practice on the ground and policy is driven by 
self-image. According to Chandler, the policy goal is not development or the eradication 
of poverty but the legitimisation of anti-foreign policy, essentially reducing foreign 
policy to a rhetorical level. 
While both Duffield and Chandler are the most prominent critics of the security–
development nexus, and this thesis takes their work as a starting point for exploring the 
politics of the nexus, the role of the recipient countries seems to be irrelevant and 
unnecessary in their works. This neglect of the local actors in their study means they are 
unable to explain the politics of the nexus at a deeper level, as it is enacted in the 
recipient countries. 
Sabaratnam’s critique of Chandler and Duffield is very useful in fleshing out the 
Western-centrism in their work. For instance, she examines the neglect in their work of 
the targets of interventions on two levels: research design and governmentality. With 
regard to the research design, Sabaratnam argues that Chandler and Duffield tend to 
focus on the donor countries and their practices in developing countries, instead of on 
the people in the developing countries. She argues, ‘such projects focused on making 
sense of the genealogies, contradictions and trajectories of intellectual traditions 
associated with the “West” as the key object of intellectual concern’.47 She suggests that 
for Duffield, Chandler and many other critical works on the security–development 
nexus, the actors in recipient countries are irrelevant to the ‘conclusions that the 
research wanted to draw about the West’s relationship with post-conflict 
environments’. 48  On the subject of governmentality, she finds that Chandler and 
Duffield are similar in their focus on the subjecthood of donor countries. She argues, 
‘they both exclude and avoid considerations of the exteriority of this power, and 
particularly the peoples targeted by interventions as political subjects’.49 By placing 
excessive strategic agency and political subjecthood on Western donor countries, 
Duffield and Chandler exhibit what Sabaratnam calls ‘avatars of Eurocentrism’ that 
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amplify the centrality of Western practices while dismissing the non-West as being of 
little importance. This does not undermine the otherwise exceptional critical works of 
Duffield and Chandler, which this thesis builds on to explore the politics of the 
security–development nexus. Rather, this critique of Duffield and Chandler as being 
Western-centric opens up a gap in the critical literature, which allows this thesis an 
entry point to add depth to the literature on the nexus. 
Beyond the neocolonial politics of the nexus, much of the critical literature examines 
the politics of the security–development nexus in the context of securitisation of the 
Copenhagen School. Robert Picciotto, analysing the ‘securitisation’ aspect of the 
indivisibility of security and development, argues, ‘defense will always prevail over 
development’ 50  in such an interaction between the two spheres of security and 
development. Similarly, Beall, Goodfellow and Putzel claim that making the security of 
the global North the principal focus of the security–development nexus may be 
disastrous for the goals of reducing poverty and enhancing global security. They argue, 
‘the trend seems to be that security at home is becoming the overriding priority of both 
[security and development] agendas’.51 Several other volumes include chapters devoted 
to the study of the security–development nexus through a securitisation lens. For 
instance, Mavrotas specifically analyses the nexus in the context of the security 
challenges posed to Western donor states and offers a policy prescription to curb the 
insecurities emanating from developing countries.52 
In most of this critical scholarship on the nexus through the securitisation lens, the focus 
is again on Western institutions, practices, policies and initiatives, without incorporating 
the way securitisation is seen through the eyes of the recipients of the security–
development nexus. This is most evident in Brown and Grävingholt, a volume that 
offers an otherwise exceptional critique of the nexus through a securitisation lens.53 
However, it is narrowly focused on Western donor policy and programming concerns in 
its exploration of the securitisation of foreign aid, entirely omitting the recipients of the 
foreign aid in this conversation. It excludes the local actors in both its research design 
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and its methodology. For instance, the study is structured around the following key 
questions:  
To what extent has securitization changed the way the donor government thinks about 
foreign aid?  
How did the donor use key concepts, such as fragile states and whole-of-government 
approaches, to reflect new perspectives on aid?  
To what extent has securitization modified the distribution of aid, including higher aid 
flows to new priority countries? Has the donor’s main bilateral aid agency been able 
to use security concerns to mobilize additional resources or expand the reach of its 
activities? Or have the new concerns contributed to an instrumentalisation of foreign 
aid, a new justification and means for non-development actors to use aid for other 
purposes? 
In sum, to what extent—and to what effect—has the government promoted and 
enacted the securitization of foreign aid?54 
These questions confine the study to a Western donor angle that is devoid of any voices 
of actors from the recipient countries. This overwhelming attention to the policy and 
practice of the Western donor states is then compounded by the chapters that focus on 
different donor states, such as the US, UK, France and the EU. For instance, Joanna 
Spear’s essay ‘The Militarization of United States Foreign Aid’ examines the 
militarisation of development in the context of US interventions in Afghanistan, 
focusing entirely on the Western donor institutions’ policy and programming level on 
the ground. 55  More recently, Lazell analysed the importance of liberalism to the 
securitisation of development.56  In Lazell’s view, the centrality of liberalism in the 
security–development discourse obscures the way the structural power of global 
capitalism underpins the nexus. Again, this critique is intrinsically Western in nature, 
employing two theories—liberalism and Marxism—that are paradigmatically Western 
in origin, neglecting the co-constitutivity of the nexus through the influence of the 
recipient countries. 
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Even in one of the latest critiques of the securitisation of the security–development 
nexus, Jesperson focuses on investigating what inhibits the integration of security and 
development into a nexus that she believes is more problematic than the dominance of 
security in the nexus. She argues that the critique of the nexus focuses on the outcomes 
of the nexus instead of what contributes to these outcomes. In her attempt to fill this 
deficiency, she explains the tension between security and development across four 
levels: conceptual, causal, institutional and motivational.57 Ironically, in her otherwise 
insightful work on the nexus, the role of the recipient countries in shaping or inhibiting 
the nexus remains entirely absent across these four levels. For instance, when she argues 
that the nexus is not straightforward but is ‘a negotiated and a political process that has 
significant implications’58, she is talking about Western donor institutional tension and 
negotiation, neglecting the fact that local actors in the recipient countries have the 
agency to negotiate and shape the nexus as well. Essentially, Jesperson, like others in 
the critical literature on the securitisation of development, limits the critique of the 
nexus to Western institutions’ policy, practice and implementation, discounting any 
possibility of the nexus being influenced by the recipient countries. 
Fundamentally, in providing a critique of the conceptual and political aspects of nexus, 
the critical literature neglects the deeper question that considers the co-constitutivity of 
knowledge production and ideas—in other words, asking who defines ideas of 
‘insecurity’, ‘underdevelopment’ and ‘threat’. Is insecurity in the so-called ‘fragile 
states’ simply the opposite of what is defined as security in the West? Is 
underdevelopment the opposite of what is considered development by Western 
countries? Even when the critical literature does question the power of definitions and 
concepts, it is limited to examining only Western policy and programming, not how it is 
manifested or understood on the ground. For instance, despite recognising how the 
production of knowledge allows ‘Western discourses to construct the postcolonial as a 
governable object’59 in the context of the security–development nexus, Stepputat shies 
away from bringing the voices of the local actors into the nexus debate. Instead, he 
reinforces the very Western-centrism by narrowly studying the nexus in the context of 
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coherence of security and development policies in the Danish Government, reducing the 
study of the nexus to a Western dialogue.  
McNeish and Lie60 are an exception in the debate on the security–development nexus. 
In their detailed examination of the nexus around its conceptual underpinning, 
neocolonial aspects and securitisation, one of their key contributions is in giving agency 
to the actors in recipient countries in terms of having an ability to resist and manipulate 
the nexus in their own favour. This is most evident in an essay by Jeremy Gould, which 
argues that African political agents are not passive victims of the nexus but rather have 
the ability to exploit it. 61  McNeish and Lie have an anthropological/ethnographic 
approach, using case studies to illustrate the effects of the security–development nexus 
on local-level power structures in developing countries.62 In a way, this thesis is similar 
to the work of McNeish and Lie in terms of demonstrating the level of agency that 
recipient countries such as Pakistan are able to exert in not only co-producing the nexus 
but also moulding it in their own favour to achieve domestic and regional interests.  
With the exception of McNeish and Lie, the critical literature, owing to its neglect of 
local actors being significant in the nexus debate, is essentially a reinforcement of 
Western-centrism through the perpetuation of a debate founded on inaccurate premises. 
This, however, is not an accident. The reason the debate on the nexus suffers from 
Western-centrism is the context, actors and language of the security–development nexus 
discourse. The subsequent sections explore this idea in detail. 
2.3.2 Context 
When the security–development nexus is considered a discourse, the context around its 
rise is very important in helping to identify the Western-centrism in the literature. This 
is because meanings are based on the context and a discourse requires both the 
speech/text and the context in which something is uttered to be understood fully. For 
instance, to say that poverty is dangerous could mean many things: a danger to life, 
good health, social fabric, children’s growth and so on. However, if we say that poverty 
is dangerous in the context of a terrorist attack, the meaning is narrowed down to 
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poverty being a precursor of terrorism. Essentially, the conversation on poverty 
thereafter will be in the context of a terrorist attack. Unless there is an attempt to 
decontextualise poverty from terrorism, to study it independently as a phenomenon of 
its own, the contextual thrust of the terrorist attack will continue to define poverty. To 
give an example of this, the modern discourse on terrorism is closely tied to the idea of 
Islamist radicalism, despite the two being only remotely interconnected. The result is 
that, since the 11 September attacks, Islam has been discussed through the lens of 
terrorism, in a way shaping the debate and identity of Muslims around the world.63 As 
long as the conversation on Islam is not consciously decontextualised from the 
11 September attacks, it will continue to be defined through the parochial lens of global 
terrorism. Hence, the situational context is relevant to understanding what specific event 
triggered and shaped the debate on the security–development nexus, to reveal the 
Western-centrism in its literature.  
While the current debate on the security–development nexus had its basis in the post-
Cold War era, with the rise of a new style of wars across the developing world,64 the 
terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 brought the debate into mainstream policy and 
the academic world, with threats from underdeveloped states becoming a real problem. 
The 11 September attacks changed the world in many ways, not all of them obvious. 
Beyond wars, global security and surveillance, the attacks provided the basis upon 
which modern international relations and much of the conversation on international 
security and international development has developed. This is described in the US 
National Security Strategy of 2002:  
The events of September 11, 2001, taught us that weak states like Afghanistan can 
pose as great a danger to our national interest as strong states. Poverty does not make 
poor people into terrorists and murderers. Yet poverty, weak institutions, corruption 
can make weak states vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their 
borders.65 
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Similarly, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), in its 2005 report, 
stated:  
Canadians cannot be safe in an unstable world, or healthy in a sick world; nor can 
expect to remain prosperous in a poor world. Failure to achieve significant political, 
economic, social and environmental progress in the development world will have an 
impact on Canada in terms of both our long-term security and our prosperity. Security 
and development are inextricably linked.66  
Given that these policy statements were in response to the war on terrorism, and the 
focus on the safety of the US and Canada was central to the issue, Western-centrism is 
evident. Numerous other European countries created similar policy statements after the 
11 September attacks and even more so after the Madrid bombing (2004) and the 
London bombings (2005). Of course, it is only natural that Western government 
documents should focus primarily on the interests of their own citizens. Nonetheless, 
the conflation of security and development, especially when promoted through a 
(naturally) self-interested Western lens, is problematic from the perspective of a 
developing country. 
Essentially, the security–development nexus can be conceived as a product of attacks on 
Western countries, because neither poverty nor underdevelopment is new, and nor are 
terrorism and violence. However, these factors have been dominant features in the 
postcolonial states that were further plunged into war during the Cold War. For 
instance, Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan have always experienced poverty and 
violence, but it took 11 September to make Western powers interested in integrating 
security and development in these countries as a way to achieve stability. In a way, the 
attack on the West gave meaning to the underdevelopment and security issues in these 
countries, thus contributing to the emergence of the security–development nexus. 
Therefore, the solution of addressing the issues of poverty, underdevelopment and 
security in these underdeveloped states is not entirely for their benefit, but has an 
underlying motive of Western security that Duffield,67  Chandler68  and many others 
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criticise in the literature by asking ‘the security of whom?’, as discussed in the previous 
section. 
This means the debate on the security–development nexus is embedded in a larger 
discourse on national security and terrorism as reference points. Hence, the context of 
the nexus and the subsequent policy statements and literature on the subject set the 
parameters and agenda of the nexus discourse. This curtails the ability of the academic 
literature to go beyond the defined boundaries that are set by the policy literature. 
Therefore, the academic literature has to either refine and reconceptualise the security–
development nexus, as in the cases of Tschirgi, Stewart and Stern and Öjendal, or 
criticise it on a basic conceptual or political level, as in the cases of Duffield, Chandler 
Shah, and Brown and Grävingholt.69 Even in the critical literature, such as that by Bjorn 
Hettne, which examines the macro-history of the security–development nexus to explain 
its geopolitical context, the analyses are deeply rooted in Western history.70 Hettne takes 
the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) as a starting point for the evolution of the security–
development nexus, moving through industrialisation, the Cold War, post-Cold War and 
finally the 11 September attacks, to draw attention to the changing nature of the nexus. 
In doing this, however, he neglects the historical accounts of recipient countries and the 
way they have viewed the evolution and rise of the security–development nexus in the 
context of postcolonial states struggling to survive during the politics of the Cold War.  
Therefore, the academic literature has not only failed to decontextualise the security–
development nexus from Western history and events, to understand it as a phenomenon 
of its own, but also has remained prisoner to the agenda and scope defined by the policy 
literature, thereby reinforcing Western-centrism. The result is that after almost two 
decades of conversation on the subject, this debate has not moved much beyond the 
conceptual underpinnings of the security–development nexus and seeing it as a 
neocolonial political construct in terms of the Western donors’ policy, practice and 
implementation. 
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The context of the 11 September terrorist attacks is not the only reason that the debate 
on the security–development nexus exhibits Western-centrism. Given that the very idea 
that there is a nexus between security and development was consolidated in the event of 
an attack on West, it is important to examine the actors involved in the production of the 
nexus and the debate on it, to locate the Western-centrism on the subject. This is 
discussed in the next section. 
2.3.3 Actors 
The debate on the security–development nexus, from the very start, has been driven 
entirely by Western donors, development agencies and Western policymakers. The 
academic literature on the topic is almost entirely produced in the West by Western 
academics who unconsciously reinforce the Western-centrism of the nexus by engaging 
in the debate based on the Western premises. For instance, much of what is published in 
the policy literature comes from the UN, DFID, US National Security Strategies, CIDA, 
and the World Bank Development Report. 71  It makes some sense for the policy 
literature to omit recipient countries from nexus deliberations, given that it is essentially 
a Western exercise. However, it is problematic when even the academic (including the 
critical) literature on the nexus omits the non-Western actors, robbing them of both their 
voice and their agency as subjects of the nexus. This is evident given that none of the 
critical studies, whether early or current, treats recipient countries as subjects of the 
nexus who are important and deserve to be studied as a reference point. As Sabaratnam 
argues, the local voices are either completely mute or assumed by the critical literature 
on the subject.72 This could be because the critical academics studying the nexus are 
also from the Western countries and institutes that unconsciously, given the context of 
the nexus, are constrained by the debate set by the policy literature. That is, the nexus 
has become a conversation between the Western donors, policymakers and academics 
on how to ‘fix’ the so-called ‘fragile states’, without acknowledging the ability of the 
actors in recipient countries to co-produce the nexus. 
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The major critical works on the security–development nexus are by Mark Duffield, a 
former development aid worker who later became an academic at a British university, 
and David Chandler, a critical scholar from a British university. In their critiques73 of 
the security–development nexus, both Duffield and Chandler reduce the recipient 
countries to irrelevant bystanders in the debate. According to Sabaratnam, they do this 
by giving ‘too much strategic agency, intentionality, ideology and purpose’74 to donor 
countries, entirely neglecting the agency and perspective of local actors in the recipient 
countries. Similarly, most of the relevant academics on the security–development 
nexus—including Stern and Öjendal, Stepputat, Hettne, and Spear—are Western 
scholars who have produced and published their works in Western publications, 
including books and special journal articles discussing the West as a referent point and 
making the subject of conversation with recipient countries an afterthought. In doing 
this, they exclude the intellectual ideas of the actors in recipient countries as being 
insignificant in the debate on the nexus. It is worth mentioning that in so many volumes 
and edited books published on the nexus, including those of Spear and Williams, 
Beswick and Jackson, and Brown and Grävingholt, there is not one effort to study the 
nexus through the lens of the local actors in the recipient countries. For instance, Spear 
and Williams clearly indicate this aspect by acknowledging that most of the authors in 
the volume are ‘currently based in Washington DC’ and that as part of its methodology, 
the study brought together practitioners from international institutions, academics and 
‘think tankers’, essentially to have a dialogue on the nexus. Brown and Grävingholt 
undertake this exclusion of actors in recipient countries through a parochial study of the 
nexus in the context of Western donor states, including the US, UK, France, Japan and 
Canada, which essentially makes the non-Western actors of the recipient countries 
irrelevant in the debate. The result of this exclusion of recipient country actors is the 
inability of the scholarly literature to diversify and deepen the prevalent understanding 
of the nexus, from a Western donor construct to a more sophisticated understanding of 
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the nexus being co-produced through an interaction of Western donor and recipient 
countries.75  
The result of this overwhelming presence of Western actors generating and steering the 
debate on the security–development nexus is that recipient countries are treated as 
objects of the nexus and not studied as subjects, as Sabaratnam indicates in her study, 
noting the way recipient actors are bypassed in both research methods and 
governmentality.76 They are either completely ignored by the academic literature or 
their views are simply assumed, indicating the irrelevance of their voices and 
understandings on the subject. The recipient countries are not considered important 
actors and nor is there any agency attributed to them, even in the academic literature. 
This total neglect of non-Western and recipient countries’ perspectives by serious 
academics on the nexus makes the literature deeply Western-centric, unable to dig 
deeper into the politics of the nexus or to reflect nuance. 
2.3.4 Language 
The Western-centrism of the literature on the security–development nexus is rooted in 
its Western context and the actors involved. In addition, the technicality of the language 
of the nexus and the jargon used creates restrictions on who can speak and write about 
it. Language is the key to identifying Western-centrism in the debate on the nexus. The 
very fact that most of the material on the nexus is in English is problematic in terms of 
increasing the barriers that block scholars in the developing world from engaging in the 
debate. Further, ‘language’ generally means a lot more than simply linguistics. As 
Fairclough notes, 
Social phenomena are linguistic, on the other hand, in the sense that the 
language activity which goes on in social contexts (as all language activity does) 
is not merely a reflection or expression of social processes and practices, it is 
part of those processes and practices.77 
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Language, in other words, is a power in the way it creates reality, gives meaning to 
things and, more importantly, defines ‘literacy’ in the subject. For instance, I argue that 
the nexus is Western-centric because, as a discourse, it has a specific technical language 
and jargon that must be learned or adopted to be able to write about the nexus, even 
from a critical standpoint. In addition, emerging scholars and those aiming to evaluate 
the nexus must abide by certain criteria in the debate on the nexus: for instance, 
agreeing to its basic context and conceptions of security, development and politics, 
which are deeply rooted in Western experiences.  
This means that the critical literature on the security–development nexus is only critical 
to certain defined limits that are permitted in the debate on the nexus. Beyond those 
limits, the critical literature fails to address its deep-rooted Western-centrism. This is 
reflected in the critical scholarship of Duffield, Chandler, Shah, Spear, and many others 
mentioned in the previous sections, who conform to not only certain technical, stylistic 
and other aspects of writing about the nexus but also its context, definitions and 
assumptions. For instance, the continued use of terms such as ‘nexus’ and ‘fragile 
states’, which do not have conceptual clarity, is standard. Similarly, although the idea of 
‘no security without development and no development without security’ is a subject of 
critique, almost every study on the subject uses it as a starting point.  
To conduct a critique that is accepted by the journals and is publishable, the critical 
literature has to engage with the specific language of the nexus. In doing this, the 
critical literature provides an acceptable critique on the conceptual and political aspects 
of the nexus, but the essential critique of identifying the nexus as being Western-centric 
in its context, actors, knowledge and language is missing. Thus, the academic literature 
fails to explain the politics of the nexus present on the ground in Pakistan.  
This study is slightly different in that it recognises the prevalent Western-centrism and 
the difficulty of entirely overcoming it. Through a decolonial approach, which is 
discussed in detail in the next section, this study makes a conscious effort to bring out 
an understanding of the politics of the nexus beyond the binary trappings of East and 
West that undermine the academic debate on the subject. It acknowledges the co-
constitutivity of the nexus, which allows for a more sophisticated and deeper level 
understanding. 
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2.4 Framework for Studying the Nexus 
The discussion thus far has shown that the Western-centrism means that the literature on 
the security–development nexus has been based on the Western context of the 
11 September terrorist attacks and the voices of the global South have been neglected in 
the study of the nexus, which is overwhelmingly dominated by Western donors, 
policymakers and academics. This means that the knowledge produced is based on 
Western conceptions of security, development and politics, without acknowledging the 
co-constitutivity of the nexus. In addition, the critical literature has developed a specific 
language regarding the nexus that reinforces its Western-centrism. Acharya correctly 
points out that the prevailing Western-centrism in international relations means it is very 
challenging to redress this problem and move forward.78 Building on the decolonial 
approach and taking cues from both Acharya 79  and Sabaratnam 80  in developing a 
strategy to study nexus, this thesis is based on three approaches. First, it 
decontextualises the nexus from the 11 September terrorist attacks as a reference point 
and retrieves the local history by examining the KLB Act within the larger US–Pakistan 
relationship history. Second, to treat the recipient countries as subjects, it relies on 
interviews with local actors in Pakistan and their stories on how they see the world and, 
more specifically, the security–development nexus. This inclusion of local actors in the 
methodology gives the Pakistan subjecthood that helps to flesh out its agency in co-
producing the nexus and using it to their advantage. Finally, this thesis strives to reduce 
the influence of politically connoted Western terms and concepts that reinforce the 
Western-centrism of the nexus, by incorporating terms, concepts and their 
understandings as used by actors in Pakistan. 
2.4.1 Reviewing the Local History 
The KLB Act is a product of the US war on terrorism, and naturally, its reference point, 
scope, major assumptions and objectives are based on the 11 September terrorist 
attacks. This means that the current studies on Pakistan, whether from the perspectives 
of security, development or foreign policy, have a particular post-11 September Western 
context. From the postcolonial perspective, this is reflective of the imperial strategy to 
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rule the developing world by suppressing the local history and rendering it irrelevant to 
the historical and political questions of the day.81  This has been a major problem, 
because for the civil–military leadership in Pakistan, the way to examine the KLB Act is 
not in a vacuum or pivoted on the 11 September terrorist attacks. It is seen as a 
historical continuity of the US transactional engagement with Pakistan throughout the 
Cold War, which influences their entire perception and objectives, based on their 
institutional memory. 
For instance, when pursuing research in the developing world, I have noticed that while 
there may be no official record keeping and sophisticated mechanism to ground their 
policies, institutional and public memories are passed on through oral traditions, which 
gives the locals a strong sense of historical presence when it comes to policymaking. 
Essentially, the narratives serve as institutions that allow continuity of policies despite 
changes in governments. One strong narrative in Pakistan is to view the US and its 
foreign assistance with deep suspicion and as being behind all major upheavals in the 
country. This narrative is rooted in Pakistan’s disappointment over the US failing to 
help Pakistan in its war with India in 1965 and 1971, which has become the 
fundamental lens for viewing its relations with the US. By clutching on to the historical 
experience with the US and using it as a discursive power, Pakistan yields its agency in 
its relations with the US. One of the former Pakistani ambassadors to the US 
commented as follows:  
One of the key foreign policy strategies of Pakistan is to keep reminding the US of its 
past blunders. There is a tendency in the bigger powers to abuse their relations with 
smaller powers and then move on, expecting a reset every time. As a smaller power, 
therefore, we rely on historical experience as a source of strength both in terms of 
crafting the policy and practising diplomacy with the US.82 
This idea that keeping local historical experience alive in a bilateral relations with the 
US gives smaller powers a potent force was expressed in various ways across the 
interviews I conducted with officials of civil and military institutions in Pakistan. While 
these historical narratives and knowledge are sometimes snubbed as ‘conspiracy 
theories’ by the West, on the ground, they provide a real framework for understanding 
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the past, present and future of the events happening around the world. This is discussed 
more in the next section.  
In contrast, US engagement with the developing world is based on short-term memories. 
For instance, one of the senior US policymakers that I interviewed in 2016 noted, 
‘Pakistan is still stuck on its grievances with US from the Cold War, while the current 
US Congress cannot even remember the Salala attack of 2011’.83 This tendency to have 
a short-term memory serves well in suppressing the developing world’s history, 
perspective and grievances and, instead, pursuing a ‘reset’ of relations every few years 
to activate the same old neocolonial tactics under different labels. The KLB Act is one 
such program that was originally earmarked as a ‘new deal’ but actually appears to 
serve the same American hegemonic interests in the region, as discussed in the 
following chapters. 
In its attempt to contextualise the security–development nexus and recover history, this 
research studies the KLB Act in the context of US–Pakistan relations as a whole, not 
just through the lens of the 11 September terrorist attacks. This is because the 
conversations in Pakistan on the subject have different reference points in history, 
which truly help to bring about a more nuanced and historical understanding of the 
nexus in the form of the KLB Act. For this reason, each discussion chapter begins with 
a brief review of the relevant history of US–Pakistan relations or civil–military 
relations, as part of the decolonial approach to the study of the nexus. This strategy is 
more effective in bringing analytical rigour to the chapters than an approach of having a 
full historical background chapter at the start, but disconnected from the rest of the 
thesis, would be. 
2.4.2 Studying the Local Actors 
The issue of Western-centrism is not so much that the West is the starting point of 
history but that its centrality distracts the nexus debate from the contributions and 
voices of non-Western actors. As shown in the previous sections, almost all of the 
literature on the nexus, even from a critical standpoint, treats the actors in recipient 
countries as bystanders, or mute, with no agency to co-produce or use the nexus 
themselves. Instead, the focus is entirely on the agency of donor countries as the only 
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important actors in the nexus discourse. This is consistent with postcolonial critique, 
which sees the de-politicisation of non-Western actors as a product of colonial practices 
of stripping locals of their agency.84 In addition, it is consistent with numerous other 
variations of postcolonial thought that reduce the locals to being ‘savages’ or 
‘barbarians’ and their voices as being ‘conspiracy theory’ that are of no significant 
value and consequence.85 Akhtar and Ahmad review this seclusion of the local voices 
through a sympathetic treatment of the conspiracy theory phenomenon in Pakistan that 
is otherwise rejected by Western scholars. They interpret conspiracy theory as a serious 
critical discourse that does not conform to the liberal norms of statehood and that ‘seeks 
to explain history with reference to global and domestic material forces, interests and 
structures shaping outcomes’.86 Akhtar and Ahmad argue that conspiracy theories in 
Pakistan provide a ‘radically different view of Pakistan from that of being either a 
“failure” domestically or a “headache” for Washington and the international 
community’.87 Therefore, they argue that to dismiss the intuition of the Pakistani public 
as delusion or conspiracy theory is ‘equivalent to telling millions of people they know 
nothing of a war they are experiencing first hand’.88  This silencing of the East by 
rejecting their voices as non-scientific, delusion or conspiracy theory is a common 
theme of the postcolonial literature that helps us to examine nexus, in the words of 
Derek Gregory, as the colonial present.89 This assessment is important for this thesis in 
terms of seriously studying the history and voices of the local actors and not totally 
rejecting them as being insignificant in shaping the nexus. 
As the empirical evidence from the KLB Act in the discussion chapters suggests, 
recipient countries such as Pakistan have the ability to co-produce the security–
development nexus and exert agency from a position of weakness to extract benefits for 
its regional interests out of the West’s dependency on Pakistan. Therefore, to explore 
the politics of the nexus, the methodology in this study includes the actors in the 
recipient countries, their experiences and their stories, including those that are often 
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rejected as conspiracy theories. This gives what Sabaratnam calls ‘political 
consciousness’90 to the local actors and helps towards the objective of achieving a non-
Western understanding of the nexus. 
2.4.3 Language 
Frantz Fanon’s Wretched of the Earth notes the colonial use of language and vocabulary 
to create a ‘master–slave’ relationship between colonial powers and locals. Language, 
knowledge production and power are dominant interlinked themes of postcolonial 
studies, as extensively discussed by Fanon, Said and Foucault. Yet the language has 
continued to display and reinforce Western-centrism across disciplines, creating 
hegemonic discourses. In the context of the security–development nexus, its Western 
conception by Western actors sets its agenda, scope and language, reinforcing the 
already existing social binaries of ‘us vs them’, ‘developed vs underdeveloped’ and 
‘civilised vs savages’, basing knowledge and ideas on misconceived Western 
assumptions that neglect the co-constitutivity of the nexus. The centuries of Eastern 
characterisation through the lens of the West makes it difficult to study the nexus as a 
completely non-Western phenomenon. The language used for this thesis (or any other 
study) is English, and the institutions, research methodology and frameworks are rooted 
in the Western interaction with the East in which the West is perceived to be 
intellectually superior and scientific. 
In my attempt to study the security–development nexus through a decolonial approach 
that transcends the ‘East–West’ binary, to understand the nexus as being co-produced 
through an interaction between the developing and developed states, I incorporate the 
language, concepts and definitions of local actors on security and development, to 
enrich the study of the nexus. This approach brings non-Western vocabulary into the 
debate on the security–development nexus, bringing about more nuance and diversity in 
our current understanding of the nexus. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The discussion in this chapter has achieved multiple goals. First, it has revealed the 
Western-centric nature of the literature on the security–development nexus, using 
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context, actors, knowledge and language as categories. It has argued that the nexus is 
Western-centric because it pivots on the 11 September terrorist attacks as a context for 
Western donors and policymakers. As a result, dominant conceptions and knowledge on 
the subject, including terms and definitions of security, development and politics, have 
been conceived by the Western donors, without recognising the co-constitutivity of the 
nexus. This, in a way, creates a specific language of the security–development nexus 
that further reinforces Western-centrism. This chapter has argued that the academic 
literature sees the voices and agency of non-Western recipient countries as being 
insignificant. This makes the literature inadequate in explaining the way the recipient 
countries see the nexus as an attack on their sovereignty, as well as the extent to which 
recipient countries are able to co-produce the nexus to use it to their own advantage.  
In this study, this deficiency is curbed by creating a decolonial framework and a 
strategy to study the KLB Act as an enactment of security–development nexus discourse 
that requires decontextualising the nexus from the 11 September attacks and studying it 
in the historical context of the US–Pakistan relationship. In addition, to understand their 
agency, the methodology integrates the voices of local actors in Pakistan and in the 
process, uses terms, concepts and non-technical language that are reflective of the its 
understanding of the security–development nexus. The discussion chapters that follow 
use these strategies to explore the politics of the nexus in depth and, in the process, both 
expand and challenges the critical literature on the nexus.  
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Chapter 3: Not Our War 
 
 
Development reinforces diplomacy and defense, reducing long-term threats to our 
national security.1 
—US National Security Strategy (2006) 
 
Aid cripples the country ... It enslaves the country. You are dictated decisions from 
abroad.2 
—Imran Khan, Chairman, PTI on the KLB Act 
 
By signing the KLB Act the government has given America the power to define Pakistan 
and dictate our national security policies.3 
—Fazal ur Rahman, Member National Assembly of Pakistan 
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3.1 Introduction 
In a recent speech outlining his Afghanistan and South Asia policy, US President 
Donald Trump saved his harshest words for Pakistan. Washington, he said, ‘can no 
longer be silent about Pakistan’s safe havens for terrorist organizations … We have 
been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars at the same time they are housing 
the very terrorists we are fighting. But that will have to change.’4 The notions that the 
US has provided Pakistan with billions of dollars in security and development 
assistance without getting a ‘bang for its buck’ and that Pakistan needs to ‘do more’ on 
terrorism are not new. They started taking shape at the end of the GW Bush 
Administration, when the US faced losses in the Afghan War. It became more robust 
during the Obama Administration, which provided Pakistan with $7.5 billion of 
development assistance through the KLB Act, expecting a change in Pakistan’s 
behaviour regarding terrorism. For its part, over the years Pakistan has constantly 
complained about the US pressure to do more, noting that Pakistan has delivered and 
suffered the most in the war on terrorism, at the expense of its sovereignty and stability. 
This chapter of this thesis takes the ‘do more’ and ‘no more’ discursive struggle 
between the US and Pakistan as a starting point for exploring the politics of the nexus. 
To do this, it attempts to address the first question of the thesis, ‘In what ways did the 
KLB Act, as an enactment of the security–development nexus, serve the strategic 
interests of the US and challenge Pakistan’s sovereignty?’  
Deploying the decolonial approach developed in the previous chapter, this chapter 
begins by studying the KLB Act in the historical context of US–Pakistan relations, 
instead of solely post the 11 September attacks, and through the eyes of local actors in 
Pakistan, using their language and understanding of world issues. This helps to deepen 
the critical literature on the security–development nexus, which otherwise neglects the 
voices of local actors on the subject. With that as a framework, the sections that follow 
then demonstrate how the security–development nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, 
has acted as a powerful discourse that allowed the US to influence Pakistan’s national 
security policy, challenging its sovereignty in the process—a reflection of the politics of 
the nexus. In doing this, the KLB Act has allowed the US to shift onto Pakistan not only 
the responsibility of fighting the war in Afghanistan but also the burden of its own 
 
4 White House, ‘Remarks by President Trump on the Strategy in Afghanistan and South Asia’ (Fort Myer, 
Arlington, VA, 21 August 2017). 
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failure. This has been achieved on three levels. First, the indivisibility of security and 
development under the KLB Act has given the US power over defining Pakistan 
through geopolitical cartography, which is essentially the colonial reconfiguration of 
geographical boundaries at the discursive level. Second, through the ‘hearts and minds’ 
approach, the US shaped the discourse on Pakistan with an aim to force a change in its 
national security policy. Lastly, the KLB Act has imposed certain conditions on 
Pakistan that have directly influenced its national security policy to serve American 
interests in the region. 
However, despite all the criticism of the KLB Act being a challenge to Pakistan’s 
sovereignty, the military establishment in Pakistan accepted it for its vested interests. 
This forces us to look deeper into the politics of the nexus and the level of agency that 
local actors are able to exert through the KLB Act. This is discussed in detail in the next 
chapter, which explores the ways that the US idea that ‘security and development go 
hand in hand’ and that security of the global North is linked to the development and 
security of the global South influenced the national security policy decisions of 
Pakistan. That chapter shows that by studying the security–development nexus in terms 
of the historical context and the perspective of local actors, deeper insights into the 
politics of the nexus are available, adding nuance that is otherwise absent in the 
Western-centric debate on the subject. 
3.2 Neither Friend nor Foe 
One consistent aspect of the US–Pakistan interaction is the inconsistency of the 
relationship, which can be seen clearly in a sine graph of US foreign assistance to 
Pakistan (see Figure 3.1).  
66 
 
Figure 3.1 US Foreign Assistance to Pakistan5 
The graph in Figure 3.1 shows three spikes in US foreign assistance to Pakistan during 
the years it needed Pakistan’s support in the Cold War and after the 11 September 
attacks and a complete elimination of assistance when the services of Pakistan were no 
longer needed. This inconsistency reflects the non-strategic and ‘clientelistic’6 relations 
between the two countries, pivoting on a US military and security objective.7 During the 
Cold War, US–Pakistan relations revolved around the Soviet Union, and after the 
11 September attacks, Afghanistan and the war on terrorism became the focus of US–
Pakistan relations. For the civil–military establishment in Pakistan, this third-party-
centred US–Pakistan relation has been a constant source of anxiety. One senior military 
official that I interviewed commented:  
 
5 Source: US Overseas Loans and Grants: Obligations and Loan Authorizations (aka the Greenbook) 
6 Christophe Jaffrelot, Pakistan at the Crossroads: Domestic Dynamics and External Pressures (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 2016). 
7 Hamza Alavi, ‘Pakistan US Military Alliance’, Economic and Political Weekly 33, No. 25 (1998): 
1551–57. 
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For over 70 years, Pakistan has tried to develop an exclusive friendship with the 
United States that is not contingent upon global wars. But for 70 years, the US has 
continued to engage Pakistan as a close ally, providing security and development 
assistance … when it has a military interest and isolating Pakistan when it no longer 
needs it.8  
This ambivalent sentiment towards the US, and its foreign assistance, has been 
reinforced by two historical episodes: the US failure to support Pakistan during its two 
wars with India in 1965 and 1971, 9  and the abrupt withdrawal of the US from 
Afghanistan after the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan. In 1990, Pakistan’s 
distrust of the US deepened after economic and military sanctions were imposed on 
Pakistan over its nuclear enrichment program, under the Pressler Amendment. While 
relations were restored out of necessity by the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 
following the 11 September attacks, mistrust over the strategy and scope of the war 
developed immediately.10  Pakistan’s government and military supported the US-led 
coalition’s effort to destroy al-Qaeda, but saw the Taliban as legitimate ‘son of the soil’ 
who were needed to bring stability in Afghanistan. 11  The Pakistan military grew 
frustrated with the unwillingness of the US to strike a political deal with the Taliban 
early in the war in Afghanistan and then felt abandoned once the Bush Administration 
shifted its focus from the war in Afghanistan to the invasion of Iraq. In an interview 
with me, a senior military official of Pakistan complained:  
The US thought it could win the war through military means, ignoring that all wars 
must have a political end. Not only did the US not strike the deal at a right time, 
worse, it ventured into a new war in Iraq, leaving Pakistan to deal with the growing 
mess of terrorism in Afghanistan. We then did what we had to in order to protect our 
interests.12  
The aforementioned view was widely shared among the Pakistani state officials 
interviewed for this thesis, and reflected evidently in publications from the military run 
 
8 Interview with a serving lieutenant general of the Pakistan Army, Rawalpindi, 16 June 2016. 
9 Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics (Cambridge: Harvard 
Press, 2014).  
10 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan & Pakistan, 2001–2016 
(New York: Penguin, 2018). 
11 Coll, Directorate S. 
12 Interview with a former director general of the ISI, Islamabad, 3 August 2016. 
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National Defence University in Islamabad13 that saw the US as a reckless power with a 
history of destabilising foreign countries through both direct intervention and indirect 
intervention based on foreign aid. This sentiment runs so deep in Pakistan’s civil–
military establishment that it limits its willingness to cooperate with the US. Of the 45 
interviews that I conducted with Pakistani officials, only one senior military official saw 
the US as a positive player in the region or as an actor that could be trusted. In fact, the 
interviews revealed a serious fear within the Pakistani civil–military establishment that 
Pakistan will end up with the same fate as Iraq or Syria, because of the American belief 
that its security is linked to the security and development of weak countries (i.e., the 
security–development nexus).14 Commenting on the growing instability in the region, 
one senior military official said, ‘The last thing we want to see is the US turning 
Pakistan into another Iraq.’15  
Another concern that came out of interviews with intelligence officials was a fear that 
the US was applying ‘chaos theory’16 through the nexus in Pakistan to destabilise the 
country to a point where intervention to destroy Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, a 
technological accomplishment prized by both the Pakistan military and the Pakistani 
people, might be rendered justified. 
The above sentiments, at times highly exaggerated, were prevalent throughout the civil–
military establishment. It developed through Pakistan’s historical interactions with the 
US and help to contextualise why the local actors in Pakistan see the security–
development nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, as an attack on Pakistan’s 
sovereignty. This historical contextualisation is important in countering the foreign 
commentators, academics and policymakers’ perception of local voices and perspectives 
 
13 Musarat Amin & Rizwan Naseer, ‘Pakistan-US Mistrust and Regional Security Challenges in South 
Asia: A Prolonged Indecisive Futile War Seeks End’, Margalla Papers, 2013.  
https://www.ndu.edu.pk/issra/issra_pub/articles/margalla-paper/Margalla-Papers-2013/07-Pakistan-US-
Mistrust.pdf 
14 This view is prevalent in the civil–military establishment and within the public of Pakistan, which sees 
a pattern emerging with events in Iraq, Libya and Syria, all of which are seen as part of the US’s slow 
plan to destabilise and create havoc in the Muslim world. 
15 Interview with a brigadier in the Pakistan Army, Islamabad, 10 June 10 2016. 
16 I asked the officials to explain what they meant by chaos theory. To them it was a strategy of artificially 
creating a state of chaos in a country to ‘bring it to the brink’, to achieve policy goals. For some of the 
civilian officials, chaos theory was applied in Pakistan not only by the US but also by Pakistan’s own 
security establishment, to bring about a change in government.  
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as being conspiracy theories.17 Retrieving the diversity within the local history reveals a 
pattern of US engagement and tactics with Pakistan that gives their perspectives 
credibility, to be studied seriously rather than rejected outright. The subsequent sections 
examine the way the nexus, as enacted through the KLB Act, has challenged Pakistan’s 
sovereignty by influencing and dictating Pakistan’s national security policy decision—
that is, the politics of the security–development nexus.  
3.3 Reconfiguring Pakistan 
Pursuing research in a developing world reveals a perspective of the locals that is 
radically different to that of the officials working in the ‘ivory towers’ of the West. For 
instance, when I asked my interviewees in the US about the US image in the world, the 
responses were mostly linked to America’s ability to exert its power, and maintain its 
economics and its political influence. However, asking the same question of my 
interviewees in Pakistan highlighted a completely different set of issues. The way 
Pakistan was seen globally affected the country in many serious ways, such as the 
ability of its people to apply for student, business or tourist visas, as well as the effects 
on national confidence and the local economy in terms of tourism and holding sporting 
events in the country, among others.  
One major concern raised by the interviewees from the civil–military establishment was 
the way the security–development nexus enacted through the KLB Act was a powerful 
discourse that not only allowed the US to define Pakistan in a way that served the US 
national interests but also challenged Pakistan’s sovereignty and stability through its 
influence on the nation’s security policy. To test this argument for validity, I examined 
the contents of the KLB Act. From the beginning, the KLB Act has shaped the 
conversation on Pakistan by stating:  
(5) The struggle against al Qaeda, the Taliban, and affiliated terrorist groups has led 
to the deaths of several thousand Pakistani civilians and members of the security 
forces of Pakistan over the past seven years.  
And:  
 
17 Aasim Sajjad Akhtar and Ali Nobil Ahmad, ‘Conspiracy and Statecraft in Postcolonial States: Theories 
and Realities of the Hidden Hand in Pakistan’s War on Terror’, Third World Quarterly 36, no. 1 (2015): 
95. 
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(7) The security forces of Pakistan have struggled to contain a Taliban-backed 
insurgency … 
And therefore:  
(8) On March 27, 2009, President Obama noted, ‘Multiple intelligence estimates have 
warned that al Qaeda is actively planning attacks on the United States homeland from 
its safe haven in Pakistan’.18 
The above clauses reflect the fundamental assumption of the nexus that the ‘security of 
the global North is tied to the security of the global South’. For instance, by first 
attributing the failure to act against terrorism, the US presents Pakistan as a vulnerable 
partner in need of support. Second, by suggesting that al-Qaeda was planning an 
imminent attack on US soil from Pakistan, the US securitised the conversation on 
Pakistan, allowing itself to pursue unprecedented measures to protect the US, which, in 
addition, required Pakistan to adopt national security policies that were in the interest of 
the US. This was evidenced by the conditions attached to the KLB Act, which required 
Pakistan to give US access to its nuclear program and cut support to the militancy not 
only in Afghanistan but also in India.19 Therefore, through initiatives such as the KLB 
Act, the US forged a framework to help Pakistan that, in reality, allowed the US an 
entry point to influence the national security policy of Pakistan, to ensure the security of 
the US. One Pakistani politician that I interviewed on the subject said:  
When we allow America to define who we are, what Islam is, and what our culture is, 
then it is only a matter of time before we start looking at ourselves through the 
American lens. We have the country and the territory but not the sovereignty to define 
ourselves globally and also domestically to our own people.20  
This power over definition through the KLB Act, according to Fazal ur Rahman in his 
speech to the National Assembly of Pakistan, created a powerful discourse that 
developed a view of Pakistan as being a weak and dysfunctional state, meaning the US 
should expand its footprint in Pakistan as a matter of urgency.21 
 
18 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), (§) 3. 
19 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), (§) 302. 
20 Interview with the Senator of Pakistan, Islamabad, 8 April 2016. 
21 Fazal ur Rahman, Member National Assembly of Pakistan (speech, National Assembly of Pakistan, 
Islamabad, August 2009). 
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The data collected from my fieldwork in Pakistan identified the US as redefining the 
discourse on Pakistan through the KLB Act in two ways. First, it redefined Pakistan’s 
political mapping away from being part of South Asia, a growing economic region, 
along with India and Bangladesh. Instead, it grouped Pakistan with Afghanistan, a 
dysfunctional state with a long-standing tribal political culture and experiencing decades 
of war. Second, through its ‘winning hearts and minds’ strategy as part of the nexus, the 
US influenced the discourse in favour of its national interest by funding the media 
houses, NGOs and even the religious madrassahs in Pakistan. For instance, the US State 
Department provided $36,607 in 2009 to Sunni Ittehad Council, a right-wing religious 
extremist group in Pakistan, to conduct rallies and issue fatwas against the Taliban as a 
way to counter the influence of Salafi ideology.22 Similar funding was made to local 
NGOs through the National Endowment of Democracy (NED), to promote a narrative 
aligned to US interests in Pakistan. To some extent, these steps transformed the 
discourse on Pakistan, as discussed further in later sections. 
3.3.1 Geopolitical Cartography 
As soon as the Obama Administration took over the White House, the KLB Act, as an 
enactment of the security–development nexus, represented a new US approach to 
dealing with Pakistan. This new approach was based on a fundamental shift in the way 
the US positioned Pakistan in the geopolitical theatre. According to a US congressional 
staffer that I interviewed, Obama and his close aides, including Richard Holbrooke and 
Bruce Riedel, believed that to ‘fix’ Afghanistan, it was important to ‘fix’ Pakistan 
first.23 This thinking was evident in Obama’s strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
released soon after Obama took over the White House.24 In other words, the Obama 
Administration saw Pakistan as a key player in achieving its policy objectives on 
Afghanistan.  
With that perception, the US began its geopolitical cartography of the region by 
grouping Pakistan together with Afghanistan in AfPak—something that the Bush 
 
22 Allen McDuffee, ‘U.S. Funding Went to Pakistani Radicals, Says CFR’s Ed Husain’, Washington Post, 
11 January 2012. https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/think-tanked/post/us-funding-went-to-
pakistani-radicals-says-cfrs-ed-husain/2012/01/11/gIQAu09nqP_blog.html 
23 Interview with the former US congressional staffer, Washington, DC, 24 September 2016. 
24  Obama White House, A New Strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, 27 March 2009, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0aJ23skfVO0 
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Administration had avoided, to contain the war inside Afghanistan. 25  However, 
according to Richard Holbrooke, the Special Representative of President Obama to 
AfPak, the term AfPak was developed for policy ease. He said it was an ‘attempt to 
indicate and imprint in our DNA’ that Afghanistan and Pakistan were a single theatre of 
war and, hence, needed to be discussed as a single unit needing a joint solution.26 The 
most prominent evidence of this grouping was the newly established office of Special 
Representative on Afghanistan-Pakistan, which legitimised the broad usage of the term, 
and the KLB Act, which officially reinforced the AfPak in the policy discourse despite 
strong disapproval from Pakistan. In his interview with Der Speigel, Musharraf 
criticised the creation of AfPak, calling it a strategy that ‘puts Pakistan on the same 
level as Afghanistan’, noting that ‘Afghanistan has no government and the country is 
completely destabilised. Pakistan is not’.27 
The fact that Pakistan has been defined globally through the narrow war lens of the US 
and for its political objectives, based on the fundamental assumptions of the security–
development nexus, is a reflection of modern-day Orientalism. This resonates with 
Chomsky, who argues that the US has historically used propaganda to shape public 
opinion in favour of its imperial interventions around the world. 28  Therefore, by 
grouping Pakistan with Afghanistan, the US could expand the war in Afghanistan into 
Pakistan and could pave the way for its direct and indirect intervention in Pakistan, as 
this thesis discusses in the following chapters. However, this was not only for the war 
on terrorism. As noted in the KLB Act, the US was equally interested in having 
oversight over Pakistan’s nuclear program and thus the regional power balance. The 
Pakistani state officials that I interviewed saw this as a challenge to Pakistan’s 
sovereignty and an expansion of American hegemony in Pakistan.  
Another major issue with Holbrooke’s approach was that while Afghanistan and 
Pakistan could be what Gagnon and Hendrickson called ‘two countries but a single 
 
25 Interview with a former congressional staffer from the GW Bush Administration, Washington, DC, 19 
October 2016. 
26 See Richard Holbrooke (speech, Munich Security Conference, 8 February 2009). 
27 Pervez Musharraf, ‘Obama Is Aiming at the Right Things’, interview with SPIEGEL, SPIEGEL Online, 
9 June 2009, http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/spiegel-interview-with-pervez-musharraf-obama-
is-aiming-at-the-right-things-a-628960.html. 
28 Noam Chomsky, Hegemony or Survival: America’s quest for global dominance (New York: Henry 
Holt, 2004).  
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challenge’29 from the lens of the US foreign policy concerns, in terms of the economic, 
political and social realities on the ground, and from the eyes of the people, they were 
anything but a single unit. This colonial configuration by the US, to redefine a region 
based on its foreign policy goals and the security–development nexus, not only irked the 
political leaders and people of Pakistan but, as suggested in the evidence presented in 
the next few paragraphs, also set a course of downward spiral in Pakistan.  
Despite the 11 September terrorist attacks and the subsequent war in Afghanistan, 
Pakistan continued to see itself primarily as a rival with India, based on its impressive 
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 5% to 7% through 2004 to 2007.30 It then 
came as a shock to the Government of Pakistan that the new Obama Administration had 
reconfigured Pakistan and boxed it in with Afghanistan under the AfPak discourse.31 
This new discourse on Pakistan was further entrenched by the subsequent KLB Act as 
an enactment of the security–development nexus. According to the civil–military 
establishment of Pakistan, this damaged Pakistan’s global image, as well as its 
economy, political stability and national morale. The interviewees suggested that 
terrorist attacks and instability in Pakistan surged exponentially after 2008, given that 
Pakistan had now been officially brought into the AfPak war theatre by the US. To 
triangulate this claim, I examined the total fatalities in terrorist attacks in Pakistan 
between 2000 and 2017. The results are shown in Figure 3.2.  
 
29 Ralph G. Carter, Contemporary Cases in US Foreign Policy: From Terrorism to Trade (London: Sage 
Publications, 2014) 27. 
30 For details on Pakistan’s GDP growth rate see: https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/pakistan/real-
gdp-growth 
31 Daniel Markey, No Exit from Pakistan: America’s Tortured Relationship with Islamabad (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2013). 
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Figure 3.2 Fatalities in Terrorist violence in Pakistan 2000-201832 
This graph clearly shows the sudden surge in terrorist attacks inside Pakistan from 2007, 
when the security–development nexus started to take shape as a powerful discourse in 
US policy circles, and throughout the years that the KLB Act was active, until 2014. 
Then the Obama Administration ceased using the AfPak and started looking for a 
broader regional solution that included China and India. The graph indicates a shift in 
Pakistan’s national security policy, as it opened war fronts against militants in the tribal 
areas of Pakistan, pushed through the ‘do more on terrorism’ discourse under the KLB 
Act. To the civil–military establishment, the graph shows how, through the security–
development nexus, the US labelled Pakistan in a way that created not only insecurities 
in Pakistan but also instability in terms of economic and development progress. One of 
the civilian officials working in the Economic Affairs Division said:  
A nation’s economic strength and FDI [foreign direct investment] is directly linked to 
its global perception. Overnight, the Obama Administration placed us out of South 
Asia—that is, one of the fastest growing region in the world—and instead, put us on 
the same level with Afghanistan—that is, a war-torn country with no government or 
writ of state. The moment we got lumped with Afghanistan, the investor confidence, 
 
32 Source: Wikimedia commons, the free media repository.  
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tourism, business and everything went into decline.33  
That makes sense in terms of the GDP change in Pakistan. From a rate of almost 5% 
GDP growth rate in 2007, Pakistan dropped to 1.7% in 2008 and 0.36% in 2009.34 In 
addition, the civil–military establishment believes that Pakistan’s tourism industry was 
badly damaged once Pakistan’s global image was tied to the insecurities of Afghanistan, 
causing Pakistan losses in millions of dollars, especially in those areas that relied almost 
entirely on tourism for their livelihood. In their research, Iqbal, Arshad and Shahbaz 
demonstrate the effect of a negative image of Pakistan on the tourism industry. 35 
Another collaborative study by Rahman, Holdschlag, Ahmad and Qadir took a case 
study of Chitral, a famous tourist location in Pakistan, and through the date of inflow of 
foreign tourists, showed the effect of the war on terrorism on the tourism industry in the 
region.36  Both studies indicate a clear link between negative changes in Pakistan’s 
global image and a reduction of tourism in the country since 2008.  
Similarly, because of the effect of Pakistan’s global image as an insecure country, 
Pakistan lost the opportunity to host sporting events, becoming deprived of leisure and 
recreation activities.37 Many of the interviewees blamed the US for Pakistan’s change of 
economic fate by damaging Pakistan’s global image, presenting Pakistan as being 
similar to Afghanistan through the security–development nexus. One of the political 
leaders of a major political party said:  
It is obvious that Pakistan has been forcefully isolated by first associating it with 
Afghanistan, and then waiting for the instability to take over the country so Pakistan 
could be deprived of sports, entertainment and all other things that make it a normal 
country. This is an attempt to disrupt Pakistan as a normal country and expand the 
war from Afghanistan into Pakistan. 38 
 
33 Interview with the Senior Government officials at the Economic Affairs Division, Government of 
Pakistan, Islamabad, 10 May 2016. 
34 See data sets on Pakistan at https://tradingeconomics.com/pakistan/gdp-growth. 
35 Muhammad Irshad Arshad, Muhammad Anwar Iqbal and Muhammad Shahbaz, ‘Pakistan Tourism 
Industry and Challenges: A Review’, Asia Pacific Journal of Tourism Research 23, no. 2 (2017): 121–32. 
36 Fazlur Rahman, Arnd Holdschlag, Basharat Ahmad and Ihsan Qadir, ‘War, Terror and Tourism: Impact 
of Violent Events on International Tourism in Chitral, Pakistan’, Original Scientific Paper 59, no. 4 
(2011): 465–79. 
37  Pakistan’s sports industry was damaged because of insecurity and terrorism, and to this date, 
international cricket and other sporting events have not taking in place in Pakistan. Instead, the Pakistan 
Cricket Board has been hosting cricket series in Dubai, where international teams feel safe.  
38 Interview with a serving member of the National Assembly of Pakistan, Islamabad, 12 June 2016. 
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There is, however, a tendency within the political and military elite that I interviewed to 
exaggerate the US role in destabilizing Pakistan through narratives. This exaggeration 
deflects the ruling elite from taking ownership of their failed domestic policies that 
brought Pakistan to the brink of collapse. The US in that way becomes a scapegoat of 
Pakistan’s domestic failures. On ground, however, anti-American sentiments are 
prevalent within the civil–military establishment and the general public, which sees 
Pakistan not as unstable or insecure as it has been represented by the US through the 
AfPak discourse. Given that words and discourses shape reality, as discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis, the US attempt to group Pakistan with Afghanistan through 
the KLB Act could well be argued as an attack on Pakistan’s sovereignty in terms of 
influencing the national security policy of the country. The next section takes this 
further, discussing this in the context of the ‘winning hearts and minds’ approach the 
US applied to influence the national security policy of Pakistan.  
3.3.2 Influencing National Security Through Hearts and Minds 
By the end of the GW Bush Administration, the image of the US in the Muslim world, 
and more specifically, in its key ally Pakistan, was severely negative. 39  This was 
identified by the Obama Administration as one of the main hindrances in the fight 
against extremists, who found support in the local population that was anti-American. 
Despite billions of dollars of assistance by the GW Bush Administration to a key ally 
such as Pakistan, the Pakistan Government was unable and unwilling to change its 
security policies to help the American interests in the region. Therefore, the Obama 
Administration quickly launched a ‘winning hearts and minds’ approach in Pakistan, 
based on the security–development nexus. The idea was not only to promote the good 
image of the US in Pakistan but also to re-engineer Pakistan’s national opinion on key 
issues such as terrorism, democracy, nuclear weapons and other areas of concern, to 
shape the discourse and eventually the national security policy of Pakistan.  
The Obama Administration’s ‘hearts and minds’ approach was similar to Joseph Nye’s 
theory of ‘smart power’40, which was adopted by the US Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton in her confirmation hearing at the US Senate. According to Nye, the idea was 
 
39 Gallup International Survey, ‘Pakistan overwhelmingly anti-US: Gallup Survey’. 2006. 
https://gallup.com.pk/source-liberty-post-2/ 
40 Joseph Nye Jr, ‘Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-07-01/get-smart. 
77 
simple: to induce Pakistan to want what the US wanted in terms of national security 
policy. Essentially, instead of using ‘carrots and sticks’ to achieve their objectives, the 
US wanted to shape the national and domestic discourse of Pakistan, to align it with US 
policy goals. This would make the people of Pakistan and its leaders take ownership of 
the war against terrorism, instead of seeing it as an American war forced upon Pakistan, 
which was the general public sentiment in Pakistan. The evidence for this new approach 
was the establishment of a full-scale Strategic Communication Working Group on 
Pakistan at the US State Department and the enhanced US spending on media in 
Pakistan, which ballooned from nothing in 2007/2008 to over $13.9 million in the 2012 
and 2013 fiscal years, under a single Public Communication Project.41 Several other 
smaller grants of $2 million to media houses were allocated under numerous projects to 
align the national discourse of Pakistan with that of US strategic interests.42  
My interviews with US State Department officials working on public diplomacy in 
Islamabad and Lahore confirmed that the core aim of US public diplomacy through the 
KLB Act was to enhance America’s soft power. According to them, the US was 
interested in funding favourable media in Pakistan that would have a sympathetic 
perspective on the US and the ongoing war against terrorism. Second, they mentioned 
that the US was interested in funding religious clerics and madrassahs, in attempts to 
soften and promote the ‘Barelvi’ version of Islam.43 Third, under the programs launched 
through the security–development nexus, the US was interested in funding NGOs and 
organisations that would promote the American narrative on the war on terrorism. 
Finally, they mentioned that one of the central aims of education exchange programs 
such as the Fulbright was to create a large pool of American-trained and -educated 
Pakistani students and professionals who would promote the American discourse and be 
sympathetic to American interests in Pakistan. All these initiatives, under the ‘winning 
hearts and minds’ approach, were based on the core idea that ‘security and development 
go hand in hand’ and the belief that development in a country such as Pakistan would 
help the US to achieve its national security goals.  
 
41 Data sourced from the USAID official datasets for the Year 2008–2012 on the aid disbursed to Pakistan, 
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/PAK?fiscal_year=2012&measure=Obligations. 
42 Data sourced from the USAID official datasets for the Year 2008–2012 on the aid disbursed to Pakistan, 
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/PAK?fiscal_year=2012&measure=Obligations. 
43  Barelvi is a stranf of Sufi version of Islam that is passive and mystical, rejecting violence and 
extremism. 
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Many of these assertions were long believed to be the type of wild conspiracy theories 
that emerge in developing countries such as Pakistan. However, when I tested them for 
validation, the evidence suggested otherwise. For instance, between 2008 and 2012, it is 
on record that the US spent over $3 million on the Pakistani media directly through a 
single project of USAID titled ‘Freedom of Media and Information’. The details of the 
projects are unknown and lack transparency.44 Indirect spending on the media through 
trainings, and sometimes consultancies through the NED, are listed on the USAID 
webpage as well, with no further details. The Christian Science Monitor reported on the 
US’s deep involvement in funding Pakistani media individuals (including journalists) 
through the State Department in terms of providing additional salaries to the already-
employed journalists of news outlets in Pakistan. 45  The Christian Science Monitor 
questioned whether this was a fair practice, arguing that it could cause controversy with 
regard to the US influencing Pakistan’s national news and discourse. In the same article, 
Dr Christine Fair of Georgetown University said, ‘the Pakistani press is the freest press 
that money can buy … the US government wants to get into this game’. 46  The 
intelligence officials in Pakistan carry a perception that between 2008 and 2013, the US 
spent over $50 million on what they saw as ‘buying’ the media houses and journalists 
through mostly covert aid that is hard to track. It is, however, important to note here that 
the US is not alone in investing into media houses and buying favourable narrative. The 
Pakistani security establishment has also for long funded voices at think tanks and 
university campuses in the US to generate a narrative suitable to the Pakistani national 
interests.  
Similarly, US involvement in funding extremist religious groups in Pakistan was 
revealed when a member of one of the US-funded Islamist groups, the Sunni Ittehad 
Council, assassinated Salman Taseer, the liberal Governor of Punjab who raised his 
voice against the abuse of blasphemy laws in Pakistan. The US funding to the religious 
group (a total of $36, 607) was listed on its website USAspending.gov.47 According to 
the US Embassy, the funding was provided to the Sunni Ittehad Council to organise 
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nationwide rallies against the Taliban, to shape the opinion of the public and the 
Pakistan Government.48 The revelation that the US had been funding Islamist groups 
created a controversy in Pakistan as increasing numbers of Pakistanis began to observe 
deep-level involvement of the US in changing Pakistani society and Islam from within. 
The intelligence official of Pakistan that I interviewed on the subject suggested that 
these religious groups would take money from the US, promising that they would shun 
the Taliban, while simultaneously encouraging an equally radical Islamist mentality 
within their own Barelvi ranks.49  
When asked how much control the US has on the domestic discourse inside Pakistan, 
most of the state officials suggested that, over the years, by spending millions of dollars 
on different programs in Pakistan, the US has exerted substantial control over the 
national discourse. That, however, appears to be unfounded given that the national 
discourse in Pakistan still remains deeply anti-American and in favour of the Pakistan 
military and intelligence agencies. What, however, the US may have been successful 
with is shaping Pakistan’s global image, especially through the KLB Act, in trying to 
make the people of Pakistan believe that their biggest threat is not India or Afghanistan 
but the terrorism from within, so the public and government can be pressed to do more 
against terrorism and accept it as Pakistan’s own war. This is evidenced in US President 
Obama’s press conference on 13 May 2010, in which he argued that Pakistan’s real 
enemy was not India but the cancer of terrorism from within. Obama asserted:  
I think there has been in the past a view on the part of Pakistan that their primary 
rival, India, was their only concern. I think what you’ve seen over the last several 
months is a growing recognition that they have a cancer in their midst; that the 
extremist organisations that have been allowed to congregate and use as a base the 
frontier areas to then go into Afghanistan—that now threatens Pakistan’s 
sovereignty.50 
A similar narrative, that ‘terrorism, not India’ is the biggest threat to Pakistan, came out 
across the board from interviewees from the Obama Administration, with regard to 
 
48  ‘US Says It Funded Sunni Ittehad Council’, The News, 12 January 2012, 
https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/619458-us-says-it-funded-sunni-ittehad-council. 
49 Interview with a Grade 19 intelligence officer, Islamabad, 20 June 2016. 
50 ‘Pakistan’s Enemy Is Cancer of Terrorism Within, Not India: Barack Obama’, NDTV, 13 May 2010, 
https://www.ndtv.com/world-news/pakistans-enemy-is-cancer-of-terrorism-within-not-india-obama-
417839. 
80 
persuading Pakistan to move six of its military divisions from the Indian border to the 
tribal areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan, to escalate the fight against terrorism.51 
Given the turmoil of terrorism in Pakistan, the threat from India did become less 
prominent for Pakistan, which diverted its resources and energies into fighting 
terrorism. As one of the former Pakistani military commander put it:  
The more military operations we conducted on behalf of the US in our tribal areas, 
the more enemies we made and further, we got embroiled in terrorism. Half of our 
people turned against us because we fought someone else’s war against our tribal 
people. The other half also turned us against us for not fighting the war against 
terrorism decisively.52  
For this reason, the ‘winning hearts and minds’ strategy has faced serious backlash for 
creating political instability and deepening the polarisation of Pakistani society on key 
national issues of terrorism, democracy and human rights. The more instability there is 
inside the country, the more convinced the civil–military establishment is about the 
American hand damaging Pakistan’s sovereignty through the security–development 
nexus, allowing the US to control the national and global discourse of the country. This 
suspicion is compounded when the prevalent academic, think tank and policy 
discussions reflect an American hegemonic discourse on Pakistan as well, as discussed 
in detail in the next section.  
3.3.3 Agents of Imperialism 
The security–development nexus allowed the US to undertake geopolitical remapping of 
Pakistan into AfPak and fund media, religious groups and NGOs to shape the discourse 
on Pakistan, in the hope of influencing the national security policy of the country. 
However, the Pakistani state officials noted the role of academia, think tanks and media 
commentators in Washington, DC, and major capitals of the world, which built on the 
nexus to shape the discourse on Pakistan according to the needs of US strategic interests 
in the region, serving as what many Pakistani officials called ‘useful agents of American 
imperialism’.53 For instance, once the Obama Administration introduced AfPak as a 
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term to define Pakistan, it was quickly picked up and embraced in academic, think tank 
and media circles in Washington, DC. According to a military official that I interviewed 
on the subject, by tying Pakistan to Afghanistan, Pakistan naturally became responsible 
for all that went wrong in Afghanistan, giving the US Government a scapegoat in the 
shape of Pakistan through academic, media and think tank discussions. To investigate 
this, I examined the evidence and found that right after the Obama Administration 
coined AfPak as a term in early 2009, The Washington Post inaugurated its AfPak series 
to cover the war in the region by mid-2009, while The New America Foundation and 
Foreign Policy magazine jointly launched an AfPak channel in August 2009, inviting 
articles on the region. Such initiatives, deliberate or not, reinforce the policy rhetoric 
and terminologies, and align the discourse to American policy interests.  
To triangulate the evidence, I examined some of the most prominent books published on 
Pakistan when the security–development nexus began to be the dominant discourse in a 
build-up to the KLB Act, to explain the discourse on Pakistan. For instance, Hassan 
Abbas, a Professor at National Defense University in Washington, DC, wrote Pakistan’s 
Drift into Extremism: Allah, then Army, and America’s War on Terror, which discussed 
the rise of religious radicalisation in Pakistan and its connection to the Pakistan Army, 
as well as the larger US–Pakistan relationship. Similarly, Descent into Chaos: The 
United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central 
Asia and Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, by 
Ahmad Rashid, are detailed and widely read books that shed light on Pakistan’s dubious 
policy in the war on terrorism both to support the Taliban and receive aid from the US. 
Numerous other books have been published on Pakistan in the past decade, including 
Military Inc. by Ayesha Siddiqa, which fleshes out the deep economic and commercial 
aspects of the Pakistan Army, to the frustration of the military establishment. According 
to the Pakistani state officials, the goal of these and other books since the 11 September 
attacks has been to present (1) Pakistan as a nuclear state under crisis and instability, 
with growing radicalisation in its borders making it a danger to the world; (2) the 
Pakistan Army and ISI as key thorns in the war against terrorism for its double game, 
yet needed by the US; and (3) the Pakistan Army as having a negative effect on 
Pakistan’s democracy and development. While the Pakistani state officials may view 
such academic works with suspicion and speculate a US hand behind it, it is plausible 
that such works may only reflect the existing reality of Pakistan. For instance, Pakistan 
is indeed a nuclear state that has witnessed a surge of radicalisation within its borders 
and has been subjected to multiple instances where Pakistani army undermined the 
democracy in the country. However, one can lend some credence to the view of 
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Pakistani state officials who believe that such academic works, published at a particular 
time, feeds into the hegemonic discourse shaping Pakistan in a way to suit the US 
national security interests. The question of ‘Why now?’ is critical to their argument on 
the issue. 
This reflects the fundamental assumptions of the security–development nexus, which 
see the weak, developing states as a security threat to the Western world, justifying 
Western donors’ neocolonial policies in their engagement with the developing world. 
This is evidenced by the KLB Act itself, which includes the aforementioned three points 
as a source of anxiety over Pakistan for the US. Even the titles of the books published 
on Pakistan reflect a particular hegemonic bias in the way they categorise and frame 
Pakistan under a particular discourse. For instance, titles such as Pakistan: A Hard 
Country, Most Dangerous Place and On the Brink may reflect the ongoing reality in 
Pakistan but could well be argued, from the postcolonial lens, to be creating a self-
serving reality that suits the Western political narrative on Pakistan.  
In addition, I examined major think tank publications, which revealed the same trend 
and themes in discussing Pakistan in the context of being a ‘difficult ally’ and proposing 
ways to ‘fix’ Pakistan’s behaviour. I analysed the blog posts and reports of the 
Brookings Institute, CFR, Atlantic Council, Wilson Center, USIP and Hudson Institute. 
Interestingly, there was a particular discourse on Pakistan being ‘an ally from hell’,54 
playing a ‘double game’55 in the war on terrorism. It is not to say that Pakistan is not 
guilty of some of the charges against it, but the single-sided imbalance of narrative has 
gone unchallenged and feeds into the US hegemonic policy discourse of framing 
Pakistan as ‘the other’, to justify American hegemonic policies in that country. Edward 
Said argued that by constructing ‘the other’, the experts and scholars dehumanise the 
‘East’.56  When put in the context of US–Pakistan relations based on the security–
development nexus, a strong Orientalist tendency in the American research and 
academia is visible right on the surface. For instance, Dr Christine Fair, a senior 
academic and a prominent voice on Pakistan in Washington, DC, attempts to paint 
American government as a ‘gullible’ partner being exploited by a cunning Pakistani 
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establishment.57 This is a modern-day ‘us vs them’ and ‘civilised vs savage’ binary that 
Said has talked about extensively.  
Similarly, although he is recognised as a very well-balanced Pulitzer award-winning 
author, Steve Coll’s depiction of Pakistani institutions and its officials reflect a strong 
bias. For instance, in his latest book, Directorate S, he is struck by the contradiction of 
Pakistan Army generals, condescendingly profiling them as ‘Black Label-sipping 
Pakistani generals with London flats and daughters on Ivy League campuses’ who ‘had 
been managing jihadi guerrilla campaigns’.58 At the same time, however, his depiction 
of CIA officials reflected a strikingly humanised and glorifying tone. Profiling one of 
the Directors of CIA he wrote, ‘He was the sort of CIA officer one would expect to 
encounter in an Oliver Stone film … and he could be funny and generous, he won the 
loyalty of senior colleagues’.59 A detailed examination of the way Coll depicts other 
characters in the book reflects deep hegemonic and cultural biases. Such a view about 
the ‘other’ gains good traction in the American policy imagination and reinforces the 
binaries, to provide easy and self-serving answers to why the US is failing in 
Afghanistan or why Pakistan, despite receiving billions of dollars in aid from the US, 
continues to support terrorism.  
One former head of Pakistan’s ISI that I interviewed was convinced that the Americans 
are engaged in a full-scale information and psychological war on Pakistan through its 
proxies in think tanks, academia and journalism, to shape Pakistan’s national security 
policies in terms of forcing Pakistan to do more on terrorism at the expense of 
Pakistan’s national interests. According to him, the problem was that Pakistan has little 
voice in this hegemonic discourse set by the US and the voices that try to challenge the 
American narrative are either labelled and discredited as ‘ISI agents’ or silenced by not 
having the opportunity to publish or speak at the forums that create such discourses. He 
asserted:  
The Pakistani intelligentsia, including writers, critics and opinion makers that are 
supposed to have a balanced view, are recruited with heavy salaries on USAID and 
other donor projects to silence any critique. The critical voices left that support the 
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Pakistani perspective are labelled as conspiracy theorists and discredited. For local 
intellectuals to then make a career and pay their bills, they end up lending their voice 
and pen to serve the American strategic interests.60 
While the aforementioned view is a standard notion against the dissenting voice in 
Pakistan, it is a reductionist explanation of the critical voices in Pakistan that robs them 
of their agency for being ‘donor funded’. Through a highly securitized lens, the military 
establishment in Pakistan also practise ‘with us or against us’ approach against any 
dissenting voices in the country. The opinion of the former ISI chief, however, finds 
some validation when we examine the number of opinion makers on donor-funded 
projects or those that receive indirect grants through local NGOs backed by donor 
states. However, it accounts for a small percentage in the vast market where there are 
several other actors including China, Saudi Arab, Iran and most importantly the 
Pakistani military establishment that has several members of the media and 
intelligentsia openly on its payroll. The larger point, however, of the Pakistani state 
officials that I interviewed on the shrinking space for Pakistan in the global discourse 
remains a reality. For instance, a Pakistani academic that I interviewed argued:  
When we as academics from Pakistan try to offer an alternative explanation of the 
events, we are shunned and discredited as being ISI agents by established academics 
in the US. However, nobody calls out Bruce Riedel, Christine Fair or so many who 
tow the American imperial narrative as CIA agents.61  
In my six interviews with Pakistani and American academics working on Pakistan, 
many of them expressed unequivocally the presence of hegemony, which does not allow 
the voices of the global South to contest the prevalent discourse. One senior think tank 
expert at a top think tank in Washington, DC, asserted that to rise in think tank circles 
and develop credibility, there is no way one can be neutral on Pakistan. She explained 
that ‘towing the line of the US Government and bashing the Pakistan Army and ISI’ for 
not doing enough on terrorism sells in the market and accords legitimacy as a scholar. 
An academic at a top international relations school in the Washington, DC, area 
substantiated this line of argument as follows:  
If you’re looking into research grants, access to the government and publication in top 
 
60 Interview with a former director general at the ISI, Islamabad, 3 August 2016. 
61 Interview with an academic from Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad, 10 July 2016. 
85 
policy forums, you have to let go the neutrality in favour of feeding into the 
hegemonic discourse. The most you can do is to raise your little voice within the 
established discourse and expect that it would make some difference … Academic 
freedom, when it comes to writing on some issues, is a myth that we have been told 
for a very long time.62  
In addition, many academics, researchers and writers in Pakistan say that unless they 
fall into line, their voices are not published in any of the major policy outlets that shape 
the global narrative. For instance, one academic in Pakistan that I interviewed 
mentioned his struggle to publish an article on the negative effect of US drone strikes in 
Pakistan’s tribal areas at one of the top policy outlets in the US.63 After being rejected 
six times, he decided to write a pro-drone strike article and the same magazine ran it as 
a cover story within a day. He then wrote another article arguing in favour of the drone 
strikes and had the same result, making him see the ‘politics’ of policy and academic 
publishing. While an experience like this may be exaggerated to a certain degree and 
could be more to do with quality of research and less to do with publishing bias, the 
presence of narrative bias is still prevalent in Washington DC think tank circles when 
we triangulate the evidence from the American academic and policy sources. This is in 
part also because of the funding and political tilt of the think tanks that push a particular 
narrative on a subject. Such barriers to entry into the global discourse promote only 
those local voices from Pakistan that fall into line with the American discourse on 
Pakistan, thereby allowing the US to shape Pakistan’s national security policy according 
to the needs of US strategic interests.  
The discussion in this section has demonstrated the different ways that the security–
development nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, has influenced the national security 
policy of Pakistan by influencing the discourse on Pakistan. The next section builds on 
the conversation from this section to study the specific terms and conditions of the KLB 
Act that influenced Pakistan’s national security policy and placed the burden of fighting 
the war on terrorism, and blame for its failure, on the shoulders of Pakistan.  
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3.4 Influence through Terms and Conditions 
The Pakistani state officials interviewed for this thesis referred to the text of the KLB 
Act as being self-explanatory in terms of creating a negative discourse around Pakistan 
and challenging its sovereignty to serve the American strategic interest. In his 
parliamentary speech, Nisar Ali Khan, who was at that time the leader of the opposition, 
brought the attention of the parliament to ‘not just read but also understand’ the KLB 
Act.64 The main thrust of his speech was that the KLB Act had disgraced Pakistan in 
global society through its derogatory and inflammatory language for the minor returns it 
promised to provide in the form of security and development aid. Similarly, in his 
parliamentary speech, Fazal ur Rahman, who heads a right-wing religious Islamist 
political party in Pakistan, argued that to understand the politics of KLB Act, one has to 
understand the conditions attached to it.65 He opened his speech by asking a question: 
does the KLB Act challenge Pakistan’s autonomy to make national security policies? 
According to him, the answer was in the KLB Act text. To test this claim, I examined 
the text of the KLB Act. For instance, the purpose of security assistance, as mentioned 
in the KLB Act was: 
(1) to support Pakistan’s paramount national security need to fight and win the 
ongoing counterinsurgency within its borders in accordance with its national security 
interests; 
(2) to work with the Government of Pakistan to improve Pakistan’s border security 
and control and help prevent any Pakistani territory from being used as a base or 
conduit for terrorist attacks in Pakistan, or elsewhere; 
(3) to work in close cooperation with the Government of Pakistan to coordinate action 
against extremist and terrorist targets.66 
These points from the KLB Act appear to be designed to help Pakistan face its security 
challenges, but contain no mention of the US interests in doing so. In a clear reflection 
of the core assumptions of the security–development nexus, they suggest that it is 
Pakistan that is facing insurgency issues and requires US help in combating them. To 
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promote the KLB Act to the Government of Pakistan, the Obama Administration 
emphasised this very section and many people there were agitated by what they saw as a 
threat to their sovereignty. Only an examination of the conditions attached to the KLB 
Act and the performance auditing required by the US Congress reveals the deeper level 
politics being played out as an enactment of the nexus. For instance, the following 
certifications requirement changes the entire meaning of ‘security assistance’ under the 
KLB Act: 
(1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in 
efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-
related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to 
Pakistani nationals associated with such networks; 
(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a 
sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating 
terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, 
including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has 
made progress on matters such as— 
(A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or 
its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any 
group that has conducted attacks against United States or coalition forces in 
Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighboring countries; 
(B) preventing al Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as 
Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of 
Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring 
countries, closing terrorist camps in the FATA, dismantling terrorist bases of 
operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and 
taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; 
and 
(C) Strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws.67 
The inclusion of an oversight of the nuclear program and sharing the private 
information of Pakistani citizens associated with the nuclear program sparked a 
controversy within the civil–military establishment and the public in Pakistan. It is 
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starkly different from the previously mentioned ‘purpose of security assistance’ under 
the KLB Act that has no mention of any oversight over the nuclear program of Pakistan. 
In addition, the mention of Muridke, which is the headquarters of Lashkar-e-Taiba (now 
Jamaat-ud-Dawa), caused a national uproar over American interference in Pakistan’s 
national security policies. This is because the civil–military establishment and the 
people of Pakistan see Lashkar-e-Taiba as a Kashmir resistance group and no threat to 
US interests in Afghanistan. Its inclusion gave a sense within the civil–military 
establishment that the KLB Act was under the influence of the Indian lobby in 
Washington, DC, or that the US was trying to appease India by forcing Pakistan to 
change its national security policy on the issue of Kashmir. One of the senior military 
officials commented:  
[The] KLB Act is less about development, security or democracy in Pakistan. It is not 
even much about Afghanistan exclusively. [The] KLB Act is mostly about forcing 
Pakistan to change its long-held national security policies on nuclear program, 
Kashmir issue, and giving blind support to the US adventures in Afghanistan by 
giving up our own national interest. There is only a limit to how much could have 
changed, and whatever we did not, we were blamed for playing a double game.68 
According to Nisar Ali Khan and the Pakistani state officials that I interviewed, signing 
the KLB Act with such clauses meant the Government of Pakistan accepted that there 
were elements within Pakistan’s military and intelligence services that provided direct 
support to terrorists, as suggested in Clause A above. Through this admission, the 
Government of Pakistan pledged in Clause B that it would do more to prevent terrorists 
from carrying out cross-border attacks in neighbouring countries, including India and 
Afghanistan, making it essentially Pakistan’s responsibility. In addition, this meant that 
if the terrorist attacks continued, Pakistan could be blamed, as per the clauses in the 
KLB Act. A senior intelligence official explained the security establishment view on the 
issue:  
Until [the] KLB Act, the US and other countries only blamed us for supporting 
terrorism without any evidence and proof. By signing the KLB Act with these terms 
and conditions, our government foolishly accepted and legitimized the discourse of 
Pakistan as a state sponsor of terror. [The] Pakistan Army and ISI naturally reacted to 
this admission but the damage was done, and from being the front-line state fighting 
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against terror, we gave an impression to the world that we were the front-line state 
supporting terror.69  
Building on this notion, Ayaz Amir, a senior Pakistani politician writing for the Khaleej 
Times, referred to the KLB Act as ‘less an assistance program than a treaty of 
surrender’.70 Senator John Kerry tried to allay the controversy, saying that the KLB Act 
was not designed to threaten Pakistan’s sovereignty, place conditions on aid to Pakistan 
or gain US oversight over Pakistan’s internal security matters. 71  However, this 
clarification was contradictory to the KLB Act text. In private, the Obama 
Administration reaffirmed to Pakistan that the language of the KLB Act, including the 
certifications and waiver required, was only a bureaucratic requirement to appease the 
US Congress, but it would have no role in the actual delivery of aid under the KLB 
Act.72 This was an even stronger indication that the KLB Act was significant for the US 
not only because of its dollar value but also because of its discursive value in shaping 
the discourse around Pakistan, to serve US interests. Shortly after the KLB Act was 
passed by the US Congress, Secretary Clinton was in Islamabad and expressed shock at 
Pakistan’s reaction to the KLB Act: 
For the United States Congress to pass a bill unanimously saying that we want to give 
$7.5 billion to Pakistan in a time of global recession when we have a 10 percent 
unemployment rate, and then for Pakistani press and others to say we don’t want that, 
that’s insulting—I mean, it was shocking to us. So clearly, there is a failure to 
communicate effectively.73 
While the Obama Administration showed bewilderment over Pakistan’s reaction to the 
KLB Act, the debates in Pakistan’s parliament by opposition parties and media houses 
fleshed out the KLB Act at deeper levels. My interviews with the Pakistani state 
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officials revealed that their annoyance over the KLB Act was particularly due to the fact 
that the US had essentially, through the security–development nexus, placed the 
responsibility for war and the burden of blame on Pakistan, especially by including the 
monitoring and auditing reports in the KLB Act. In other words, the KLB Act gave the 
US the power of gauging Pakistan’s performance in the war on terrorism. For instance, 
the KLB Act required monitoring and auditing reports, based on expecting that Pakistan 
would: 
(A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and 
terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas; 
(B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan; 
(C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-
Mohammed; 
(D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; 
(E) prevent attacks into neighboring countries; 
(F) increase oversight over curriculum in madrassas, including closing madrassas 
with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and 
(G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for 
observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the 
United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of 
Terrorism; 
(12) [provide] a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of 
nuclear-related material and expertise; 
(13) [provide] an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly 
or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by 
the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial 
resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its 
nuclear weapons program.74 
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The inclusion of these clauses in the KLB Act text infuriated the military officials and 
the opposition political parties in Pakistan because of their derogatory language. They 
represent a clear case of the US challenging Pakistan’s sovereignty and advancing its 
hegemony in the country by not only dictating Pakistan’s national security policy but 
also, as one of the civilian officials put it, ‘bullying Pakistan’ into submission, to fight 
the US war. According to Fazal ur Rahman, for $7.5 billion in aid, Pakistan gave the US 
the power to dictate the country’s national security policy and internal policies such as 
madrassah reforms, and to gauge Pakistan’s performance based on US interests.75 One 
of the senior politicians that I interviewed said:  
There were serious red flags in the KLB Act and we warned the Government, which 
assured us that most of these were merely for bureaucratic purposes. None of us (or 
maybe some of us) were able to predict the long-term repercussions of these 
conditions in the KLB Act. We don’t think strategically and hence we did not realise 
that for a few billion dollars that we were yet to receive [from] the US, we were 
handing over the responsibility to ensure the security of Afghanistan, fight the 
American war in the region, stop extremism and terrorism, and failure in doing so 
would make us accomplices. This was too heavy a burden on Pakistan that we did not 
realise we were lifting.76 
The argument that for a few billion dollars, Pakistan became a ‘hire gun’ for the US in 
the region for a war that was not in the security or economic interest of Pakistan, was a 
repeated claim of the current prime minister, Imran Khan, who saw his popularity rise 
because of his principled stand against the US war in Afghanistan. Most of my 
interlocutors saw the KLB Act as a precursor to the constant ‘do more’ narrative from 
the US, which continues to this day. Many felt that for a few billion dollars from the US 
(half of it was never received and the other half was barely actualised on the ground 
because of high overhead costs), Pakistan signed up for a one-sided project to serve the 
American interests at the expense of Pakistan’s stability. It was not just the economic 
and political costs that bothered the state officials; the suffering that Pakistan has gone 
through, and continues to go through, due to global humiliation and disrespect at the 
hand of the US, was more traumatic.  
 
75 Fazal ur Rahman, Member National Assembly of Pakistan (speech, National Assembly of Pakistan, 
Islamabad, August 2009). 
76 Interview with a senior politician from the PML-N, Islamabad, 8 August 2016. 
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3.5 The Economics of the Nexus 
The KLB Act, as an enactment of the nexus, is a powerful discourse on Pakistan that 
has influenced and dictated Pakistan’s national security policies and, in turn, put the 
entire responsibility of the war on terrorism and the burden of blame on Pakistan. This 
was beneficial to the US in two ways. First, it was cheaper to hire the Pakistan Army to 
wage the US war on terrorism than to have the full-scale US military presence on the 
ground. Second, it provided a convenient scapegoat to blame for any failures. The 
economics of war makes sense of the US requirement for Pakistan to be the front-line 
state in the war on terrorism. Using Pakistan’s Ground Lines of Communications and 
Air Lines of Communications is one saving; hiring the Pakistan Army reduces 
American expenditure on the war by trillions. For instance, at the time of writing, the 
annual cost of putting a single US soldier on the ground in Afghanistan is between 
$800,000 and $1.2 million.77 This makes it very difficult for the US to sustain a larger 
military presence in Afghanistan, especially along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The 
annual cost of putting a Pakistani soldier on the ground in the bordering areas of 
Afghanistan and Pakistan is roughly $10,000.78 At the time of writing, Pakistan has 
more than 100,000 of its soldiers deployed exclusively for the war on terrorism near its 
border with Afghanistan, essentially serving US security interests and saving the US 
exchequer billions of dollars by subsidizing the US war effort. To have a fully trained 
foreign army at the service of the US for a few billions dollars is both economically and 
politically viable, if seen from the US viewpoint. Hence, the constant US demand 
pushing Pakistan to ‘do more’ on terrorism. The security–development nexus, therefore, 
is a powerful discourse that allows the US to impose (and at times, force) such 
neocolonial policies onto developing countries.  
The officials of civil and military institutions of Pakistan have been complaining for 
years that Pakistan has been wrongly blamed for American losses in Afghanistan. They 
use the word ‘scapegoat’ to define Pakistan’s resentment over what they see as 
nefarious US tactics to blame Pakistan for its failures. One of the senior military 
officials said: 
 
77  See US Congress, Congressional Record, Volume 149—Part 14, July 17, 2003 to July 25, 2003 
(Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office). 
78 Interview with a major general of the Pakistan Army, Islamabad, 12 August 2016. 
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Let us accept for a minute that [the] US is losing in Afghanistan due to Pakistan 
Army and ISI—what, then, explains its losses in Iraq? The truth is that the US could 
have won the war in Afghanistan but it got distracted by opening another front in Iraq 
and letting [the] Taliban take over Afghanistan. Yet, somehow when Pakistan is 
blamed, we know what is going on.79 
While the aforementioned views offer a convincing context, it is also an attempt to 
absolve Pakistan of any wrongdoing in the war on terrorism. The fact that the entire 
leadership of Taliban conducted its insurgency from inside Pakistan, raised funds and 
had overt support of the Pakistani security state seems to fade in the background when 
blaming the US for troubles in Afghanistan 
Despite of it the sentiment that for a few billion dollars, the US essentially found itself a 
country to scapegoat for its failure to justify to its domestic audience why the US had 
failed to achieve anything so far in Afghanistan is prevalent within the civil and military 
establishment of Pakistan. In addition, there was concern within the Pakistan Army that 
even today, the US does not a have a real plan for the war in Afghanistan and has 
instead, through the security–development nexus, rented out its war for Pakistan to win. 
According to the former vice chief of the Pakistan Army, the US war strategy in 
Afghanistan was to ‘make it Pakistan’s war, holding it responsible for results and 
failures through a constant narrative that Pakistan needs to do more’.80 He argued that 
this had been made possible by ‘elevating Pakistan as a key actor in the US security 
matrix that the US depends upon’.81 This dependence reflects the core assumption of the 
security–development nexus that ties the security of the global North to that of the 
global South. More generally, the Pakistani state officials interviewed for this thesis felt 
that Pakistan had sacrificed the most in the fight against terrorist groups, yet it was 
punished for failures in US policy. ‘We are constantly told to do more and threatened 
with aid cuts and sanctions. There comes a time when we say “to hell with you”’, said a 
retired Pakistan Army general who led operations against militant hideouts in Pakistan. 
Many of them squarely blamed their dire security and economic situation on the KLB 
Act, which gave the US power to define and shape Pakistan’s discourse and in the 
process, forced Pakistan into a war that was not its own and against its own people, in 
most cases.  
 
79 Interview with a current lieutenant general of the Pakistan Army, Rawalpindi, 18 June 2016. 
80 Interview with a former vice chief of the Pakistan Army, Lahore, Pakistan, 11 May 2016. 
81 Interview with a former vice chief of the Pakistan Army, Lahore, Pakistan, 11 May 2016. 
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What this tells us about the security–development nexus is the way the indivisibility of 
security and development has been used by the US as a means of influencing the 
national security policies of states such as Pakistan, which have become hostage to US 
security concerns. This chapter has revealed the nuance present on the ground with 
regard to the way the nexus is practised in a recipient country such as Pakistan. This 
evidence from the ground deepens the critical literature on the nexus by exploring the 
politics of the nexus, especially the issue of sovereignty, through the eyes of the local 
actors. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed the history of US–Pakistan relations and studied the voices of  
of Pakistani state officials to explore the politics of the security–development nexus by 
examining the way the KLB Act challenged Pakistan’s sovereignty in terms of 
influencing its national security policy. It has argued that the KLB Act helped the US to 
influence and dictate Pakistan’s national security policies in two stages. First, the US 
reconfigured the geopolitical cartography of Pakistan, away from South Asia to AfPak, 
while applying the ‘winning hearts and minds’ approach to shape the discourse on 
Pakistan by funding media, religious groups and NGOs. This is evidenced in the 
academic, think tank and policy conversations that this thesis provides. Second, the 
chapter has argued that through the conditions imposed under the KLB Act, the 
discourse on Pakistan was not only legitimised but also reinforced. Under its strict terms 
and conditions, the US shifted the responsibility for the war on terrorism and the burden 
of blame onto Pakistan. The chapter has demonstrated that the decolonial approach to 
the study of the security–development nexus highlights the question of sovereignty, 
which provides a local nuance on the politics of the nexus that is otherwise missing in 
the critical literature on the subject. Thus, this chapter has helped to deepen the critical 
literature on the security–development nexus through empirical evidence from a case 
study of the KLB Act in Pakistan.  
The chapter has shown that the while the military establishment protested against the 
KLB Act, it eventually accepted it. The fact that the military officials accepted it, after 
such an intense political storm, raises questions that need to be investigated further. The 
next chapter does this, exploring this paradox to flesh out the politics of the security–
development nexus by examining the way the military establishment in Pakistan exerted 
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its agency in terms of co-producing the nexus in the form of the KLB Act, using it to 
achieve its own strategic interests.  
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Chapter 4: ‘Help Me, or Else’ 
 
 
Pakistan is a guy sitting on a keg of dynamite, he swallowed poison, a deadly snake is 
writhing towards him, there is an earthquake in the vicinity, a jet plane is about to 
crash in his area and somebody is shooting at him with a rifle. So what is going to get 
him first? How do you sequence the problem?1 
—Stephen Cohen 
 
If the military aid cuts degrade our effort to fight war on terror, who does it help? 2 
—Shahid Khaqqan Abbassi, ex-Prime Minister of Pakistan 
 
A stable, prosperous Pakistan is the world’s greatest hope against the spread of 
extremism and terrorism.3 
—Shah Mahmood Qureshi, Foreign Minister of Pakistan 
 
American soldiers enter war fearing death, while we enter embracing death. True 
power is when you have nothing to lose.4 
—Senior Pakistan Army official 
  
 
1 Stephen Cohen, interview quoted in Alicia H. Moullan, ‘US Aid to Pakistan: National Building and 
Realist Objectives in Post 9/11 Era’ (PhD thesis, Australian National University, 2016, 85). 
2  ‘PM Warns US Against Starving Pakistan of Funds’, The Express Tribune, 11 September 2017, 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/1503575/us-sanctions-will-hurt-counter-terrorism-efforts-pm-abbasi/. 
3 Shah Mahmood Qureshi (speech, National Assembly, 16 October 2009). 
4 Interview with a major general of the Pakistan Army, Islamabad, 11 June 2016. 
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4.1 Introduction 
There is a common saying in Pakistan that ‘god is with the weak’. What people really 
mean is that there is a divine strength in the position of weakness and desperation. This 
belief is deeply rooted within the ideology of Pakistan’s security establishment when it 
comes to negotiating and bargaining with the US in their asymmetrical power 
relationship. That Pakistan has nothing to lose and, in a classic game theory scenario, is 
‘ready to collide with the oncoming car’ is the prevalent message in the speeches on 
matters of security and defence of its former rulers.5 Stephen Cohen describes this in his 
foreword for Schaffer and Schaffer as Pakistan ‘pointing a pistol at their own head and 
saying, “Help me, or else”’.6 
Using that idea as the starting point for expanding the conversation from the previous 
chapter on the politics of the security–development nexus, this chapter addresses the 
second question of the thesis, ‘To what extent was Pakistan able to exert its agency and 
mould the KLB in its own favour, from a position of weakness?’ As noted earlier, the 
literature on the security–development nexus gives no agency to the recipient actors in 
the developing world and, instead, treats them as bystanders in the nexus debate. 
However, the data in this chapter present counter-evidence with regard to the level of 
agency that Pakistan has been able to exert in co-producing the nexus and using it for its 
own advantage in terms of national security policy—a reflection of the politics of the 
nexus.  
The central aim of this chapter is to examine the ways that Pakistan has been able to use 
its image as a weak, terror-stricken country being forced to fight the American war, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, to exert its power through the KLB Act. It studies the 
politics of the security–development nexus in two ways. The first is the way Pakistan 
reinforced and used its image of being a weak and fragile state, within the nexus 
discourse of ‘security and development go hand in hand’ and ‘the security of the global 
North is linked to the security of the global South’, to engage the US in a long-term 
relationship in the form of the KLB Act. The second is the way that fighting the 
American war on terrorism, albeit reluctantly, allowed Pakistan to benefit in terms of 
 
5 Rory McCarthy and John Hooper, ‘Musharraf Ready to Use Nuclear Arms’, Guardian, 6 April 2002, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/apr/06/pakistan.rorymccarthy. 
6 Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding 
the Roller Coaster, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), xi. 
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developing its armed forces and achieving its regional strategic interests with regard to 
India and Afghanistan.  
This chapter, in the light of the discussion in the previous chapter, demonstrates that 
Pakistan is not a passive actor under the security–development nexus. Rather, it argues 
that Pakistan plays an important role in co-producing the nexus, as enacted through the 
KLB Act. This is why, despite all the outrage against the KLB Act influencing 
Pakistan’s national security policy, the military establishment actually embraced it and 
used it to its own advantage. It did this by tying Pakistan’s stability to the US, knowing 
that the US would provide the necessary economic and development help to protect 
Pakistan from collapsing. It could modernise Pakistan’s armed forces and play regional 
politics at the same time as knowing that the US would come to save Pakistan in the 
case of a crisis with India.  
The chapter begins by applying the decolonial approach to first review the historical 
context of the way Pakistan views itself and its relations with the US, especially vis-à-
vis India and the fear of isolation. Second, it studies the voices of the local actors, to 
explore the politics of the security–development nexus. This serves as a framework to 
demonstrate in the next sections the way the security establishment co-produced the 
nexus, in the form of the KLB Act, and used it for its own advantage to keep the US tied 
to Pakistan by increasing the cost of letting Pakistan collapse. The section after that 
examines the way Pakistan benefited from being forced to be the front-line state in the 
US war on terrorism in terms of modernising its armed forces and activating its regional 
policies with regard to India and Afghanistan. The chapter concludes by demonstrating 
that recipient countries such as Pakistan are able to exert their agency and influence the 
foreign policy of bigger powers such as the US from a position of weakness. This 
nuance is absent in the critical literature on the security–development nexus.  
4.2 US–Pakistan Relationship and the Fear of Isolation 
To understand Pakistan’s ability to co-produce the nexus and exert its agency from a 
position of relative weakness through the KLB Act, it is important to review the early 
history of Pakistan, which reveals some of the key anxieties that shaped Pakistan’s 
negotiating technique with the US. For instance, the fear of isolation and collapse of the 
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nation from both internal and external forces drives Pakistan’s foreign and security 
policy.7  
Pakistan was carved out of India at the end of British colonial rule and the onset of the 
Cold War in 1947. In the words of its founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the 
British gave the Muslims of India a ‘moth-eaten’8 country with territorial disputes from 
both India in the east over Kashmir and Afghanistan in the west over the Durand Line. 
With poverty, bloodshed, mass migration and, above all, an early war with India over 
Kashmir in 1947-1948, as well as calls for a separate ‘Pashtunistan’ in the North-
western province, Pakistan was in desperate need of foreign security and development 
assistance.9 The bi-polar world order under the Cold War presented a good opportunity 
and Pakistan pitched itself to the US as being a reliable partner in the region against the 
Soviet Union and its strong ally, India. Unlike its neighbour, India, which chose to 
remain neutral, Jinnah openly declared: 
Pakistan is a democracy and communism does not flourish in the soil of Islam. It is 
clear therefore that our interests lie more with two democratic countries, namely the 
UK and the USA, rather than with Russia.10 
By taking an overtly strong position in support of the West in the Cold War, Jinnah 
extensively lobbied the US in attempts to bring its attention to the rising Soviet threat in 
South Asia, where Pakistan could be the ‘brick wall’ to stop further Soviet expansion.11 
He tried to draw American attention to the ‘Great Game’ between the Soviet Union and 
the British Empire, connecting it to the idea that calls for separate ‘Pashtunistan’ in the 
North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) were part of a Soviet conspiracy to develop its 
footprint in the region.12  
However, much to his dismay, the US refused to find relevance in its relationship with 
Pakistan at a time when Europe, the Middle East and China were its main concern. 
 
7 Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2014), 4. 
8 Muhammad Jinnah, speech on the partition of Bengal and the Punjab, 4 May 1947, National Archives of 
British Government. 
9 Lubna Sunawar and Tatiana Coutto, ‘U.S. Pakistan Relations during the Cold War’, The Journal of 
International Relations, Peace Studies, and Development 1, no. 1 (2015), Article 6. 
10 Muhammad Jinnah, quoted in Dennis Cux, ‘The United States and Pakistan, 1947–2000: Disenchanted 
Allies’, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2001), 21. 
11 Cux, ‘The United States and Pakistan’, 20. 
12 Cux, ‘The United States and Pakistan’, 21. 
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Hence, Pakistan struggled to woo the US in the early years of independence, and despite 
repeated calls for military assistance,13 the US refused to entertain Pakistan’s requests.14 
For the US, India, despite its close ties to Soviet Union, was seen as a preferable 
partner, given its size and significance to the Soviet Union. This early struggle to 
acquire an American alliance embedded an idea within the civil–military establishment 
of Pakistan that in the presence of a bigger and more powerful neighbor (India), 
Pakistan would never have the same level of significance to the superpowers on the 
global stage. It therefore realised that it had to rely on Western fears to secure Western 
support and a long-term, sustainable partnership. This very experience of Pakistan 
points to its core foreign and security policy, even in the post-11 September attacks 
setting of using the ‘terrorist’ threat as a way of locking the US into a strategic 
partnership. This illustrates the way Pakistan, even before the emergence of the 
security–development nexus in the Western policy debate, was actively using the 
underdevelopment and fragility within its borders as a tactic to woo the US into a long-
term partnership with Pakistan: that is, exerting its agency in co-producing the nexus.  
Eventually, the situation worked for Pakistan, with President Mossadegh taking office 
in Iran in 1951 and nationalising the oil industry, threatening the British and American 
interests.15 As noted by McMahon, Pakistan came to be an important country in terms of 
the US national security objectives, to establish air bases and intelligence systems for its 
larger West Asia policy. 16  For Pakistan, this was not an ideal scenario, as it had 
imagined collaborating with the US against India and Afghanistan, both states that had 
strong ties with the Soviet Union and were major foes of Pakistan. However, it was a 
way for Pakistan to begin to benefit from the dependency of the US. With US support, 
Pakistan became a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in 1954 
and Baghdad Pact in 1955, in return providing the US with airbases inside the country. 
In 1958, Pakistan’s military dictator-turned-President Ayub Khan stated:  
We need friends for our security; we shall hold fast to those we have and we shall 
seek new friends because the more friends we have the better it is for our country. We 
 
13 According to Cux, ‘The United States and Pakistan’, Pakistan requested $2 billion of economic and 
military aid to the US in 1947 but received only $10 million for Pakistan’s basic needs.  
14 M. S. Venkataramani, The American Role in Pakistan (1947–1958) (New Delhi: Vanguard Books, 
1982). 
15 Hamza Alavi, ‘Pakistan US Military Alliance’, Economic and Political Weekly 33, no. 25 (1998): 
1551–57. 
16 Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994).  
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shall stand by our commitments and prove that we are steady, dependable friends.17  
While Pakistan won the support of America, it was not easy, consistent or reliable, as 
Pakistan saw in its two wars with India in 1965 and 1971, when the US refused to help 
Pakistan and, after the wars, imposed sanctions on it.18 The leadership in Pakistan came 
to see the alliance with the US as being one-sided, focused only on the security of the 
US, not on that of Pakistan. This again reflects one of the strong critiques of the 
security–development nexus around the question of ‘whose security’ is meant through 
the nexus. 
During the Cold War, the relationship with the US and forthcoming foreign assistance 
varied tremendously, based upon Pakistan’s need according to the American military 
interests and Pakistan’s domestic ambitions. The Americans were interested in having 
Pakistan on their side for military bases in an important geostrategic location, but the 
Americans had no interest in catering to Pakistan’s regional security concerns with 
India—a point that caused anxiety in Pakistan’s leadership.19 For Pakistan, the great 
highs and deep lows of its unsteady relationship with the US was a matter of concern, 
given that Pakistan could not afford isolation and abandonment from its main security 
partner. Therefore, Pakistan devised a way to cling close to the US for as long as 
possible, to serve American interests in the region while simultaneously and silently 
catering for its own security needs against India and Afghanistan.  
This became most noticeable in the mid-1970s, when after years of insistence and 
lobbying, the US finally agreed to become involved in supporting the Jihad against the 
Soviet Union in Afghanistan, making Afghanistan the ‘Vietnam of the Soviet Union’.20 
This is contrary to the common perception of Pakistan being a victim, that the US ‘used’ 
Pakistan to fight its war in Afghanistan and, in the end, left Pakistan ‘high and dry’. In 
reality, it was the exact opposite. Through diplomatic manoeuvres, Pakistan created 
hysteria in the US policy community with the idea of the Soviet Union marching from 
Afghanistan and taking over Pakistan for access to a warm-water port.21 The situation in 
Iran compounded American fears and renewed US interest in Pakistan. The Iranian 
 
17 Ayub Khan, Speeches and Statements (1959–66). Vol. I (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, 1966, 61). 
18 Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan, 126. 
19 Sunawar and Coutto, ‘U.S. Pakistan Relations’, 6. 
20 George Crile, Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in 
History (New York: Grove Press, 2003).  
21 Interview with a former Pakistan Army official, Islamabad, 20 June 2016. 
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Revolution in 1979 and Soviet involvement in Afghanistan had the US, under President 
Jimmy Carter, lift the sanctions on Pakistan that had been imposed because of 
Pakistan’s pursuit of a nuclear program and the military takeover by General Zia ul 
Haq. 22  The decade that followed saw unprecedented US–Pakistan relations, with 
billions of dollars of security and development assistance flowing into Pakistan to train 
Islamists to wage a Jihad against the Soviet Union.  
As Pakistan took on the overwhelming burden of fighting the Afghan War, its close 
cooperation with the US and billions of dollars of aid gave Pakistan an advantage in two 
ends. First, it enabled Pakistan to pursue its nuclear development program23 at a rapid 
speed, as General Zia ul Haq realised that given the dependency of the US on Pakistan 
in the Afghan War, the US would turn a blind eye on the nuclear issue.24 Second, 
through the extensive support of the US, Pakistan was able to create an entire network 
of Islamist guerrilla forces that, after the Cold War, would help in its policy of ‘strategic 
depth’ 25  in Afghanistan and take the fight to Kashmir against the Indian forces. 26 
However, there was a problem. The abrupt end of the Afghan War and, with that, the 
Cold War brought out the worst fears of Pakistan and the US. Because of its 
dependency in the Afghan War, the US did not raise a concern over Pakistan’s nuclear 
build-up which eventually would go on to become a major problem in the regional 
power balance. For its part, Pakistan feared being isolated once again, which meant 
discontinued patronage from the US and no cover of security or development 
assistance—that is, Pakistan was on its own.  
However, Pakistan now had a fundamental safeguard in the form of a nuclear bomb, 
which not only gave it stability and strength but also, and more importantly, gave 
Pakistan the long-needed significance on the global stage, which would help with its 
insecurities in the region.27 In addition, its nuclear bomb gave Pakistan a trump card in 
 
22 Bruce Riedel, What We Won: America’s Secret War in Afghanistan, 1979–1989 (Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press, 2014), 98–99. 
23 Stephen Cohen, South Asia Papers: A Critical Anthology of Writings (Washington, DC: The Brookings 
Institution, 2016).  
24 Rabia Akhtar, The Blind Eye: US Non-Proliferation Policy towards Pakistan from Ford to Clinton 
(Lahore: University of Lahore Press, 2018). 
25 The idea of strategic depth means many things but in its basic sense it refers to Pakistan’s interest in 
having a friendly government in Afghanistan so that people do not have to deal with the India–
Afghanistan nexus on either its eastern or western border.  
26 Samina Yasmeen, Jihad and Dawah: Evolving Narratives of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jamad ud Dawah 
(London: C. Hurst & Co, 2017).  
27 Interview with a senior intelligence official of Pakistan, Islamabad, 10 May 2016. 
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pursuing asymmetrical warfare against India, with a guarantee that war would not 
escalate beyond a certain point because of international pressure and concerns over 
nuclear fallout.28 In a way, Pakistan acquired immense strength from its position of 
weakness by ‘holding a hand grenade in a room full of people’29 in case it was cornered. 
As well, it gave Pakistan a well-grounded strategy to keep the US engaged with 
Pakistan, based on the element of fear. Pakistan was able to do this because of its close 
understanding of the way the US foreign policy establishment worked.  
Hence, in the light of Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions, the 1990s saw a complete reduction 
of US–Pakistan relations and foreign assistance to Pakistan under the Glenn-Symington 
(1977) and Pressler Amendments (1985). These amendments were intended to ensure 
that the aid Pakistan received from the US would not be used to pursue its nuclear 
capacity or the proliferation of nuclear material. While the US Government had been 
well aware of Pakistan’s nuclear program since the 1980s, it kept providing a ‘waiver’ 
to the Congress so that Pakistan could receive billions of dollars in aid to fight the 
Soviets.30 Once the Soviet threat ended, Pakistan received a major blow as the US 
imposed sanctions at a time when Afghanistan had collapsed and Pakistan had been left 
alone to bring stability to its neighbourhood. The Cold War between the two 
superpowers may have ended, but the civil war in Afghanistan between different Jihadi 
groups who had been armed and trained by the ISI and the CIA had only just begun.  
With over 3 million Afghan refugees pouring into Pakistan, civil war raging and 
extreme poverty, Pakistan had struggled to bring stability to Afghanistan on its own, by 
reconciliation and giving birth to the Afghan Taliban to bring some level of peace and 
stability in Afghanistan.31 Hence, the US sanctions on Pakistan came at a very bad time 
and escalated the situation in the region into a threat for the international community. 
The security–development nexus was the result of this threat, aiming to secure the weak 
countries ravaged by wars, to secure the developed countries. However, as this study 
seeks to demonstrate, it was much more than that.  
 
28 Cohen, South Asia Papers. 
29 Interview with a US think tank expert on Pakistan, Washington DC, 12 October 2016. 
30  Rabia Akhtar, ‘The Correct Narrative on Pressler’, Dawn, 29 May 2017, 
https://www.dawn.com/news/1335979. 
31 Interview with a former senior military official, Rawalpindi, 29 August 2016. 
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The Pakistani policymakers, military and people felt betrayed, abandoned and isolated 
by the US exiting the region in such haste, leaving it in a mess. I interviewed the 
Director General of the ISI from that era, who said:  
We were the front-line state against the Soviet Union that suffered immensely, and 
when the War was over, while the world rejoiced, we were abandoned and left alone 
to clean up the superpowers’ mess in Afghanistan. We got a reality check that the US 
will never be a strategic partner of Pakistan and was interested only in short-term 
military engagements. We naturally adjusted ourselves to this reality and since then, 
have continued to cooperate with the US on a short-term basis, with back-up 
options.32 
While the view above presents Pakistan as a victim of American negligence, another 
senior official of the ISI expressed the opposite view, holding that the security 
establishment in Pakistan expected the sanctions because of its nuclear program and, 
therefore, was ready to adjust itself to the post-Cold War reality. My interviews with 
both ISI officials suggested that, as a weaker power, Pakistan continually adjusts itself 
to the US global posture. That is, if the US foreign policy establishment does not see 
Pakistan as a strategic partner, Pakistan adjusts itself as a short-term ally of the US, to 
make the most out of the US needs in the region. It is interesting to note that, unlike 
other postcolonial states that have had movements against foreign influence and 
imperialism, Pakistan, to the contrary, has historically invited and eagerly embraced the 
foreign presence in the country and has even blamed the West, especially the US, for 
abandoning the country. This is because the active presence of the US in Pakistan has 
allowed Pakistan not only extensive military and economic assistance but also 
protection against any Indian aggression towards Pakistan.  
Hence, the decade of the 1990s is marked as the era of the mistrust between the US and 
Pakistan that has continued to guide Pakistan’s US policy, including at the time of the 
KLB Act. Many US policymakers now say that the US should not have abandoned 
Pakistan after the Cold War, especially when US sanctions did not help to stop Pakistan 
from acquiring its nuclear warhead and instead, radicalised an entire generation of 
Pakistan’s military and political elite against the US. 33  Moreover, the decade of 
sanctions led to a surge in poverty, militancy and terrorism in the Afghanistan and 
 
32 Interview with a former director general of the ISI, Islamabad, 16 July 2016. 
33 Hillary Clinton, Secretary of State (speech, US Congress, 28 April 2009).  
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Pakistan region, which eventually led to the events of 11 September, thus ending the 
US–Pakistan separation as Pakistan once again became the front-line state for the US 
war on terrorism, this time in Afghanistan.  
It is important to note here that this ‘guilt’34 in the US policy community for abandoning 
Pakistan has been the discourse of Pakistan, which took years to become established in 
the US, to ensure that the US continued its involvement in the region.35 The core of this 
argument is actually the fundamental assumptions of the security–development nexus, 
that the weak and underdeveloped states pose a direct threat to the Western countries. 
Pakistan’s use of this narrative pre-dates well before the security–development nexus 
becoming a dominant discourse in the Western donor states. This is evidenced in my 
interviews with the security establishment of Pakistan, who say that despite all the 
criticism and wrongs of the US, they prefer and advocate for a continued US presence in 
the Afghanistan and Pakistan region. Pakistan knows it is only relevant if the US needs 
it in Afghanistan. That is what gives it agency from a position of weakness.  
This historical context brings our attention to the way, historically, Pakistan has played 
on the fears of the US to achieve its own strategic interests, while simultaneously 
complaining about its sovereignty being under threat. Taking this historical context as a 
framework for understanding the thought processes of Pakistan’s security establishment, 
the next sections study the politics of the security–development nexus in the context of 
the KLB Act. They do this in terms of the way Pakistan locked the US into a dependent 
relationship through the nexus and the way that fighting the US war on terrorism was 
aligned with its own security interests with respect to India and Afghanistan.  
4.3 The Dependency Trap 
In the aftermath of the 11 September attacks, US relations with Pakistan were heavily 
based on security and military aspects, with no broader goals, which created anxiety in 
Pakistan that it could see another abrupt US withdrawal from the region. The question 
for the civil–military leadership of Pakistan was how to avoid having an abrupt 
withdrawal of the US from the region and global isolation, repeating their experience of 
a decade before. 
 
34 The ‘guilt trip’ is referred to in Schaffer and Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates, as one of the three 
negotiating techniques of the Pakistan security establishment in its relationship with the US.  
35 Interview with a former ambassador of Pakistan to the US, Washington, DC, 10 October 2016. 
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My interviews with the state officials in Pakistan revealed one dominant answer: lock 
the US into a long-term plan in the region through a security–development nexus, 
creating a US dependency on Pakistan.36 This is what was achieved through the KLB 
Act in Pakistan, which amplified the indivisibility of security and development, shifting 
the responsibility for the war on terrorism onto Pakistan, as well as ensuring safeguards 
against nuclear proliferation. One of the military officials that I interviewed identified 
this dependency on two levels. First, it aimed to ensure that the US was reminded 
constantly of its past with Pakistan and its abandonment of the region after the Cold 
War, to avoid that situation recurring. Second, it promoted and embraced the discourse 
of Pakistan being a weak state with nuclear weapons, but on the verge of collapse, to 
raise the stakes with regard to abandoning Pakistan. This would ensure long-term US 
security and development cooperation and presence in the region. 37  To test this, I 
examined the official statements of Pakistan in its relations with the US and found that 
consecutive governments, political leaders and military officials repeated the same 
rhetoric, that the US abandonment of Pakistan at the end of the Cold War was the core 
reason for a trust deficit between the two countries and the fragile conditions in 
Pakistan. For instance, Musharraf, in his interview with Wolf Blitzer on CNN, noted 
that at the end of the Cold War, Pakistan was ‘left alone’ by the US to deal with the 
trained Jihadis that destabilised Pakistan.38 Similarly, in his article for the New York 
Times, President Asif Ali Zardari complained, ‘When the Soviets were defeated and left 
in 1989, the US abandoned Pakistan and created a vacuum in Afghanistan, resulting in 
the current horror’.39 Similar discourse is present at the diplomatic level as well, with 
Pakistan continuing to remind the US of its role in the crisis that grips Pakistan, to 
ensure continued US support for the country.  
 
36 This notion was echoed in the interviews with civil–military officials in Pakistan, who advocated for a 
larger US role in the region. One common point made in the conversation was to emphasise that the US 
should go beyond just security assistance , instead, invest equally, if not more, in economic assistance, to 
have a stable Pakistan. In a way, nexus or its enactment in the form of the KLB Act is essentially as much 
of a product of recipient countries such as Pakistan as it is of the US. 
37 Interview with a former major general of the Military Operations branch of the Pakistan Army, Lahore, 
July 10 2016. 
38  Pervez Musharraf, interview by Wolf Blitzer, CNN, 23 January 2009, 
https://www.dailymotion.com/video/xfqoq. 
39  Asif Ali Zardari, ‘How to Mend Fences with Pakistan’, New York Times, 9 December 2009, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/10/opinion/10zardari.html. 
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Christine Fair and Sumit Ganguly, writing for Foreign Affairs, are critical of what they 
call the Pakistani establishment-created myth of being ‘too dangerous to fail’, to keep 
the US hooked to Pakistan. They write that Islamabad:  
pretty much convinced Washington to stay engaged no matter what because its 
country’s fleet of terrorists and its fast-growing nuclear arsenal made it ‘too 
dangerous to fail.’ In fact, Pakistan encouraged Americans to fear the worst outcome: 
a rupture in the state security apparatus that would allow terrorists to get their hands 
on Pakistani nuclear know-how, fissile materials, or weapons—even as Pakistan used 
US funds to invest in such assets along the way.40  
Fair and Ganguly provide good evidence for the way Pakistan reproduced the fragility 
discourse around it to ensure the long-term support of the US. This is in stark contrast to 
the popular narrative in Pakistan and, globally, that Pakistan’s security establishment is 
weary of the US presence and the continued war in Afghanistan, and wants the US to 
end the war and leave the region. In reality, the state officials that I interviewed for this 
thesis, despite having no love for the US, advocated for a continued US presence in the 
region. In fact, the officials said that the Pakistan has extensively lobbied the US to stay 
in the region until there is some semblance of peace. This is because, for Pakistan, a US 
withdrawal from the region, with Afghanistan in chaos, would mean another decade of 
isolation and perhaps sanctions. In addition, it would mean that Pakistan would have 
less ability to pursue its regional policy in India and Afghanistan. Therefore, after the 
Obama Administration took office in 2008, Pakistan actively pursued the nexus 
discourse through its ‘friends’41 in Washington, DC. One former intelligence officer of 
the ISI who worked on the America desk commented:  
We routinely dispatched notable academics, politicians and funded seminars in 
Washington DC to remind the US not to make the same mistake it did at the end of 
the Cold War by abandoning Pakistan with a mess in Afghanistan. Our goal was 
simple; we want the US to not ignore its past mistakes and take ownership of playing 
a big role in the region by providing us with both security and development 
 
40 Christine C. Fair and Sumit Ganguly, ‘Pakistan and the Myth of “Too Dangerous to Fail’, Foreign 
Affairs, 8 January 2018, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/pakistan/2018-01-08/pakistan-and-myth-
too-dangerous-fail. 
41 There is a very strong and closely knit group of ‘friends of Pakistan’ in the US comprising former US 
diplomats, congressmen, businessmen and numerous think tankers. 
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assistance, along with political support at international forums.42  
The interviews I conducted with members of the Obama Administration recognised that 
the US had been at fault for leaving Pakistan ‘high and dry’ after the Cold War. This is 
evidenced in US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s speech in her congressional 
hearings in April 2009, in which she said: 
We can point fingers at the Pakistanis. I did some yesterday frankly. And it’s merited 
because we are wondering why they just don’t go out there and deal with these people 
… But the problems we face now to some extent we have to take responsibility for, 
having contributed to it. We also have a history of kind of moving in and out of 
Pakistan. Let’s remember here ... the people we are fighting today, we funded them 
twenty years ago ... and we did it because we were locked in a struggle with the 
Soviet Union. They invaded Afghanistan ... and we did not want to see them control 
Central Asia and we went to work ... and it was President Reagan in partnership with 
Congress led by Democrats who said, ‘You know what it sounds like a pretty good 
idea ... let’s deal with the ISI and the Pakistan military and let’s go recruit these 
mujahideen. And great, let them come from Saudi Arabia and other countries, 
importing their Wahabi brand of Islam so that we can go beat the Soviet Union’. And 
guess what ... they (Soviets) retreated ... they lost billions of dollars and it led to the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. So there is a very strong argument which is ... it wasn’t 
a bad investment in terms of [the] Soviet Union but let’s be careful with what we sow 
... because we will harvest. So we then left Pakistan ... We said okay fine you deal 
with the Stingers that we left all over your country ... you deal with the mines that are 
along the border and ... by the way we don’t want to have anything to do with you ... 
in fact we’re sanctioning you ... So we stopped dealing with the Pakistani military and 
with ISI and we now are making up for a lot of lost time.43 
That the US had a part in sponsoring armed Islamist resistance against the Soviet Union 
during the Afghan War, then leaving the region in havoc, imposing economic and 
security sanctions once the Cold War ended, is essentially a reflection of the nexus 
discourse that Pakistan promoted in the US and that Clinton endorsed. It covered how 
and why the 11 September attacks happened and what must be done in the future. 
Clinton’s statement was widely celebrated and considered a triumph for Pakistan’s 
security establishment; having the US confess its errors in its relations with Pakistan 
 
42 Interview with a brigadier of the ISI, Islamabad, 1 August 2016. 
43 Hillary Clinton, confirmation speech (US Congress, 13 January 2009).  
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established the start of a new era under Obama. The Obama Administration genuinely 
appeared to believe that Pakistan’s reluctance to make every effort to deal with 
terrorism was rooted in its deep anxiety that the US would abandon the region once 
again, leaving Pakistan alone to deal with the problems of militancy, poverty and 
instability in the Afghanistan and Pakistan region. 44  Therefore, as a show of 
commitment, the US gave Pakistan what it had wanted since 1947—a long-term 
security and development assistance plan in the form of the KLB Act, something that 
the civil–military officials in Pakistan said Pakistan had pursued extensively, but failed 
to achieve, under the Bush Administration. However, the Obama Administration 
misunderstood the Pakistan problem by believing the tailored Pakistani discourse on the 
reasons for the ‘trust deficit’ between the US and Pakistan and the reasons for terrorism 
in the region. In reality, Pakistan’s inaction was mostly out of self-interest, to seem to be 
fighting the war on terrorism but only delivering the bare minimum required to keep the 
US engaged on its side. The evidence of this can be found in the article by Benazir 
Bhutto for The Guardian. She wrote: 
The new Pakistani dictator, General Pervez Musharraf, has played the West like a 
fiddle, dispensing occasional support in the war on terrorism … to keep it in the good 
graces of Washington, while it presides over a society that fuels and empowers 
militants at the expense of moderates.45  
Her article highlighted the duplicitous role of the Pakistan Government under General 
Musharraf, which for this study reflects the agency that Pakistan was able to exert in its 
relations with the US through the security–development nexus.  
Under the Obama Administration, the situation appeared to be moving in the right 
direction for Pakistan. In fact, US President Obama stated:  
In the past we too often defined our relationship with Pakistan narrowly. Those days 
are over. Moving forward, we are committed to a partnership with Pakistan that is 
built on a foundation of mutual interest, mutual respect, and mutual trust … And 
going forward the Pakistan people must know America will remain a strong supporter 
of Pakistan’s security and prosperity long after the guns have fallen silent, so that the 
 
44 Interview with a former US Congressional aide who worked on the KLB Act, Washington, DC, 21 
October 2016. 
45  Benazir Bhutto, ‘The Price of Dictatorship’, Guardian, 22 August 2006, 
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2006/aug/23/comment.pakistan. 
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great potential of its people is unleashed.46 
Moreover, in his early speeches, Obama caused much surprise and anger in India by 
demonstrating the US willingness to become involved in the Kashmir issue, to broker 
peace between India and Pakistan.47 Obama’s statements on Kashmir were music to the 
Pakistani establishment ears and indicated how deeply Pakistan’s discourse in 
Washington, DC, had been absorbed. One reason that Pakistan’s discourse gained so 
much traction was that it aligned the security–development nexus with Pakistan being a 
weak and crumbling nuclear-powered state, the collapse of which presented a doomsday 
scenario. While this global image was partly a construction of the US and was 
reinforced further through the KLB Act, it was also a careful orchestration by Pakistan; 
right at the time that Obama took office.48  
For instance, on 23 April 2009, testifying to the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 
Hillary Clinton declared the situation in Pakistan to be ‘the mortal threat to safety and 
security’ of the US and the world at large. She was referring to Pakistan’s peace deal 
with Sufi Muhammad, a local Islamist leader of Tehreen-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-
Muhammadi (TNSM). Under the peace deal, Pakistan allowed TNSM to enforce sharia 
law in the Malakand and Swat regions of Pakistan, and in return, TNSM ceased their 
insurgency against Pakistan and promised to encourage other militants to do the same. 
Clinton’s remarks sent the US media into a blaze. The Washington Post used the 
headline ‘Defiant Taliban Forces Advance to within 60 Miles of Islamabad’.49 This was 
followed by a hard-hitting New York Times editorial on Pakistan, titled ‘60 Miles from 
Islamabad’, referring to the Taliban’s takeover of the Buner district of Pakistan.50 The 
New York Times presented a doomsday scenario, urging the US Government to act to 
prevent Pakistan’s nuclear weapons from falling into the hands of terrorists. It 
 
46 White House Office of the Press Secretary, ‘Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on the 
Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan’, press release, 1 December 2009. 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-
afghanistan-and-pakistan 
47 Myra Macdonald, ‘Obama’s Kashmir comments hit a raw nerve in India’, Reuters, 3 November 2008.  
http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/2008/11/03/obamas-kashmir-comments-hit-a-raw-nerve-in-india/ 
48 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 13 March 
2016. 
49 Pamela Constable, ‘Defiant Taliban Forces Advance to within 60 Miles of Islamabad’, Washington 
Post, 24 April 2009.  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/04/22/AR2009042200863.html 
50 ‘60 Miles from Islamabad’, New York Times, 26 April 2009. 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/27/opinion/27mon1.html 
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concluded by arguing, ‘Washington cannot afford to waste any more time figuring out 
the way forward—not with the Taliban 60 miles from Islamabad’.51 
With the foreign news reporting that the Taliban were camped outside Islamabad, the 
pressure on the Government of Pakistan mounted and the peace deal between the 
Government of Pakistan and TNSM collapsed. Sufi Muhammad blamed the 
Government of Pakistan for going back on its word under foreign direction. In May 
2009, Pakistan launched Operation Black Thunderstorm, and by August, it had cleared 
the Swat valley and adjacent areas of militant control. Pakistan’s ‘half-baked’ peace 
deal followed by a military operation was no accident. One of the former intelligence 
officials that I interviewed from that era remarked:  
The presence of US forces in Afghanistan gives [the] Pakistan Army leverage over 
the US. Hence, our actions and signals can create perceptions and force some policy 
changes the way it suits us.52  
The intelligence official was referring to Pakistan’s ability to play on the deep fear and 
delicate sensitivities of the US to create emergency-like situations, forcing the US to 
yield to Pakistan’s demands. Pakistan signing the peace deal with TNSM was a way to 
threaten the US. In a talk with Jon Stewart, then Ambassador of Pakistan, Husain 
Haqqani revealed that, in fact, the peace deal was a tactic by the Government of 
Pakistan to bring the militants out from their hiding into open fields, so it was easier for 
the Pakistan Army to capture and kill them.53 He presented it as a cunning move by 
Pakistan to root out terrorists from their safe havens.  
As cunning as it sounds, the view I gathered from my interviews with the military 
officials was that Pakistan’s security establishment, despite officially being on board 
with the US war on terrorism, continued to exert its agency and authority at will. 
Particularly when it came to Pakistan’s own national security needs, the security 
establishment had both partnered with the US and diverged from the US whenever it 
saw benefit in doing so. Thus, Pakistan knows how and when to attract the attention of 
the US and keep it tightly locked into its engagement with Pakistan under the security–
 
51 ‘60 miles from Islamabad’. 
52 Interview with a former director general of the ISI, Islamabad, 10 June 2016. 
53 Robert Mackey, ‘Sifting through the ‘debris of the past’ to make sense of Pakistan’s Taliban problem, 
New York Times, 14 May 2009. https://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/05/14/pakistans-daily-show-
diplomacy/?hp 
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development nexus discourse. The alarming threat of Taliban being just 60 miles from 
Islamabad raised the stakes and resulted in the KLB Act, an enactment of the nexus that 
provided the largest package of security and development assistance for Pakistan. It 
locked the US into its complicated relations with Pakistan, achieving Pakistan’s long-
held foreign policy goal of creating an interdependent relationship with the US. 
Although the language and conditions of the KLB Act were not entirely suited to 
Pakistan’s expectations, it was nevertheless a major win for Pakistan’s security 
establishment in terms of influencing US foreign policy and keeping the US engaged in 
the region through the security–development nexus.  
In a way, it can be argued that the global discourse on Pakistan as being a fragile and 
weak state on the verge of collapse is essentially a reinforcement of the nexus and being 
as much a product of the recipient countries as of the donor country. In addition, it 
shows that a recipient country such as Pakistan can use its image of being a fragile 
country on the brink of collapse to influence the foreign policy of a bigger power such 
as the US. The next section provides evidence for this argument, explaining the way 
Pakistan used the US dependency on Pakistan, through the KLB Act, in its favour in 
terms of modernising its armed forces and achieving its regional ambitions, all from a 
position of weakness. 
4.4 You Scratch My Back, I Scratch Yours 
Despite the Pakistan security establishment’s criticism with regard to the responsibility 
for the war on terrorism and the burden of blame being shifted onto Pakistan, as 
discussed in the previous chapter, it accepted the security–development nexus, enacted 
in the form of the KLB Act. What made the indivisibility of security and development 
so attractive to the security establishment of Pakistan? This paradox was the cornerstone 
of questions that I asked during my interviews with the military officials in Pakistan.54 
There was no compulsion for Pakistan to accept the KLB Act and it could have easily 
rejected the insulting terms, conditions and language of the aid it involved. Yet the 
Government of Pakistan accepted it and, in the years to come, even complained about it 
 
54 I was interested to explore Pakistan’s doubletalk, which was becoming apparent when I looked over the 
parliamentary speeches, official interviews with government officials on the KLB Act and my interviews. 
For instance, on the surface, the KLB Act was seen as an evil imperial design by the US to plunder 
Pakistan, and yet at the same time, Pakistan was not rejecting it but, instead, embracing it. The benefit 
that Pakistan was seeking in this arrangement became the centre of my research inquiry.  
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being ‘peanuts’. One former senior military official from that era explained this paradox 
as follows:  
The purpose was to create a strong interdependent relation with the US that could 
withstand the wartime pressures. Hence, we signed up for the KLB Act despite its 
deeply disturbing discourse because frankly, beggars cannot be choosers. Therefore, 
by pursuing the American interests, we expected in return to get our military forces 
and equipment modernised if the US wanted us to fight terrorists. In addition, we 
knew that we needed a US close partnership to serve our security interests in the 
region with Afghanistan and India. We told the Americans very clearly that if the 
threat from India to our sovereignty looms, we would continue to be distracted in the 
War on Terror. They promised to help us. So while the KLB was not the best of deals, 
it was better than nothing.55 
Thus, this military official explains how Pakistan, from a position of weakness, sought 
to achieve its regional security and military interests by accepting the otherwise 
controversial terms of the KLB Act and adjusting to the American pressure. The fact 
that the military official used the words ‘beggars can’t be choosers’ reflects the main 
argument of this thesis, that Pakistan positioned itself to make the most out of the 
security–development nexus. In my interviews with the military officials, asking them 
to list the benefits expected from the KLB Act, only two benefits came to prominence. 
One was the modernisation of Pakistan’s military equipment and the other was 
American help in Pakistan’s troubled relations with its neighbours. It is important to 
note that none of the interviewees saw the KLB Act as an opportunity for Pakistan in its 
fight against terrorism nor as a plan that could help Pakistan develop its economy or 
social sector—the supposed central goals of the KLB Act from the US lens. This is 
because Pakistan and the US saw terrorism from different perspectives. My interviews 
with the military officials showed that Pakistan categorised terrorist groups operating in 
the country on three levels. The first type of terrorist groups were those that posed a 
direct threat to Pakistan, such as Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).56  Second were 
groups that were a threat to only the US, Afghanistan or India, such as the Haqqani 
 
55 Interview with lieutenant general of the Pakistan Army, Lahore, 19 March 2016. 
56 TTP is the most lethal anti-state militant group inside Pakistan. Its two former leaders, Bait-ullah-
Mehsud and Hakeem ullah Mehsud, were both killed in a US drone strike at the behest of Pakistan. Its 
current leader, Maulana Fazlullah, is highest on Pakistan’s target list. The TTP was responsible for 
carrying out the attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar that killed over 150 schoolchildren.  
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network, the Taliban and Jamaat-ud-Dawa.57 The third category involved the groups 
that were a threat to both the US and Pakistan, such as al-Qaeda. While Pakistan was 
committed with the US to fight against al-Qaeda, it was reluctant to pursue groups that 
did no harm to Pakistan, for fear of opening up too many fronts within the country. 
However, under the KLB, the US forced Pakistan to pursue groups that Pakistan did not 
see as a threat.58 Therefore, the aid under the KLB was never seen as useful for fighting 
what one of the politicians called ‘People that America defines as terrorists but are just 
really our own people’.59  
Similarly, the KLB Act was never really seen as a game changer for Pakistan’s 
development or economy. Chaudhary Nisar Ali Khan, in his parliamentary speech 
criticising the KLB Act, reminded the parliament that such assistance packages barely 
‘trickled down to the ground’ because of heavy overhead costs, the inability of 
institutions to implement the programs and corruption. 60  The view in the military 
establishment of the perceived economic and development benefit of the KLB Act was 
similar. They saw negligible benefits and almost all of them referred to it as ‘peanuts’, a 
repeated term that reflects the level of coherence of the discourse on the KLB Act 
within the military establishment. In an interview with a civilian official at the interior 
ministry of Pakistan, I inquired about the reasons for Pakistan not seeing the KLB Act 
as anything more than a political tool of the US. He responded:  
The aid under the KLB Act makes up barely 1% of Pakistan’s total budget, and 
having an idea of how much of the promised aid actually gets disbursed, the 
Government never truly banked upon aid to change anything in the country. The only 
aid that actually mattered was the military aid that gets well absorbed into the 
institution and the results are visible. The rest of the development aid is really a sham 
to show people that the US not only cares about security issues but also cares about 
long-term stability and friendship with Pakistan. Honestly, with so much happening in 
the country and people getting desperate of Pakistan’s support to the War on Terror, 
the Americans needed to give a ‘lollipop’ to the people of Pakistan to appease them. 
 
57 Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) was formerly known as Lashkar-e-Taiba. The group is headed by Hafiz Saeed. 
JuD is considered a Kashmir resistance group in Pakistan and operates freely under the protection of the 
state.  
58 This includes basically the Haqqani Network and JuD.  
59 Interview with a senior political leader of a right-wing political party in Pakistan, Islamabad, 1 May 
2016. 
60 Nisar Ali Khan, the Federal Minister of Interior, Government of Pakistan (National Assembly speech, 
Islamabad, 30 August 2017). 
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The KLB Act was precisely that.61 
Thus, this civilian official indicates that the KLB Act was less about security and 
development assistance and more about the politics that was activated through the KLB 
Act, validating the idea that the nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, was little more 
than what Chandler identifies as a rhetorical façade.62 However, based on the evidence 
presented in this thesis, this rhetorical façade works to the benefit of both the donor and 
recipient countries—a nuance that is absent in the critical works of Chandler and several 
other critical scholars on the nexus. Despite all the rhetoric around it, the aid under the 
KLB Act amounted to only $15 per capita in Pakistan.63 More importantly, even by the 
USAID estimates, only half of the total $7.5 billion was ever disbursed,64 of which only 
$1 billion was materialised on the ground.65 In a way, the Pakistani state officials in 
Pakistan rightly predicted, through their historical experience as a recipient state, how 
little the KLB Act would really contribute to the country’s economy and development. 
Therefore, for Pakistan, the KLB Act, as an enactment of the nexus, was really a 
strategic political tool to engage the US in the region for goals beyond economic and 
development.  
As noted earlier, one of the goals revealed by my interviews with military officials was 
the modernisation of Pakistan’s military forces and the ability to continue receiving US 
military assistance in terms of technology, training and equipment. For instance, under 
the Obama Administration’s plan to reduce Pakistan’s anxiety over its fear of isolation 
and the threat from India, numerous military deals were continued and allowed, in three 
categories. The first category was the military equipment paid by the US under Foreign 
Military Financing. The second was the equipment paid through a mix of Foreign 
Military Financing and Pakistan’s national funds. The third was the equipment bought 
by Pakistan entirely through its own funds. Under these categories, Pakistan received 
 
61 Interview with a civil official of the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 10 
August 2016. 
62 David Chandler, ‘The Security–Development Nexus and the Rise of “Anti-Foreign Policy”’, Journal of 
International Relations and Development 10, no. 4 (2007): 362–86. 
63  See Net Official Development Assistance received per capita in the World Bank data sets, 
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ODAT.PC.ZS. 
64 Spokesperson for the US Embassy, Islamabad, quoted in ‘KLB Act Expires before Providing Pakistan 
Full Aid Committed by US’, The News, 7 December 2014, 
https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/541158. 
65 The officials of the Economic Affairs Division give this figure. According to them, it is hard to assess 
accurately, since much aid was spent by the US directly through NGOs and, in some cases, without the 
knowledge of the Pakistan Government.  
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over a billion dollars’ worth of F-16 aircraft, PC-3 Orion, Cobra helicopters, night-
vision goggles, advanced satellites and numerous other types of military and defence 
equipment.66 The official US policy was that this military equipment was to prepare and 
equip Pakistan to fight terrorism in the country. However, having F-16s equipped with a 
nuclear delivery system, PC-3 Orion designed for maritime surveillance and with an 
anti-submarine warhead system, and over 100 Harpoon anti-ship missiles was really to 
enhance Pakistan’s defences and reduce its anxiety over India. The Obama 
Administration mistakenly believed that the safer Pakistan felt in its military power 
equation with India, the more inclined it would be to pursue terrorists inside its own 
borders. This misperception was articulated by Obama in his article in Foreign Affairs 
magazine.67 He wrote, ‘If Pakistan can look toward the east with greater confidence, it 
will be less likely to believe that its interests are best advanced through cooperation with 
the Taliban’. 68  This misperception was not an accident. The narrative had been 
sponsored by the Government of Pakistan through years of diplomatic and intelligence 
efforts in Washington, DC. Schaffer and Schaffer rightly point out the way Pakistan can 
walk a fine line in Washington, DC, through its exceptional diplomatic manoeuvring.69 
One former Pakistani diplomat that I interviewed on the subject, who was involved 
directly with US–Pakistan relations during the Obama Administration, was candid:  
The US continues to question why Pakistan doesn’t go after terrorists, and it keeps 
coming up with its own theories and answers. It then asks us in meetings if so-and-so 
reason is what makes Pakistan reluctant to go after the Taliban or LeT [Lashkar-e-
Taiba]. We just smile and say nothing. They take it as a yes! The truth is that it is 
neither a yes nor a no, but it serves us because it gives us what we want and we 
maintain plausible deniability. Our reluctance to fight the groups that the US wants us 
to go after has nothing to do with our security concerns [regarding] India. If anything, 
the survival of these groups in the region gives Pakistan significance in the 
geopolitics of the region.70  
Pakistan’s use of terrorist organisations to conduct cross-border strikes in India and 
Afghanistan are well documented, but this aspect of Pakistan holding onto terrorist 
 
66 See K. Alan Kronstadt, Major U.S. Arms Sales and Grants to Pakistan Since 2001 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 4 May 2015). 
67 Barack Obama, ‘Renewing American Leadership’, Foreign Affairs 86, no. 4 (2007): 10. 
68 Obama, ‘Renewing American Leadership’, 10. 
69 Teresita C. Schaffer and Howard B. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States: Riding 
the Roller Coaster, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2011), 
70 Interview with a former Pakistani diplomat, Washington, DC, 1 November 2016. 
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organisations as a way to avoid isolation and continue its global and regional relevance 
is something that came out of my interviews with military officials in Pakistan. This 
view was echoed in an interview with a retired senior intelligence official, who was 
very critical of Pakistan’s security establishment role in the war on terrorism. According 
to him, the Pakistan Army had not just been playing a ‘double game’, as America liked 
to put it; in fact, it was playing a triple game. The first game was against the terrorists, 
hand in hand with the US in the war on terrorism. The second game was against the US, 
by smiling and saying nothing when the US continued to ask if the Taliban was under 
Pakistan’s control, giving a perception that Pakistan controlled the Taliban. The third 
game was against both the US and terrorists, by cooperating and playing them both at 
the same time. He said:  
The Pakistan Army understands that its relevance to the US is only based on its 
perceived control over Taliban. In other words, Taliban gives power and importance 
to Pakistan on the international stage. Truth is that Pakistan does not have control 
over Taliban, and never did for that matter. However, Pakistan Army has wrongly 
convinced and dodged the Americans into believing that Pakistan has command and 
control over Taliban. This has benefited us over the years in terms of military aid and 
US presence in the region. However, our lies have come back to haunt us because the 
US now blames Pakistan for a double game, and at the same time expects Pakistan to 
deliver on Taliban—something that Pakistan cannot do. What we are basically left 
with is a mess of our doubletalk with the US.71  
This senior military official was a rare case of a Pakistani military or intelligence 
official departing from the institution’s set discourse that paints Pakistan as a victim of 
American aggression and foreign policy under the KLB Act. However, after several 
rounds of interviews and establishing the right level of comfort, I began to understand 
the extent to which Pakistan’s security establishment had been able to exert its agency 
in its relations with the US. This was especially in terms of persuading the US to grant 
the KLB Act, locking the US into what is called a ‘bad marriage’72 with Pakistan. This 
indicates the way Pakistan involved the US in its regional power play with Afghanistan 
and India, their second goal in embracing the security–development nexus, enacted by 
the KLB Act.  
 
71 Interview with a former senior ISI official, Islamabad, 12 August 2016. 
72 This term is attributed to Dennis Cux, former US diplomat to Pakistan, who said it at a seminar in 
Islamabad in November 2011.  
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For instance, on numerous occasions, Pakistan, playing through the security–
development nexus, threatened to move its troops away from the fight in tribal areas, 
back to its eastern borders with India, if the US would not help in pacifying the ties 
between the two countries.73 This was especially true in the aftermath of the Mumbai 
attacks (2008) in India, when Pakistan feared that India would wage a ground attack on 
Pakistan. The presence of over 100,000 Pakistani troops along the Afghanistan border 
provided much-needed support to the US military operation in Afghanistan in terms of 
drawing out terrorists from their safe havens and restricting their movements.74 Pakistan 
has historically lobbied and encouraged a third-party involvement in resolving the 
Kashmir and larger India–Pakistan issue, something that India has detested. Hence, 
having the US locked into a tightly dependent relationship with Pakistan through the 
security–development nexus allowed the military officials to press the Americans on 
‘getting the Indians off Pakistan’s back’. 75  However, it is not only for defensive 
purposes that Pakistan relies on the US. In November 2008, just as Obama won the US 
elections, 10 terrorists presumably from Pakistan launched an attack in Mumbai, killing 
over 150 people and injuring over 1,000. The US intervened and stopped India from 
waging an all-out war on Pakistan. The risk of an all-out confrontation between the two 
nuclear powers was one thing, but having Pakistan diverted from the war on terrorism 
by a war with India would have been a major blow to US interests in the region. 
Whether this plan was carefully orchestrated and timed by Pakistan’s security 
establishment at a time when Obama was just taking over the White House and could 
not afford a major foreign policy crisis or was conducted by rogue elements within 
Pakistan’s military and intelligence agencies remains an unresolved question. However, 
it is obvious that it is the complicated dependency of the US on Pakistan through the 
security–development nexus that allows the US to step in and protect Pakistan from a 
perceived Indian attack.  
Similarly, on the Western front, having the American presence in the region was a 
perfect moment for Pakistan to lobby for border fencing over the Durand Line, which 
the Afghanistan Government had denied Pakistan since 1947. The Afghan Government 
refuses to acknowledge the Durand Line and large parts of North-West Pakistan, 
 
73 K. Alan Kronstadt, Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, India, and Implications for US Interests (Washington, 
DC: Congressional Research Service, 19 December 2008), 16.   
74 Kronstadt, ‘Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai’, 16. 
75 Interview with a senior military official of the Pakistan Army, Lahore, 17 August 2016. 
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claiming it as Afghan territory taken over by the British during the colonial era and 
wrongly handed over to Pakistan instead of being returned to Afghanistan.76 Pakistan’s 
argument is that the cross-border terrorism from Pakistan to Afghanistan, and vice 
versa, requires a commonsense approach to fence the border to avoid attacks. However, 
Afghanistan saw it as Pakistan using ‘terrorism’ to inflate the fear of the US to settle an 
old territorial dispute. This was substantiated by my interview with a Pakistani civilian 
official who said:  
We can’t be blamed for cross-border terrorism if we are not allowed to fence the 
border. Either let us fence the border, or the Afghan and US Governments should 
continue to face [the] terrorism that they blame on us.77 
The military institution was on the same page on this subject. One brigadier who 
worked as Pakistan’s Defence Attaché to Kabul remarked:  
Americans were fully on board with the idea to fence the Durand Line, which is 
natural response to stop cross-border terrorism. However, later it realised that it was a 
big political issue for the Pashtuns in Kabul and so the Americans backed off from the 
subject. Now, when there is terrorism, we are getting blamed from both the 
Americans and Afghans. I say to them in meetings, ‘let us fence the border’, to which 
the Afghans don’t respond positively.78  
The views above reflect why The Soviet–Afghan War in the 1980s was seen by 
Pakistan as an opportunity to pacify a threat on its Western borders by installing a 
favourable and friendly Taliban regime. That project was dismantled by the US after the 
11 September attacks and its refusal to negotiate with the Taliban. However, the active 
threat of the Taliban and cross-border attacks on the US forces from Pakistan locked the 
US into a long-term security–development nexus trap with Pakistan, which paved the 
way for the fencing of the Durand Line.  
Therefore, for many of the Pakistani state officials that I interviewed, the increased 
insecurity of the US in Afghanistan was seen as a way to achieve Pakistan’s long-
 
76 Frederic Grare, Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post 9/11 Era, (Washington DC: Carnegie  
Endowment for International Peace, 2006): 3.  
77 Interview with an official from the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 19 July 
2016.  
78 Interview with a brigadier of the Pakistan Army posted to Kabul as a defence attaché, Islamabad, 3 
May 2016. 
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standing and unresolved regional security issues, while benefiting in terms of 
modernising the Pakistan defences against its neighbours—evidence of the agency that 
Pakistan was able to exert through the KLB Act. The security–development nexus 
meant a lot more than just economic and security stability; it had deep political value for 
Pakistan in achieving its regional goals, even if that came at the expense of the US 
challenging Pakistan’s sovereignty by influencing its national security policy.  
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the way the security establishment in Pakistan, despite its 
criticism that the KLB Act is an attack on Pakistan’s sovereignty, embraced the KLB 
Act to serve its own interests from a position of relative weakness—what this thesis 
identifies as the politics of the security–development nexus. The chapter has challenged 
the literature on the security–development nexus by arguing that the security 
establishment was able to not only exert its agency through the nexus but also co-
produce the nexus to draw benefits on the national security and foreign policy front. 
This has been demonstrated by fleshing out the early history of the way Pakistan saw its 
relations with the US, revealing its long-held grievances against the US, including the 
transactional nature of the relationship and global isolation. In addition, it has revealed 
Pakistan’s need for having a long-term, mutually dependent relationship with the US, to 
support Pakistan’s regional security ambitions.  
Proceeding with the historical background as a context, through direct interviews with 
Pakistani state officials, the chapter has identified two ways in which Pakistan exerted 
its agency through the KLB Act. First, the very perception of Pakistan as a weak state 
with nuclear weapons helps Pakistan to create an emergency-like situation, raising the 
stakes for the US to involve itself in Pakistan’s long-term security and development 
through initiatives like the security–development nexus, enacted by KLB Act. Second, 
by becoming a front-line state for the US in the war on terrorism, Pakistan was quietly 
able to modernise its armed forces and military equipment to deal with the larger threat 
of India. Similarly, by having the US dependent on Pakistan’s support in the war on 
terrorism, Pakistan was able to achieve its long-term policies of fencing the Durand 
Line and pursuing asymmetrical warfare against India, with a guarantee that the US 
would intervene to protect Pakistan from Indian aggression.  
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The chapter has demonstrated that studying the voices of civil–military actors in a 
recipient country such as Pakistan reveals so much nuance. This includes the ability to 
explore the level of agency that Pakistan is able to exert in its relations with the US 
from a position of weakness and the way the nexus is co-produced by the actors in 
recipient countries, to serve their own strategic interests.  
The next chapter explores the politics of the security–development nexus by examining 
the KLB Act as being a challenge to Pakistan’s sovereignty in terms of interference in 
their civil–military relations, and the way the civilian political actors in Pakistan were 
able to exert their agency to use the nexus to their advantage in the domestic civil–
military battle. 
 
122 
Chapter 5: Aiding the Civil–Military Divide 
 
 
We must start with a serious review of our investments in Pakistan to make sure that 
U.S. assistance is supporting democracy.1 
—Senator Barack Obama (2007) 
 
For over sixty years the US blindly supported Pakistan Army in its quest to crush 
democracy, dissent and liberal voices in the country because that suited it during the 
Cold War. Now that Pakistan Army is not on board with their adventures in the War on 
Terror, the US seeks to promote democracy in Pakistan through a few billion dollars 
under the KLB Act.2 
—Civilian official, Government of Pakistan  
 
The notion that more development will lead to more democracy in Pakistan which 
eventually will help ensure the security of the US is taken as a free pass by the US to 
interfere in Pakistan’s civil–military relations.3 
—Senior Pakistani journalist 
  
 
1 Barack Obama, ‘Obama Statement on State of Emergency in Pakistan’, The American Presidency 
Project, 5 November 2007, https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/obama-statement-state-
emergency-pakistan. 
2 Interview with a senior civil official, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 15 
August 2016. 
3 Interview with a senior Pakistani journalist, Islamabad, 12 June 2016. 
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5.1 Introduction 
On Thursday, 4 April 1979, at 2.00 am, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged to death in 
Pakistan after spending two years in prison on murder charges.4 Bhutto, an Oxford 
graduate, was one of the most charismatic leaders of Pakistan and was serving as the 
prime minister of the country when General Zia-ul-Haq toppled his government in a 
military coup in July 1977 and sent him to jail for the alleged murder of a political 
opponent. This was not the first time that a prime minister in Pakistan had faced such a 
tragic end. Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan’s first prime minister, was assassinated in 1951 
just as he was about to deliver a public speech in Rawalpindi.5 General Zia-ul-Haq, the 
military dictator of Pakistan who sent Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to the gallows, himself died in 
a mysterious air crash in 1988.  
On the surface, these events reflect a clear case of tense civil–military relations in 
Pakistan, a prevalent theme of the postcolonial states. However, it means a lot more 
than just a domestic civil–military debacle to the government officials in Pakistan that I 
interviewed and to the Pakistan public at large. In a country that has allied closely with 
the US in its Cold War and the war on terrorism, the assassinations of its former leaders 
are seen widely, by both the public and Pakistani state officials in Pakistan, as an 
American conspiracy to influence Pakistan’s political landscape. Bhutto was a socialist 
who initiated Pakistan’s nuclear program and attempted to shift Pakistan’s foreign 
policy posture away from the US towards China, Russia and the Muslim world. The 
notion of American involvement in his death is compounded by Bhutto’s death-memoir, 
If I Am Assassinated, written from his prison cell. 6  In it, Bhutto identified Henry 
Kissinger as being behind the political mayhem of that time in Pakistan. He noted that 
Kissinger, on his trip to Pakistan in 1976 (a year before the military coup that toppled 
Bhutto), warned him against pursuing the nuclear program, threatening, ‘We will make 
a horrible example out of you’.7 The Pakistani public believes that Bhutto stood up 
against American imperialism and paid for that with his life, becoming a legendary anti-
 
4 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s trial and death verdict by the courts under military rule is considered a dark period 
of legal abuse in Pakistan and is often referred to as the ‘judicial murder’ of a prime minister.  
5 He was shot by an Afghan assassin who was under strict surveillance by Pakistan’s intelligence services. 
Yet he was allowed to take the front seat during Khan’s public address. Instead of arresting the Afghan 
assassin, the security guards present quickly shot him dead, eliminating major evidence that could have 
revealed the conspiracy.  
6 The memoir was smuggled out of prison and published in India after Bhutto’s death in 1979.  
7 Tariq Ali, The Duel: Pakistan on the Flight Path of American Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
2009), 110. 
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imperial figure celebrated by both the left- and right-wing political corners of the 
country. A similar story is narrated with regard to Liaquat Ali Khan, who dared to defy 
the US by threatening to remove the US airbases provided by Pakistan and refused to 
oblige the US in its attempt to use Pakistan against Iran, which had recently elected 
President Mossadegh. 8  According to the common public perception, Zia ul Haq 
received the same fate, despite being a close ally of the US in the Soviet–Afghan War, 
for pursuing a nuclear weapons program after repeated attempts by the US to stop him 
from taking that path.9  
What might appear to be conspiracy theories or folklore to Western commentators is a 
powerful discourse in Pakistan on the pattern of US involvement in the political 
landscape of the developing world. For instance, the Pakistani state officials that I spoke 
to about US involvement in the civil–military relations in Pakistan were surprised that I 
could not see what was so obvious. They quoted examples of the US–British action in 
overthrowing the democratically elected government of President Mossadegh in Iran the 
moment he nationalised Iranian oil. They quoted far-away examples in Latin America, 
with the US overthrowing the government of Salvador Allende, the President of Chile,10 
and other governments in Guatemala and Nicaragua. However, most importantly and 
relevant to this thesis, they gave the example of the KLB Act as the most recent US 
attempt to influence civil–military relations in Pakistan. They asked me, ‘Why is it so 
hard to believe that the US is behind the civil–military tensions in Pakistan when there 
is clear evidence of it?’11 
With that as a starting point to explore the politics of the security–development nexus, 
this chapter asks how the nexus, as enacted through the KLB Act, influenced Pakistan’s 
civil–military relations to achieve the US strategic interests. It argues that the very basis 
of the nexus (i.e., ‘security and development go hand in hand’ and the ‘security of the 
global North is linked to the development and security of the global South’) allows the 
US an entry point to influence civil–military relations in Pakistan to suit American 
security concerns.  
 
8 See Zafar Alam Sarwar, ‘Foreign Hand behind Murder of Liaquat Ali Khan’, News, 28 October 2017. 
9 Hameed Gul, the former director general of the ISI at the time of Zia ul Haq’s death, blamed it on the 
US despite the fact that along with General Zia ul Haq, the US Ambassador and US Military General died 
in the plane crash as well.  
10 “CIA Activities in Chile”, CIA General Reports. September 2000. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/chile/index.html#1 
11 Interview with the former senior civilian bureaucrat, Islamabad, 2 June 2016. 
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The chapter begins by drawing attention to the historical pattern of US interference in 
Pakistan’s civil–military equation and argues that the US influence in Pakistan’s civil–
military relations has a recorded history. This historical narrative provides context and, 
in the process, gives subjecthood to local actors and their voices, which is otherwise 
missing in the literature on the security–development nexus. The sections that follow 
then argue that the nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, influenced the civil–military 
relations in Pakistan in three stages. First, it allowed the US to shift the discourse and its 
support away from the Pakistan Army to the civilian government, because of their 
frustration with the Pakistan Army for failing to deliver in the war on terrorism. This 
served as a precursor to the KLB Act. Second, the terms and conditions of the KLB Act 
serve as clear evidence of an overt attempt by the US to interfere in Pakistan’s civil–
military relations, to tweak it in favour of the US. Finally, the direct funding of millions 
of dollars to international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and NGOs through 
the KLB Act in Pakistan provides evidence of deep-level US involvement in the civil–
military relations of Pakistan. In other words, the US, through the nexus enacted in the 
form of the KLB Act, influenced civil–military relations in Pakistan across all three 
levels (discourse, policy and programming) to achieve its strategic interests in Pakistan.  
While the military establishment and opposition political parties strongly opposed US 
interference in civil–military relations through the KLB Act, the PPP-led government of 
the time embraced the KLB and hailed it as a ‘pro-democracy bill’. This paradox is 
discussed in Chapter 6, which takes the discussion on the politics of the nexus to a 
deeper level by examining the level of agency that the PPP-led government exerted in 
terms of co-producing the nexus, as enacted through the KLB Act, and using it in its 
favour against the military establishment of Pakistan.  
In this chapter, the discussion focuses narrowly on revealing the politics of the nexus, as 
reflected in the way the KLB Act influenced Pakistan’s civil–military relations, 
challenging Pakistan’s sovereignty. This discussion adds depth to the critical literature 
on the security–development nexus, which, because of its Western-centrism, neglects 
the voices of the local actors, leaving unexplained the politics of the nexus as present on 
the ground. Hence, this chapter, by reviewing the history of US–Pakistan relations to 
bring context, and through the study of Pakistani local voices and actors, reveals the 
level of influence exerted through the nexus on the civil–military relations of a 
developing country. In doing this, it deepens our understanding of the politics of the 
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security–development nexus while simultaneously enriching the critical literature on the 
subject.  
5.2 Civil–Military Relations and the Cold War 
As noted in the previous chapters, most of the interviews with Pakistani state officials 
that I conducted contained a strong sense of history. Each interview not only started 
from a historical background but also tended to focus on the significance of history in 
understanding the security–development nexus in Pakistan. One prominent British-
educated historian of Pakistan called history a ‘potent weapon’ for Pakistanis to remind 
the West about its follies in the developing world—a kind of discursive power to shape 
the discourse.12 This attitude was a major difference from the interviews I conducted in 
the US, which tended to ignore their historic relations with Pakistan and, instead, every 
few decades, attempted to supress their shared history through a ‘reset’ of bilateral 
relations. Hence, the way the security–development nexus, as enacted through the KLB 
Act, was a challenge to Pakistan’s sovereignty through interference in its civil–military 
relations, requires an appreciation of the history of US involvement in Pakistan’s 
delicate civil–military balance.  
The sources of Pakistan’s turbulent civil–military relations can be categorised into two 
levels: domestic-historical and foreign.13 The domestic-historical sources include the 
nature of the Pakistani state, with a deep-rooted colonial legacy, as well as the internal 
power struggles and challenges faced by Pakistan since its independence. The foreign 
sources include the global political environment that has contributed to the civil–
military imbalance in Pakistan. The domestic-historical category is discussed in Chapter 
6, as it has more relevance to the argument I make regarding the way the security–
development nexus has been co-produced by Pakistan, which is able to exert a high 
degree of agency through the nexus.  
This chapter focuses specifically on the second category of civil–military imbalance 
deepening because of the global political climate of the Cold War. Throughout my 
interviews, the civil and military officials in Pakistan constantly drew my attention to 
 
12 Interview with an academic, Punjab University, Lahore, 6 May 2016. 
13 I categorised them based on both the literature that I reviewed on civil–military relations in Pakistan 
and the evidence gathered through my interviews. Both domestic-historical and foreign sources of civil–
military relations emerged as prominent themes. 
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this aspect. While it has seldom been discussed in the literature, the native voices 
revealed that the effect of the global political environment and the funnelling of billions 
of dollars of aid, first under the Cold War and later post the 11 September attacks, were 
very significant factors in destabilising the civil–military relations in the country.  
This foreign interference in Pakistan’s civil–military equation has its roots in the very 
creation of Pakistan. As Narendra Singh Sarila correctly identifies, now backed by 
documentary evidence, the partition of India and an independent Pakistan was in the 
interest of Britain’s strategic goal to contain the spread of communism throughout South 
Asia and have a pro-Western ally in its Middle East policy.14 According to Ishtiaq 
Ahmed, this suggests the British interest to promote what he calls a ‘proto garrison 
state’ in what is Pakistan today.15 In other words, from its very birth, Pakistan was made 
to serve as a military base for Western powers—something that anti-imperial writings in 
Pakistan have identified as the core of the civil–military divide and the dominance of 
the military in the country.16 Moreover, Pakistan was created in a world marked by an 
early Cold War rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union. Because of the war with 
India immediately after the partition and the global intensification of the Cold War, 
Pakistan joined the Baghdad Pact and SEATO under American patronage, to offset the 
regional security challenges faced through India and Afghanistan.17  
With American help, the Pakistan Army was professionalised, receiving modern 
military training and funding to help the American global cause against communism. 
Hence, the Cold War played an important role in the consolidation of power by the 
military inside Pakistan. 18  TV Paul calls this a ‘geostrategic’ curse that has kept 
Pakistan locked into perpetual instability and made it impossible for democratic 
institutions to take root.  
 
14 Narendra Singh Sarila, The Shadow of the Great Game: Untold Story of India’s Partition (New Delhi: 
Harper Collins Publisher, 2005).  
15 Ahmad Ishtiaq, Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947–2011) 
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013, 67) 
16 See Hamza Alavi, ‘Pakistan US Military Alliance’, Economic and Political Weekly 33, no. 25 (1998): 
1551–57. 
17 Musarrat Jabeen and Muhammad Saleem Mazhar, ‘Security Game: SEATO and CENTO as Instrument 
of Economic and Military Assistance to Encircle Pakistan’, Pakistan Economic & Social Review 
(Summer 2011). 
18  Ahmad Ishtiaq, Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences (1947–2011) 
(Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013); Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A Muslim Homeland 
and Global Politics (Cambridge: Harvard Press, 2014); T. V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the 
Contemporary World (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015).  
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Naturally, this all tilted the balance of power domestically in favour of the military in 
terms of civil–military relations. With their keen interest in security and the military 
side of affairs, the Americans worked closely with the Pakistan Army and empowered 
it, at the cost of Pakistan’s democracy, liberal values, human rights and socio-economic 
development, as can be seen in the history of relations between the two countries.19 
From the American standpoint, Pakistan could serve very little, beyond the US security 
and military interests in the region during the Cold War. 20  Therefore, given the 
militaristic and transactional nature of US–Pakistan relations, the Americans were not 
eager to press Pakistan on promoting democracy, liberal values and reforms. As long as 
the American geopolitical interests were served, Pakistan could do whatever it wanted 
domestically. Ahmed asserts, ‘Pakistan can continue as a post-colonial garrison state as 
long as the donors are willing to provide it with the required resources’.21 Interestingly, 
the donors continued to provide the security and development assistance both during the 
time of the Cold War and after the 11 September attacks, with the war on terrorism 
giving the Pakistan Army a great degree of prominence in the national affairs of the 
country. One US State Department official that I interviewed candidly suggested:  
The US Government finds it easier and almost always preferable to engage with the 
military establishment in Pakistan than take the civilian route to negotiations with a 
country with which the US has deep security-led relations. Maybe this preference by 
the US to talk with the military is the reason for the civil–military imbalance, or civil–
military imbalance is the reason for the US preference—a chicken-and-egg problem.22  
This US official captures the essence of the US–Pakistan relations, in which the US has 
relied on the Pakistan Army and its military bases to deliver on the foreign policy and 
regional interests of the US. In return, the Pakistan Army has received security 
assistance, both overt and covert, that has helped Pakistan in its own strategic anxieties 
with not only India and Afghanistan but also the internal issues from domestic political 
actors. One senior military official of Pakistan confirmed this by arguing, ‘Pakistan is as 
 
19 Sanjay Gupta, Dynamics of Human Rights in the US Foreign Policy (New Delhi: Northern Book Center, 
1998), 211. 
20 Interview with a former US State Department official, Washington, DC, 5 October 2016. 
21 Ishtiaq Ahmed, Pakistan: The Garrison State, 24  
22 Interview with a former US State Department official, Washington, DC, 5 October 2016. 
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much under threat from internal actors as it is from the external sources’, hinting that 
the civilian government was ‘for sale to the highest bidder’.23  
Throughout the Cold War, the US engagement with Pakistan was security led, which 
not only empowered the military establishment in Pakistan but also legitimised its 
undemocratic rule during Ayub Khan’s time, Zia ul Haq’s era and then, finally, its close 
alliance with Musharraf in the 2000s. The civilian political leadership resented the US 
for its role as being antidemocratic, favouring the military establishment. 24  This is 
evidenced in the policies of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, which made an effort to reduce 
Pakistan’s dependency on the US and bring the country towards non-alignment in the 
Cold War. Pakistan experienced an era of socialist reforms in Bhutto’s period and an 
opening up of relations with the Soviet Union. This ended when Zia ul Haq forced a 
military coup against the democratic government, which was struggling on the 
economic front as well as on political legitimacy, after the rigged elections in 1977.25  
A few years later, when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan under the dictator 
Zia ul Haq became the largest recipient of US security and economic aid in the world 
and played a major role in driving the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.26 However, this 
led to the decline of moderate and left-wing politics in Pakistan, with Islamisation and 
radicalisation surging in the country. The US not only watched the entire social re-
engineering of Pakistan27 under a dictator but also helplessly allowed it to develop the 
nuclear bomb. Zia ul Haq understood that he had the advantage over the US during the 
Soviet–Afghan War and that the US would choose short-term national security interests 
over long-term principles on a nuclearised world. 28  After Zia ul Haq’s death in a 
mysterious plane crash in 1988, democracy returned to Pakistan, but consecutive 
governments were unable to complete their tenure because of behind-the-scenes military 
involvement in destabilising the democratic government until 1999, when the Nawaz 
Sharif government was finally toppled by Musharraf in a coup.  
 
23 Interview with a major general of the Pakistan Army, Lahore, 5 May 2016. 
24 See Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (New York: Oxford University Press 1969), which 
details the US external influence in Pakistan’s civil–military relations.  
25 Peter Niesew, ‘Pakistan Army Seen Shaken by Execution of Bhutto’, Washington Post, 7 April 1979. 
26 See Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, From the 
Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004) on US military assistance to Pakistan 
during General Zia’s regime.  
27 During the 1980s, Pakistani society was Islamised through a massive media campaign, text books and 
the educational curriculum, in pursuit of fighting the war in Afghanistan against ‘Communism’.  
28 Interview with a former military general who worked with Gen Zia ul Haq, Islamabad, 6 March 2016. 
130 
It seems a strange coincidence that military coups in Pakistan are usually followed by 
Pakistan’s involvement in global wars that help the martial-law government gain global 
legitimacy. For instance, Ayub Khan’s coup in 1958 meant that Pakistan became deeply 
involved in espionage against the Soviet Union—the infamous U-2 spy plane that was 
shot down by the US took off from the US airbase in Pakistan. Soon after Zia ul Haq’s 
military coup, Pakistan became involved in the Soviet–Afghan War in the 1980s. After 
the most recent coup by Musharraf, Pakistan became the front-line state in the war on 
terrorism. In that sense, the 11 September terrorist attacks could be seen as a blessing 
for the Musharraf regime, which was quick to join the American war on terrorism in 
return for foreign assistance to stabilise Pakistan’s economy. Pakistan flourished under 
the extensive security and development aid package, and Musharraf was able to 
consolidate and legitimise his power in Pakistan. 
As is evident through this brief review of history, the Cold War and early post-
11 September period served to exacerbate the fragile civil–military balance by 
empowering military rule in Pakistan. The US, guided by its own national security 
interests, increased foreign assistance during the military coups and put Pakistan under 
severe sanctions throughout most of the democratic period. This raised a serious 
concern in Pakistan that America ‘talks democracy but supports dictatorships’ around 
the world.29  
The hard data on the issue are startling. They show that out of the $12.6 billion provided 
to Pakistan from 1954 to 2002, over $9.19 billion was provided under the 24 years of 
military rule and only $3.4 billion under the 19 years of civilian rule—clear evidence of 
US support to the military dictatorships in Pakistan.30 The US discrimination against 
civilian rule in Pakistan is evidenced not only by these numbers but also by the historic 
US discourse about Pakistan’s civil–military relations, which explains why the best 
periods of US–Pakistan relations and cooperation have been during the military coups. 
For instance, in the 1960s, Ayub Khan received a hero’s welcome in the US for his 
support during the Cold War in providing the CIA with covert airbases from which it 
could fly U-2 spy planes over the Soviet Union. In the late 1970s and throughout the 
1980s under Zia ul Haq’s martial law, the US and Pakistan shared excellent bilateral 
relations and collaborated closely to force the Soviets out of Afghanistan, ending the 
 
29 This notion was echoed across the civilian political leadership in Pakistan that I interviewed.  
30 Mazhar Aziz, Military Control in Pakistan: The Parallel State (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
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Cold War. Again, in the 2000s under Musharraf, the US funnelled billions of dollars 
into Pakistan to fight the war on terrorism and President George W Bush developed a 
close and personal friendship with Musharraf, seeing him as a liberal and progressive 
ruler of Pakistan. Such legitimisation provided by the US to Pakistani dictators has 
created a strong sense in Pakistan that during military rule, Pakistan has always been 
respected globally, creating a sort of nostalgia, especially for Ayub Khan’s ‘golden’ era 
and Musharraf’s initial years in power. 31  In contrast, during the brief years of 
democracy in Pakistan in the 1970s and the 1990s, US foreign aid to Pakistan declined 
to nothing because of embargos and sanctions, fostering a perception that the civilian 
government was not only incompetent to rule the country but also corrupt and therefore 
did not deserve the same level of respect from foreign countries. Civilian rule in 
Pakistan became synonymous with that country’s global isolation.  
The American romance or blindness with the Pakistan Army underwent a monumental 
shift with the post-2001 US failures in Afghanistan and the US’s growing anxiety with 
Musharraf for not ‘doing enough’ to stop militants from attacking US forces and 
damaging US interests in Afghanistan. By the end of GW Bush’s tenure, there was a 
deep realisation in the US security and political establishment that it had erred by 
supporting the military in Pakistan and empowering it over the decades, at the cost of 
long-term democratic stability and development in the country.32 Hence, the KLB Act, 
building on the indivisibility of security and development, arose as an enactment of the 
security–development nexus to correct that error and resolve the civil–military divide—
which the US would later discover was ‘a cat hard to put back in the bag’.33  
The historical evidence of US interference in Pakistan’s civil–military divide highlights 
two ways that the US supported and legitimised the military dictators in Pakistan; first, 
through its discourse and, second, through increased security and development 
assistance. Building on these two factors, the next section discusses the way the US 
used the nexus to influence civil–military relations in Pakistan by shifting the discourse 
and its support away from the Pakistan Army to the civilian government, because of its 
growing frustration in the war on terrorism. 
 
31 Interview with a civilian political leader of the PPP, Lahore, 18 March 2016. 
32 Interview with a US State Department official who worked in Islamabad, 12 June 2016. 
33 Interview with a USAID official, Washington, DC, 21 October 2016. 
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5.3 Changing Friends in Pakistan 
Three major events with regard to the KLB Act shifted the US discourse and support 
away from the Pakistan Army to the civilian government. First, there was a change in 
the US thinking and approach in its relations with the Pakistan Army in the war on 
terrorism. Second, Musharraf’s decade-long rule came to an end and democracy, in a 
very weak form, returned to Pakistan. Finally, two long tenures by GW Bush ended and 
President Barack Obama was elected to the White House, promising a ‘reset’ in US–
Pakistan relations. The security–development nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, was 
both a product of this critical juncture and a useful tool to shape the civil–military 
relations in Pakistan through a shift in US alignment in Pakistan’s political landscape. 
The change of mind and approach in the US regarding its relations with Pakistan began 
with its frustration with Pakistan under Musharraf’s military dictatorship, which 
complicated their relationship with the Pakistan Army, its key ally in the war on 
terrorism. According to the Pakistani state officials, it was much more than just a 
‘complicated’ bilateral relationship; it had become a highly suspicious and treacherous 
one. In my interviews with US officials on the subject, they suggested that the Pakistan 
Army was playing a double game with the US by officially playing the role of being the 
front-line state in the war on terrorism and receiving billions of dollars of aid, while at 
the same time supporting the Taliban and giving it safe haven inside Pakistan.34 One of 
the Pentagon officials commented:  
We knew from the very start that Pakistan was reluctant to go against Taliban but we 
thought that given the tragedy of 9/11 and the US giving so much support to Pakistan 
that it would go against the militants. Pakistan, however, was very selective in its 
approach and went after only those militants that it saw would continue the flow of 
US aid while not going after those that would help the US end the war. It was as if 
Pakistan never wanted us to win the war in the first place—only wanted to drag it 
out’.35  
 
34 This sentiment is a main theme of most of the academic and policy works published on Pakistan since 
2006. 
35 Interview with a civilian official from the Pentagon, Washington, DC, 18 November 2016. 
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The idea that Pakistan played a double game is a dominant discourse highlighted in 
several policy and academic works on the role of Pakistan in the war on terrorism.36 
Most recently, it is echoed in Steve Coll’s new book Directorate S, in which he explains 
the way Generals Mahmoud Ahmad and Musharraf urged the Bush Administration to 
not invade Afghanistan and, instead, to pursue dialogue with Mullah Omar to eliminate 
Osama bin Laden. 37  These demands were rejected but Pakistan, according to Coll, 
pursued its own agenda on the side, which was to protect some of its long-developed 
assets in Afghanistan, including the Haqqani network. However, my interviews with 
officials in the Pakistan Army and ISI presented a counter-narrative on the subject. They 
explained that Pakistan was never reluctant in the war on terrorism; in exchange for the 
small amount of aid that the US gave them, Pakistani officials claim that they handed 
over 800 al-Qaeda militants to the US 38 —the largest crackdown on the al-Qaeda 
network in the world. The issue was explained by one of the former ISI director 
generals as follows: 
For Pakistan, [the] War on Terror was against al-Qaeda and we were fully on board 
with the US on that. In fact, Pakistan has the best success rate in dismantling the 
entire al-Qaeda network in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. The US Government 
showered praises on us for our job that we did for peanuts of aid. The problem really 
started when the US expanded its War on Terror from al-Qaeda to all the other 
Afghan and Kashmir groups. Pakistan never signed up to fight for American 
adventures. It was as if the US was not interested to end the war and wanted to go 
after the groups that could have easily been negotiated with. The refusal of Pakistan 
Army to expand the War on Terror to irrelevant groups that had nothing to do with 
9/11 is what ruptured the US relations with Pakistan.39  
This perspective, that Pakistan was forced to fight an American war that had nothing to 
do with the 11 September attacks but had more to do with geopolitics is a constant 
theme of the policy discourse emerging from Pakistan criticising the security–
 
36 C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2014); Carlotta Gall, The Wrong Enemy: America in Afghanistan 2001–2014 (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2014); Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, 
and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: Public Affairs, 2013). 
37 Steve Coll, Directorate S: The CIA and America’s Secret Wars in Afghanistan & Pakistan, 2001–2016 
(New York: Penguin, 2018). 
38 The exact number is anywhere between 600 and 1200, based on numerous sources, including Pervez 
Musharraf, In The Line of Fire: A Memoir (London: Simon and Schuster, 2006).  
39 Interview with the former director general of the ISI, Islamabad, 12 July 2016. 
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development nexus.40 Essentially, the US pressure on Pakistan through the nexus to 
pursue the Haqqani network or JuD required Pakistan to reverse its foreign and security 
policy by 180 degree. The military officials that I interviewed saw Pakistan’s reluctance 
to go against groups that did not pose a threat to Pakistan’s national security as common 
sense. The officials appeared to be especially agitated that American pressure on 
Pakistan to eliminate JuD and its leader, Hafiz Saeed, was not actual American policy 
but was on behalf of India. According to one senior military general, this made it a 
‘nonstarter’ for Pakistan.41  They argued that it had come about because of the US 
perception of the Pakistan Army as a ‘backstabber’ playing a ‘double game’ with the 
US. One Pakistani military official that I interviewed commented:  
By 2006 to 2007, it was evident to the US and to us that the Afghan War was a lost 
cause. For years, we were pushing the US to strike a political deal with the Taliban to 
end the war from a position of strength. The US, however, kept rejecting our 
proposition, arguing that it could win the war by practically killing all Taliban. This 
notion was due to the US lack of understanding of what the Taliban was and the 
ground situation. Moreover, with the US distracted by the Iraq War, they left 
Afghanistan an open field for the Taliban to regroup and take over, village by village. 
Having failed in the Afghan War, the US now blames us, the Pakistan Army, for 
playing a double role. If anyone has played a double role, it is the US itself.42  
This military official suggested that Pakistan became a scapegoat for the US failures in 
the Afghan War. This would seem to be true, because the ‘do more on terrorism’ 
narrative slowly started to take shape between 2006 and 2007.43  
Musharraf’s reluctance to eliminate the safe havens and kerb the support for terrorism 
was not the only problem the US had with the Pakistan Army, or the only reason for it 
deciding to shift its alignment towards the civilian government of the PPP. In 2004, the 
Western world was taken aback by shocking news of nuclear proliferation by Dr Abdul 
 
40  ‘Pakistan Forced to Fight the US’ War: Imran Khan’, Express Tribune, 22 May 2011, 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/173395/pti-rally-against-drones-draws-huge-crowds/. 
41 The Pakistani security establishment views the US and India as having developed a close relationship 
that requires the US to be sympathetic to India’s security demands in the region. One of the demands is to 
persuade Pakistan to cut back on its support to Kashmiri militants operating in the Kashmir valley against 
the Indian forces. For Pakistan’s security establishment, Kashmir is a main foreign policy concern and it 
finds it difficult to move forward in its relations with the US with such demands on the table.  
42 Former chief of Joint Staff Committee, Pakistan Army, Islamabad, 18 August 2016. 
43 The ‘do more’ rhetoric first started in 2007 within the Congressional Democrats, who were beginning 
to question the role of the Pakistan Army in the war on terrorism. It later found its way into the Bush 
Administration but saw widespread usage in the White House under President Obama.  
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Qadeer Khan, who is rhetorically regarded as father of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb. An 
investigation led by multiple international agencies revealed that Dr Khan had run a 
covert nuclear scheme that had helped Iran, Libya and North Korea to develop their 
nuclear program in return for large amounts of money. While Khan was put under house 
arrest by the Pakistani authorities and forced to confess his role, many observers saw 
him as only being the tip of the iceberg.44 As the investigation on the matter continued, 
evidence of Pakistan Army officials involved behind the scenes became apparent, 
causing distress in US policy circles. One senior US State Department official from the 
time that I interviewed recalled the conversation in the US policy community back in 
2004: 
Our instant reaction to the AQ [Abdul Qadeer] Khan story was to find out the extent 
to which nuclear proliferation happened, and who all were involved in the racket. We 
questioned if this was done on an individual level by Khan and a few other military 
officials, or was it done as a state policy? With Pakistan, nothing is ever that simple to 
understand. Our main fear was, what if some military officials that are turning 
Islamist after 9/11 decided to develop a dirty bomb for Taliban or al-Qaeda? Ensuring 
Pakistan’s nuclear safety became the single most important agenda of the US policy, 
even more important than the War on Terror.45 
While the US feared a ‘dirty bomb’ getting into the hands of the terrorist groups, the 
Pakistani state officials in Pakistan that I interviewed saw the AQ Khan story as part of 
the hegemonic discourse that helped generate US leverage over Pakistan to argue for 
stricter controls and oversight of Pakistan’s nuclear program. However, it was 
interesting to note that on this issue of AQ Khan, I witnessed very hesitant and 
speculative answers, even from people at the very top of the Pakistani security 
establishment hierarchy. For instance, one senior military official commented: 
It is preposterous to entertain the idea that Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan acted on his own 
for greed or money. The man naturally had some backing from very powerful 
individuals in Pakistan’s security establishment. My hunch, however, is that whatever 
happened was not an institutional policy or done on the authority of Pakistan Army. 
Instead, a few senior individuals, driven by greed, colluded with Khan to sell the 
 
44 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, ‘A. Q. Khan and Onward Proliferation from Pakistan’, 
in Nuclear Black Markets: Pakistan, A.Q. Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks: A Net Assessment, 
ed. Mark Fitzpatrick (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007). 
45 Interview with US State Department official, Washington, DC, 28 October 2016. 
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nuclear secrets to other states.46 
The use of words such as ‘hunch’ and ‘my personal opinion’ across the interviews on 
the subject indicated the deep anxiety of the Pakistan officials with regard to providing 
comments with certainty on the issue. One civilian official at the Ministry of Interior 
that I spoke with on the subject explained this uncertainty as being a dilemma within the 
security establishment, with most of those even at the very top level not knowing 
exactly what happened.47 According to this official, if Pakistan accepted that the state 
was involved directly in these dealings, it would face major international sanctions and 
loss of credibility at a time that Pakistan was growing at a 6% GDP rate, in 2004. If 
Pakistan called it an accident, or something that it did not know about, this would bring 
shame upon Pakistan and the West would have a major argument against Pakistan’s 
nuclear program for being insecure. Hence, for Pakistan, the best option was to put the 
entire blame on AQ Khan and treat it as an isolated incidence of greed.48 While Pakistan 
was able to cover up the backlash caused by the discovery of Dr Khan’s nuclear 
proliferation scheme, it caused permanent anxiety and loss of faith within US policy 
circles over the Pakistan Army and its nuclear program.49 Many opinion makers in the 
US believed that civilian supremacy in Pakistan was required to safeguard US national 
security interests in Pakistan.50 The terms and conditions of the KLB Act clearly reflect 
the US anxieties over the Pakistan Army and its interest in promoting civilian 
supremacy in Pakistan, as discussed in the next section of this chapter.  
The second major event related to the KLB Act that shifted the US discourse on the 
Pakistan Army was a change in Pakistan’s political landscape. As Musharraf lost 
support in Washington, DC, the civilian political leaders in Pakistan, including Benazir 
Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, signed a charter of democracy to restore democracy to 
Pakistan. The lawyer’s movement in Pakistan against the ‘emergency’ declared by 
 
46 Interview with a member of the Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan, which controls Pakistan’s nuclear 
bomb, Rawalpindi, 22 July 2016. 
47 One of the reasons for this was the extreme secrecy of the nuclear program, with only a handful of 
people within the security establishment knowing the details on the subject. See Feroz Khan, Eating 
Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). 
48 Despite the military government under Musharraf putting AQ Khan under house arrest and concluding 
that his personal greed was the reason for his actions, none of my interviewees, nor the general public, 
was convinced by this argument. Most of them were convinced of a collusion within the nuclear 
establishment of the country.  
49  Interview with a former White House official responsible for South Asia, Washington, DC, 8 
November 2016. 
50 See for instance C. Raja Mohan, ‘How Obama Can Get South Asia Right’, The Washington Quarterly 
32:2 (2009): 184 
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Musharraf brought his government to the edge, forcing him to cede power to the 
political parties. With the February 2008 elections, democracy returned to Pakistan and 
the PPP took power, ending the military regime of Musharraf after an entire decade. 
This was significant for the US in two ways. First, the Pakistan Army was at its weakest 
politically, with a very low approval rating inside the country. This presented an 
opportunity to force Pakistan to change its behaviour on terrorism in the region, as well 
as on nuclear-related issues, by tying it to a long-term aid package under the security–
development nexus. Second, it was an opportunity for the US to reset the toxic 
relationship that had developed under Musharraf’s military rule. This meant forging 
close ties with the newly elected democratic government of the PPP and through its 
empowerment, taming what the Americans called ‘the beast’ (the Pakistan Army) for 
the national security interests of the US.  
This is evidenced in the WikiLeaks documents about the meeting between a US 
delegation that included Senator Joe Biden, Senator John Kerry and Senator Chuck 
Hagel, all of whom were in the top policy positions in the Obama Administration and 
were the key players in Pakistan, with the newly elected leadership of the PPP, led by 
President Asif Zardari. In the meeting, Senator Biden offered Zardari a ‘radical increase 
in assistance to move from a transactional relationship to one based on the long term’51 
if Zardari demonstrated political maturity. Regarding the role of the Pakistan Army, 
Senator Biden asked if Zardari was interested in ‘selecting his own commanders’52 as a 
way to diminish the role of the Pakistan Army. This meeting, along with Obama’s 
speeches on his campaign trail in 2007, in which he criticised Bush’s policy to support 
dictatorship in Pakistan at the expense of democracy, reflected the shifting discourse of 
the US away from its support for Musharraf to strengthening democracy, to achieve the 
American interests in the war on terrorism.53 Further evidence of this was offered during 
my interviews with US officials that worked under the Obama Administration. They 
said the newly elected government in Pakistan was a once-in-a-lifetime moment to 
change the equation of US–Pakistan relations and make it more about civil–civil 
 
51 US Embassy Islamabad, ‘Codel Biden’s Meeting with Asif Zardari’, 7 April 2008, 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ISLAMABAD1476_a.html. 
52 US Embassy Islamabad, ‘Codel Biden’s Meeting’. 
53 Obama, ‘Obama Statement on State of Emergency in Pakistan’. 
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relations, instead of military-led relations that empowered only the Pakistan Army, 
which the US no longer saw as a friendly partner.54 
This new discourse in the US was a product of the shift that occurred in the US political 
landscape. First, the Democrats won the majority in the US Congress in 2006, radically 
transforming the US discourse on its partnership with Pakistan and especially with 
Musharraf’s military rule. The key players in the US Congress saw the absence of 
democracy, lack of development and the military rule of Musharraf as their core 
hindrance in achieving US interests in the war on terrorism, essentially reinforcing the 
security–development nexus. Second, the November 2008 Presidential elections in the 
US brought the Democrats back into the White House, after two terms of Bush, who 
had taken the US into two long wars. With the slogan of ‘change’, Obama took over the 
White House after an anti-war election campaign. 55  For the military officials in 
Pakistan, even though Obama presented new hope in the US engagement with Pakistan, 
Republican governments in the White House had always been considered much more 
respectful and cordial in their relations with the Pakistan Army. The military leadership 
in Pakistan saw the Democrats as being pro-India and hard on Pakistan.  
The Obama Administration was keen to disrupt the ‘business as usual’ setting with 
Pakistan and try a different approach to changing Pakistan’s behaviour.56 As discussed 
in the previous chapters, the Obama Administration believed that to change Pakistan’s 
behaviour the US needed to forge closer ties with Pakistan’s civilian government, to 
reduce its anxiety regarding US support for the military dictatorship and it abandoning 
Pakistan after the war on terrorism, as well as its anxiety over India. More importantly, 
a key goal under the Obama Administration was to persuade Pakistan to take ownership 
of the war on terrorism by recognising the threat it posed to Pakistan’s existence—in a 
way, getting Pakistan to do what the US wanted it to do.57 The security–development 
nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, therefore reflected the shifting US policy and 
discourse on Pakistan to influence Pakistan’s civil–military relations and the political 
landscape, to suit American national security interests. This policy was articulated In C 
Raja. Mohan’s critical paper in The Washington Quarterly. Mohan wrote:  
 
54 Interview with a US State Department official, Washington, DC, 12 October 2016. 
55 Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011).  
56 Vali Nasr, The Dispensable Nation: American Foreign Policy in Retreat (New York: Anchor, 2014). 
57 Hillary Clinton, confirmation speech (US Congress, 13 January 2009). 
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While some of the new U.S. analyses recognize the importance of promoting 
democracy in Pakistan, the real challenge is engineering a power shift within 
Pakistan away from the army and toward elected leaders. Without such a shift, 
there will be no fundamental change in Pakistan’s external policies, the key 
elements of which have long been controlled by the army even when it acquiesced 
its civilian rule.58 
This context of growing US frustration with the Pakistan Army on terrorism and nuclear 
proliferation, along with changes in the political government in both countries, shifted 
US support away from the Pakistan Army and towards the civilian government. It 
served as a precursor to the KLB Act reflecting the discourse around the indivisibility of 
security and development (the nexus) as a tool to influence civil–military relations of 
Pakistan. Most of my interlocutors saw the nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, as a 
tool to ‘clip the wings’ of the Pakistan Army and empower the civilian government of 
Pakistan, believing that the latter would be more amenable to supporting US interests in 
the region. As further evidence on the way the security–development nexus, as enacted 
through the KLB Act, influenced Pakistan’s civil–military relations, the specific terms 
and conditions of the KLB Act are discussed in detail in the next section.  
5.4 The KLB Way 
The text of the KLB Act (which includes the context, clauses and conditions of the US 
assistance to Pakistan) reveals the politics of the security–development nexus in terms 
of its influence on the civil–military relations in Pakistan. It caused an uproar in 
Pakistan’s security establishment and within the opposition circles of the parliament, 
which labelled it as being ‘anti-Pakistan Army’ because of the US involvement in 
Pakistan’s domestic civil–military affairs. However, the PPP government of Pakistan 
hailed the KLB Act as a positive step between the US and Pakistan. The reasons for this 
attitude are explained in the next chapter, which explores the way the actors in Pakistan 
co-produced the security–development nexus and used the KLB Act politically in their 
own favour. Thus, the KLB Act was controversial even before the first dollar arrived in 
Pakistan. According to the officials that I interviewed, the nexus, as enacted through the 
 
58 C. Raja Mohan, ‘How Obama Can Get South Asia Right’, The Washington Quarterly 32:2 (2009): 184 
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KLB Act, aimed to influence civil–military relations in Pakistan at two different levels: 
discursive and in practice.59  
At the discursive level, the first section of the KLB Act indicates a shift in the US 
discourse away from having a close and direct engagement with the Pakistan Army to 
an engagement with the civilian government, especially on the ongoing matters of the 
war on terrorism and Afghanistan. For instance, the opening of the KLB Act states:  
Congress finds the following: 
(2) Since 2001, the United States has contributed more than $15,000,000,000 to 
Pakistan, of which more than $10,000,000,000 has been security-related assistance 
and direct payments. 
(3) With the free and fair election of February 18, 2008, Pakistan returned to civilian 
rule, reversing years of political tension and mounting popular concern over military 
rule and Pakistan’s own democratic reform and political development. 
(5) The United States intends to work with the Government of Pakistan— 
(B) to support the people of Pakistan and their democratic government in their efforts 
to consolidate democracy, including strengthening Pakistan’s parliament, helping 
Pakistan re-establish an independent and transparent judicial system, and working to 
extend the rule of law in all areas in Pakistan.60 
These points from the context section of the KLB Act gives evidence to the shifting US 
position and discourse on civil–military relations in Pakistan. It reads like an acceptance 
of wrongdoing by, first, confessing that the US, since the 11 September attacks, had 
disproportionally provided security assistance to a military dictatorship in Pakistan, thus 
legitimising and empowering its rule in the country. It then details its ‘change of heart’ 
in points 3 and 5-B—that with the return of democracy in Pakistan, the US wanted to 
correct the mistakes of the past and ‘reset’ the relationship by supporting the civilian 
government of Pakistan to ‘consolidate democracy’ and establish its writ in the country.  
As discussed in the previous section, this shift was because of the Pakistan Army’s 
reluctance to align Pakistan’s national security policy with that of the US, as well as the 
 
59 Interview with a military official of the Pakistan Army, Islamabad, 10 April 2016. 
60 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), § 3. 
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change in the political situation in the US and Pakistan after the elections in both 
countries.61 In that context, the KLB Act essentially reveals the politics of the security–
development nexus to not only make amends with the civilian political leaders in 
Pakistan but also win their support, aiming to persuade them to align their discourse 
with that of US policy, which the Pakistan Army had long been reluctant to do. This 
was seen by the military establishment in Pakistan as an active US attempt to fix the 
civil–military equilibrium from outside, to change the power balance in the country. 
Opposition leader, Nisar Ali Khan, said:  
These are matters which have to be decided by us, the Parliament and the government 
of Pakistan … If there’s external involvement, it does no good to us, our 
sovereignty.62 
Similarly, the military establishment in Pakistan was of the view that this sudden US 
interest in ‘democracy’ in Pakistan was not out of goodwill but, instead, a way to reduce 
the control of the Pakistan Army over the foreign and security policy of the country. 
They were especially agitated that the US was trying to change Pakistan’s domestic 
power equation while the country was fighting full-scale insurgency within the 
country.63 The Pakistani military officials saw this as a ‘selfish game’ of the US, to 
destabilise the country further by increasing the civil–military divisions through the 
KLB Act, for its own strategic gains. Clause K of the ‘Objectives’ section of the KLB 
Act provides evidence to substantiate this claim, with a blunt message of bringing the 
Pakistan Army under the direct control of the civilian government: 
(K) to strengthen Pakistan’s efforts to develop strong and effective law enforcement 
and national defense forces under civilian leadership.64 
The military establishment interpreted this clause as a US attempt to sabotage the 
independence and autonomy of the Pakistan Army.65 Hence, it was one of the most 
controversial elements of this new US discourse through the KLB Act, which aimed to 
 
61 This was a dominant sentiment in all my interviews, between March 2016 and October 2016, with 
Pakistani civil–military officials and experts on the subject.  
62 See Nisar Ali Khan, speech on the KLB Act (National Assembly of Pakistan, 8 October 2009). 
63 The Pakistani military and intelligence officials believed the US failure in Afghanistan was partly 
because of the ‘politics’ in Washington, DC, which politicised the war effort. For instance, the military 
officials pointed out that since 9/11, NATO had changed over 16 military commanders in Afghanistan, 
which meant no commander had stayed on the ground for more than a year.  
64 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), § 4 
65 Interview with a former lieutenant general of the Pakistan Army, Lahore, 16 May 2016. 
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support the oversight and control of the civilian leadership over the military and 
intelligence community. 66  The US interest to rein in the Pakistan military and 
intelligence forces and change the power balance through the KLB Act is made even 
clearer in the Security Assistance section: 
The purposes of assistance under this title are— 
(4) to help strengthen the institutions of democratic governance and promote control 
of military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government.67 
The inclusion of such points in the KLB Act is strong evidence of the US influencing 
Pakistan’s civil–military affairs, challenging the country’s sovereignty. This discourse 
to change the Pakistan Army’s behaviour was compounded further by the many 
certifications and evaluation/audit reports required by the US. Some that clearly spelled 
out the foreign interference in civil–military affairs included:  
(3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the 
political or judicial processes of Pakistan.  
(15) An assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises 
effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which 
civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military 
budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, 
civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in 
civil administration.68 
These clauses provide evidence of the extent to which the US was influencing a civilian 
supremacy in Pakistan, even if that meant damaging its long-standing relationship with 
the Pakistan Army. Given the sensitive and delicate civil–military history of Pakistan, 
and knowing how the military jealously guards its independence from any political 
interference from what they see as a ‘corrupt political order’ of feudal lords in Pakistan, 
the Pakistan Army saw the discourse being propelled through the KLB Act as an 
‘American declaration of war’.69 They particularly objected to the Americans making 
 
66 Previous attempts by the PPP government in Pakistan to bring the ISI under the Ministry of Interior 
were rejected by the Pakistan Army, which saw the civilian government trying to politicise the agency for 
its vested interests.  
67 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), § 201 
68 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), § 203 
69 Interview with a former lieutenant general of the Pakistan Army, Lahore, 16 May 2016. 
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aid conditional on the civilian government controlling the promotion of senior military 
officers, which jeopardised the integrity of the military institution.  
While the military officials in Pakistan that I interviewed had no reservations (on the 
surface) with regard to civilian supremacy and authority in the country, they were 
nervous about this discourse being dictated by a third party, the US, for its perceived 
national security interests and not the interests of Pakistan. In addition, they were upset 
about the speed with which the US was expecting to ‘fix’ things in Pakistan, which they 
believed would jeopardise not only Pakistan’s war effort but also its political stability 
and the delicate civil–military balance achieved by the civilian government after the end 
of Musharraf’s decade-long military coup. One military official commented:  
If the Pakistan Army was to allow the civilian government to call the shots on 
promotions of its senior leadership, they would politicise the institution, the same way 
the bureaucracy has been first politicised and then made dysfunctional to a point 
where it only serves the political interests of the party in power.70 
The problem with such views is that they lack credible logic. Given that Pakistan Army 
has repeatedly interfered in democracy and institution building of the country, to then 
cite civilian leadership trying to take back its space as a ‘threat’ to the military 
institution is unfounded. Regardless, the notion that the military institution was above 
the civilian oversight was repeated among not only the military officials but also the 
civilian officials in bureaucracy and political leadership. The Pakistan Army enjoys a 
high popular approval rating in Pakistan71, which is one reason that no military coup in 
Pakistan has ever been resisted by the public.  
Given the overt terms and conditions set out under the KLB Act, aiming to interfere in 
the civil–military relations of Pakistan to serve the US interest, the Pakistan Army 
reacted to it with criticism. The US came under fire and the nascent democratic 
government took a great deal of heat for agreeing to such terms without first consulting 
the military establishment. During the Corps Commander meeting, the Army Chief, 
General Ashfaq Kayani, called the KLB Act a ‘humiliation’ for Pakistan, expressing 
‘serious concerns’ over the ‘national security’ implications of the aid that was being 
 
70 Interview with a brigadier of Pakistan Army, Islamabad, 10 June 2016. 
71 ‘Armed forces most trusted institution in Pakistan: survey’, The Express Tribune, 20 Oct 2015. 
https://tribune.com.pk/story/976172/armed-forces-most-trusted-institution-in-pakistan-survey/ 
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proposed in the KLB Act. 72  While the military establishment publicly recorded its 
displeasure over the US terms, conditions and language that framed Pakistan as a state 
sponsor of terror, in private the military was also furious about the direct interference by 
the US in the delicate civil–military affairs of the country. One of the former director 
generals of the ISI that I interviewed commented on this underlying ‘motive’ behind 
this American move:  
When the Americans could no longer get what they wanted through the Pakistan 
Army, they came up with the KLB package for the civilians, to try and cut the wings 
of the military and get the civilian government of Pakistan to align with the American 
agenda in the region. Instead of helping to enhance the civilian capacity to rule and 
govern, the Americans, through KLB, wanted to bring down the military to the level 
of the civilians, so that civilians could rule easily. This was a direct meddling in 
Pakistan’s internal affairs.73  
The notion of ‘KLB Act being a way for the US to use civilians against the Pakistan 
Army’ is deeply indicative of the overall mindset of the military officials with regard to 
the KLB Act. They believe that this was not the first time that the US had pitched 
civilians or military against each other in any country. With a large amount of aid 
proposed in the KLB Act, the US had essentially ‘bribed’ the civilian government into 
allowing US influence not only to dictate Pakistan’s national security policies, as 
discussed in the previous section, but also to determine the civil–military equation in the 
country. This bribe did not always come through immediate funding but as Nye 
suggests, sometimes it was the promise (attraction) of aid that mattered more than the 
actual aid delivered on the ground.74 For instance, in an attempt to offer the civilian 
government a deal they could not refuse, the KLB Act included the following statement:  
(d) Sense of Congress on foreign assistance funds 
It is the sense of Congress that, subject to an improving political and economic 
climate in Pakistan, there should be authorized to be appropriated up to 
$1,500,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2015 through 2019 for the purpose of 
 
72  ‘Aid Package from US Jolts Army in Pakistan’, New York Times, 7 October 2009, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/08/world/asia/08pstan.html. 
73 Interview with the former director general of the ISI, Islamabad, 10 June 2016. 
74 Joseph Nye Jr, ‘Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power’, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2009, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-07-01/get-smart. 
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providing assistance to Pakistan under the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.75 
For the civilian government of the PPP that had just taken over the government after a 
decade of military rule, with a history of civil–military tensions, poor economy and 
instability, the prospect of $15 billion dollars in aid for the next 10 years was too 
lucrative to refuse. This ‘long-term’ US assistance is a classic ‘smart power’ tactic that 
is deployed by the US to win over the political leadership in poor underdeveloped 
countries, as a way to persuade them to align their national policies to serve the US 
interests. Nisar Ali Khan repeatedly reminded the government not to fall for the 
American trap, which promised a lot of aid that, in reality, would never materialise. His 
assessment was eventually correct; the aid proposed in the KLB Act was suspended 
after only four years and according to a critical report of the Office of Inspector General 
of USAID, they disbursed only $1.8 billion of the $7.5 billion promised to Pakistan.76 
However, it did contribute to deepening the civil–military tensions in the country further 
and these continue to this date.  
To explore the politics of the security–development nexus in greater depth, the next 
section fleshes out the way the KLB Act influenced Pakistan’s civil–military at the 
implementation level through funding INGOs and NGOs working in the democracy-
building space. 
5.5 The Third Option 
When diplomacy is inadequate and military force is inappropriate in achieving the US 
national interests abroad, Tertia Optia, or the President’s Third Option, is the motto for 
the CIA’s Special Activities Center. It is equally applicable to US foreign assistance in 
the developing world that aims to help serve the American national interests through the 
security–development nexus. For instance, the security–development nexus, as enacted 
through the KLB Act, projected power at both the discursive level and the practice level 
on the ground, to influence civil–military relations in Pakistan and serve American 
strategic interests.  
 
75 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), § 102. 
76 Office of Inspector General, Competing Priorities Have Complicated USAID/Pakistan’s Efforts To 
Achieve Long-Term Development Under EPPA (Office of Inspector General, USAID, 8 September 2016). 
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The first evidence of the direct US attempt to influence Pakistan’s civil–military 
relations through the KLB Act is in the review of the data regarding US funding for the 
INGOs and NGOs in Pakistan, to promote civilian supremacy in the country.77 The data 
on US spending in Pakistan are neither entirely available nor transparent. The data that 
are available are complicated and difficult to decipher because of the technical 
language, including abbreviations, and the method of creating projects under special 
categories, which makes it difficult to locate specific allocations. More importantly, the 
available information regarding projects is vague and lacks essential details. For 
instance, the only information available on a multi-million-dollar project titled ‘Citizen 
Voice and Public Accountability Project’ (CVP) noted its aim to:  
provide approximately 120 grants across the country to engage civil society on 
democratic governance themes including capacity building of elected representatives 
of local governments in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh provinces ... CVP 
interventions support a culture of tolerance towards difference of opinion, political 
inclusion and peaceful civic interaction among demographically diverse sections of 
the society.78  
What makes this more questionable is that the monitoring and evaluation reports 
attached to the project were for a USAID project in Colombia and they had nothing to 
do with the CVP project in Pakistan. This is not a single incident of a mistake; this is a 
repeated pattern, with either the project documents or monitoring evaluation reports 
being missing, or in the rare cases that they are available, they are simply from another 
project on another continent. This brings into question the purpose and objectives of 
over 100 grants allocated to NGOs in Pakistan. This is discussed in the subsequent 
paragraphs in detail.  
Despite this challenge in locating and navigating data on the projects, the USAID 
funding to the NED explains much about the way the US used the KLB Act to influence 
Pakistan’s civil–military relations, challenging the country’s sovereignty. For instance, 
the NED received no funding from the US Government between 2001 and 2008, when 
Pakistan was under military rule and needed the most assistance with democratisation. 
In 2008 to 2009, when the US changed its position towards the civilian government in 
 
77  Data on the project is available at USAID Foreign Aid Explorer website, 
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/PAK. 
78 Information available at Citizen’s Voice Project website, https://cvpa-tdea.org/v3/. 
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Pakistan, the NED started receiving extensive funding from the US State Department. In 
2010, the funding was increased to nearly $1.94 million. In 2011, it was doubled to $4 
million. The latest documents from the NED’s archive show that it received $3.342 
million to disburse to local NGOs in Pakistan for the promotion of democracy.79 The 
change in the funding pattern between 2001 and 2017 reflects the shift in the US 
position on the civil–military relations in Pakistan, from supporting Musharraf when it 
suited the US national interests to supporting the civilian democracy when convenient 
otherwise.  
The problem with such funding going directly to NGOs, without government regulation, 
was that it was seen (especially by the military officials in Pakistan) as the US 
Government paying local NGOs to serve the American strategic interests in the country 
through shaping a particular discourse or, worse, collecting intelligence under the guise 
of development in sensitive areas of Pakistan. One of these grants was made available to 
the Balochistan Institute for Development. The purpose of the $180,000 grant, between 
2011 and 2013, was to:  
increase the capacity of local media in Balochistan to understand and report on human 
rights and democracy, sharpen their journalism skills, and strengthen networking 
among journalists. BID [Balochistan Institute for Development] will conduct a series 
of trainings to strengthen the skills and knowledge of 100 journalists working in 
Balochistan.80 
Given that Pakistan was facing separatist movement and insurgency in the province of 
Balochistan, the US Government funding NGOs to train local activists and journalists 
raised deep concerns within the Pakistani military establishment with regard to the US 
threatening Pakistan’s sovereignty through its development funding. Another such grant 
was given to the Democratic Commission for Human Development. The purpose of this 
$80,000 grant, according to the USAID documents, was ‘to raise awareness about 
democracy, human rights, and tolerance among secondary school teachers and 
 
79  Data available at National Endowment for Democracy’s website, 
https://www.ned.org/region/asia/pakistan-2017/. 
80  Data on the project is available at USAID Foreign Aid Explorer website, 
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/PAK. 
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students’.81 Similarly, between 2010 and 2012, a $186,000 grant was made available to 
the Civil Society Support Programme, aiming to:  
promote the active political participation of youth in public affairs and to strengthen 
the capacity of youth organizations to engage in advocacy and awareness-raising on 
social, economic, and political issues.82 
In ordinary circumstances, these grants would seem to be typical programs run by 
USAID throughout the developing world. However, in the context of the KLB Act and 
the US pursuit of forcing a systemic change in the political and policy situation in 
Pakistan, these types of grants are highly questionable. The NED spent millions of 
dollars in making such grants to local NGOs, reaching out to the very grassroots level in 
education, media and other sectors to promote the American perspective and shape the 
national discourse of Pakistan on key issues of terrorism, democracy and culture in a 
way that suited American strategic interests. The major concern raised by the Pakistani 
state officials regarding the US approaching the public directly through NGOs was that 
this indicated a strong neocolonial tendency to restructure the mindset of the society to 
make it see the world through the American lens. This was seen as a threat to Pakistan’s 
sovereignty. Since then, the Pakistani security agencies have routinely cracked down 
and banned several INGOs and NGOs in Pakistan, even as recently as 2018.  
In addition, many of these programs reached out directly to Pakistani politicians and 
government officials, to make them more sympathetic to the American perspective. For 
instance, USAID funded a $21.5 million project on democracy, titled ‘Political Party 
Development Program’, which aimed to work ‘with the political parties of Pakistan to 
help them engage their members and leaders in policy development’ and ‘enhance the 
ability of political parties to contribute to democratic policy-making and governance 
processes’. 83  Along with projects called ‘Elections and Political Processes’ and 
‘Legislative Function and Processes’, many of these projects provided the US 
Government with direct access and ability to influence Pakistani politicians, many of 
whom ran the local NGOs that received funding from the US State Department. For 
 
81  Data on the project is available at USAID Foreign Aid Explorer website, 
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/PAK. 
82  Information is available for the Civil Society Support Program (CSSP) sponsored by USAID at 
http://www.cssp.org.pk/. 
83 USAID, Political Party Development Program: Performance Evaluation Report (Washington, DC: 
USAID, June 2014). 
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instance, the Jinnah Institute, founded and managed by a senior politician of the PPP 
and the former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, received $605,000 in grants from the 
US State Department to run democracy-building programs and generate a particular 
discourse. The funding description required the Jinnah Institute to ‘engage policy-
makers, government officials, media organizations, civil society, state institutions, and 
academia … and to produce policy briefs, write articles, and organize a speaker series 
and a conference for students’.84 What is more striking is that while the politician in 
question was Pakistan’s diplomat to the US, the think tank continued to receive 
$260,000 from the US State Department—a serious conflict of interest that went 
unchecked. Similarly, the Baacha Khan Trust Educational Foundation, operating in 
KPK, which lists two senior politicians of the Awami National Party on their Board 
of Directors, received $373,182 between 2010 and 2015 from the US State 
Department through the NED.85 Both of these politicians are seen by the public as 
being the most outspoken critics of the Pakistan Army, which fuels suspicion about 
their association with the US State Department grants.  
While this may or may not be direct evidence of bribery, it clearly constitutes a conflict 
of interest, with the Western donor funding the private organisations of Pakistani 
politicians. To the military establishment in Pakistan, this was one of the many ways the 
US Government tried to influence and align the discourse of Pakistani politicians to 
support the American strategic interests, which included removing the Pakistan Army 
from national security and foreign policy decisions and bringing those decisions under 
the control of civilians. As one military official complained: 
The only thing the KLB Act achieved was that it got the Pakistani political leaders to 
also speak the language of the Americans and blame their own Army for playing 
double games in Afghanistan, albeit for their own political interests. The KLB Act 
changed the political and national security discourse in Pakistan—looking back, we 
realise that was perhaps the entire purpose of it.86  
 
84  Description on the project is available at USAID Foreign Aid Explorer website, 
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/PAK. 
85  Descriptin on the project is available at USAID Foreign Aid Explorer website, 
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/PAK. 
 
86 Interview with the former chief of General Staff, Pakistan Army, 18 August 2016. 
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While the aforementioned views of the Pakistani state officials appropriate too much 
blame to the KLB Act and the civilian political leaders for the influencing the civil-
military relations in Pakistan, it is more so a reflection of deep insecurity of the security 
establishment in Pakistan over dissenting voices in the country. The KLB Act was not 
entirely unique in its impact on civil-military relations, given that there were dissenting 
voices and political leaders in Pakistan throughout its history that resisted against the 
military transgressions. It was, however, given the time a pivotal one to shift the 
discourse on civil-military relations. For instance, through its funding to the INGOs and 
NGOs, the KLB Act contained a more blunt projection of power, indicating its interest 
to ‘train’ the Pakistani officials into respecting civilian authority. For instance, the KLB 
Act called for:  
d) Exchange Program between military and civilian personnel of Pakistan and certain 
other countries in order to foster greater mutual respect for and understanding of the 
principle of civilian rule of the military.87 
In other words, the US was interested in not only forcing the military out of politics and 
limiting its role in national security but also (according to one military official) 
‘disciplining’ the Pakistan Army to respect civilian supremacy through seminars and 
workshops. He saw this as micromanaging affairs in Pakistan and being highly 
disrespectful of the military establishment in Pakistan. He believed the US was forcing a 
particular discourse on the civil–military issues of Pakistan as well as painting the 
Pakistan Army as a rogue institution that needed to be brought under civilian control.88  
Another USAID project titled ‘Local Government and Decentralization’, which had the 
purpose of strengthening local government bodies and local government officials, 
displayed blunt power projection through programs on the ground as well. This program 
received multiple grants, totalling over $30 million, in a single year.89 However, there is 
no record available within USAID or the Pakistan Government of the way that money 
was spent and in what areas, which raises concerns over the purpose of these multi-
million dollar grants. One NGO representative, who had first-hand experience of 
USAID, candidly suggested that such grants usually enriched the political and military 
 
87 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), § 202. 
88 Interview with the former chief of General Staff, Pakistan Army, 18 August 2016. 
89 Data on the project is available at USAID Foreign Aid Explorer website, 
https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/PAK. 
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establishment through consulting fees and contracting of resources on the project. A 
report by the Belfer Center at Harvard University titled ‘US Aid to Pakistan—US 
Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption’ provides evidence of $30 million of US 
funding used to build a road in Pakistan that was never made and there is no record of 
where the money was spent.90 Suspicions around aid feeding corruption are further 
compounded by the fact that several US Government-funded projects are listed on the 
USAID webpage that do not specify the organisation receiving the grant. For instance, 
the US State Department spent $9 million on an ‘Unspecified Project’ under a 
description of ‘Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Program’. For the Pakistan 
Government and its intelligence services, these unspecified fundings have been a cause 
of major anxiety. Similarly, the NED funded a project that is listed as ‘Grantee 
Unspecified’. The purpose listed on the grants document is ‘To engage citizens in a 
long-term campaign for peace, tolerance, and democracy in south Punjab’.91 The fact 
that South Punjab is an area of US interest, because of militancy and extremism, makes 
this funding very questionable, especially at a time when the US funding of religious 
organisations, such as the Sunni Ittehad Council, to conduct rallies against the Taliban 
in Pakistan created a controversy.  
To explore the detail of the politics around US Government funding in Pakistan would 
be another doctoral research project in itself. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter, 
the projects that aimed to promote democracy through the KLB Act are presented as 
evidence of the politics of the security–development nexus to influence the civil–
military relations of Pakistan by changing the mindset of the society and, through 
payments to the politicians and government officials, challenging the country’s 
sovereignty. This is in line with what Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, decades ago in his prison cell, 
highlighted as a significant problem for the developing nations in his book Myth of 
Independence, a postcolonial critique of the Great Powers. Bhutto wrote:  
the aim of a Great Power is no longer to subjugate the world in the conventional 
sense, but to control the minds of men and gain the allegiance of the leaders of 
underdeveloped nations, through economic domination and other devices, without 
 
90 Azeem Ibrahim, ‘US Aid to Pakistan—US Taxpayers Have Funded Pakistani Corruption’ (discussion 
paper, Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, July 2009). 
91 Project details are available at https://explorer.usaid.gov/cd/PAK. 
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necessarily interfering directly.92 
However, the practices associated with the security–development nexus prove Bhutto 
wrong with regard to the Great Powers directly interfering in the development world. As 
this chapter suggests to the contrary, through the KLB Act the US directly interfered 
with and influenced the civil–military balance of Pakistan in favour of the civilian 
political establishment, to serve its strategic interests across the discursive, policy and 
programming aspects.  
5.6 Conclusion 
To explore the politics of the security–development nexus, this chapter has 
demonstrated how the nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, influenced civil–military 
relations in Pakistan, challenging the country’s sovereignty, to serve the American 
strategic interest. This, the chapter has argued, was done in three steps. First, the 
American discourse on Pakistan shifted because of its frustration with the Pakistan 
Army and changes in the political situations in the US and Pakistan. Second, the terms 
and conditions of the KLB Act clearly spelled out the requirements of civilian 
supremacy and control over the Pakistan Army. Lastly, the US directly funded the 
INGOs and NGOs to promote democracy on the ground in Pakistan. The KLB Act 
affected civil–military relations in Pakistan across the discursive, policy and 
programming levels, to serve the American strategic interest. The discussion in this 
chapter has helped to deepen our understanding of the politics of the nexus while 
simultaneously enriching the critical literature on the subject, which is otherwise devoid 
of the nuance with regard to the way the nexus served to influence the civil–military 
relations of a developing country to serve American strategic interests.  
However, this story is still incomplete here, because while the US has historically 
played a role in aiding a civil–military divide in Pakistan, studying the voices of 
Pakistani actors provides much deeper insights into the politics of the security–
development nexus in the context of civil–military relations. For instance, the fact that 
the civilian government of Pakistan accepted the KLB Act and vehemently argued in 
favour of it, calling it a ‘pro-democracy’ bill, indicates what the military officials 
believed to be collusion between the PPP-led government of Pakistan and the newly 
 
92 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, The Myth of Independence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), 14. 
153 
elected Obama Administration. The next chapter explores the way the civilian 
government of the PPP in Pakistan helped to co-produce the nexus and the degree of 
agency it was able to exert through the KLB Act to its own advantage in its domestic 
power struggle with the Pakistan Army.  
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Chapter 6: The Road to Civilian Supremacy 
 
 
When the Army takes money from the US and pushes back on democracy, it is only 
patriotism. When we (politicians) take the money from the US in hopes to fix the civil–
military balance, it is treason.1 
—Civilian political leader 
 
In Pakistan, three A’s rule the country: Allah, America and Army. Allah is neutral, and 
America can be convinced against the Army.2 
—Civilian political leader 
 
The US meant to promote democracy in Pakistan through the KLB because it was 
suitable to its long-term agenda. The promotion of democracy in Pakistan happened to 
be our long-term agenda as well. The KLB was therefore a blessing for democracy.3 
—Former Ambassador of Pakistan 
  
 
1 Interview with a former PPP senator, Lahore, 9 April 2016. 
2 Interview with a former PPP member of the National Assembly, 7 May 2016. 
3 Interview with a former Pakistani ambassador to the US. 
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6.1 Introduction 
At the peak of its power, the British ruled India with only a few thousand of its own 
soldiers and civil servants, relying mostly on the native soldiers and bureaucrats to 
protect British interests. The common perception is that this feat was achieved through 
the ‘divide and rule’ strategy that the British adopted in India.4 While the use of ‘divide 
and rule’ was indeed significant, this perception attributes too much agency to the 
British and its diplomacy, neglecting the role and ambitions of the locals in an India that 
was already divided into hundreds of princely states and kingdoms.  
For instance, the British victory in the Battle of Plassey5 in 1757 that marked the start of 
its colonial rule in India was equally a victory of Mir Jafar, the general of Nawab Siraj-
ud-daulah that took over the throne of Bengal after the war. It is noted that Mir Jafar 
secretly worked to form an alliance with the British, asking them to intervene and help 
him overthrow Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah.6 As a reward, Mir Jafar, as the new nawab, 
awarded British lucrative trade deals. Mir Jafar may have taken over the throne, but in 
the history of South Asia, his name has been synonymous with treachery for over two 
centuries.7 Even his house in Murshidabad in the state of West Bengal is known as 
‘Traitor’s home’.  
The story of Mir Jafar is relevant to this chapter, and the thesis in general, because in 
my interviews with the military officials of Pakistan, ‘Mir Jafar’ was a term used 
repeatedly for the civilian political leaders of Pakistan to explain their agency and role 
in co-producing the nexus, as enacted through the KLB Act. They said they used it in 
their own favour to achieve domestic political interests against the Pakistan Army. For 
the civilian political leaders that I interviewed, it was a legitimate fight for civilian 
supremacy in an otherwise military-dominated state. This chapter builds on this idea to 
address the second question of the thesis, ‘To what extent was Pakistan able to exert its 
agency and mould the KLB in its own favour, from a position of weakness?’ 
 
4 See Shashi Tharoor, Inglorious Empire: What the British Did to India (Brunswick: C Hurst & Co 
Publishers, 2017). 
5 The Battle of Plassey was fought between the British under the command of Colonel Robert Clive 
against the Nawab Siraj-ud-daulah, the ruler of Bengal who requested help from the French against the 
British.  
6 George B. Malleson, The Decisive Battles of India from 1746 to 1819 (London: W.H. Allen, 1885), 49–
51. 
7 Sushil Chaudhary, Trade, Politics & Society: The Indian Milieu in the Early Modern Era (New York: 
Routledge, 2017), 152. 
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Specifically, it examines the agency of the civilian political government of the PPP 
during its rule from 2008 to 2013, which despite severe criticism from the opposition 
political parties and military establishment in Pakistan, embraced the KLB Act as a 
‘pro-democracy’ bill. 
In the previous chapter, the politics of the security–development nexus was explored 
through a discussion of the way the nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, helped the US 
to influence civil–military relations in Pakistan, challenging the country’s sovereignty. 
It presented one side of the politics activated through the nexus. To explore the politics 
of the security–development nexus at a deeper level, this chapter argues that the PPP 
government was not a passive bystander under the KLB Act. Rather, it played an active 
role not only to co-produce the KLB but also to use it to force the Pakistan Army out of 
the political landscape, to establish civilian supremacy in the country—a goal that 
aligned with American strategic interests in the region.  
This chapter begins by taking a decolonial approach in terms of discussing the historical 
civil–military divide in Pakistan, to show that civil–military relations are, by and large, 
a domestic affair in Pakistan, where local actors seek foreign support to consolidate and 
legitimise their power through the security–development nexus. This makes the voices 
of the local actors significant, giving them agency to be relevant in the nexus debate. 
The sections that follow then demonstrate how the PPP government co-produced and 
used the underlying notion of the nexus (‘security and development go hand in hand’ 
and ‘security of the global North is linked to the security of the global South’), as 
enacted through the KLB Act, to establish civilian supremacy in Pakistan. The chapter 
argues that this was achieved in three steps across the discursive, policy and practical 
level. First, by adjusting and contributing to the changing US narrative on the Pakistan 
Army, the PPP pitched itself to the US as a better alternative to deliver in the war on 
terrorism, discrediting the Pakistan Army in the process. Second, by including specific 
terms and conditions in the KLB Act to make it act as a ‘soft coup’ against the Pakistan 
Army and tilt the balance of civil–military relations in favour of the civilian 
government, the PPP co-produced the security–development nexus, as enacted through 
the KLB Act. Lastly, the PPP used the American patronage attained through the KLB 
Act to take practical steps to reduce the power of the Pakistan Army. This is evidenced 
by the Memogate scandal, PPP’s failed attempt to bring the ISI under civilian control, as 
well as the Dawn Leaks.  
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Essentially, the discussion in this chapter demonstrates that actors in recipient countries 
such as Pakistan are able to use the indivisibility of security and development to their 
own advantage in domestic civil–military affairs. In doing this, it challenges the critical 
literature on the security–development nexus, which sees recipient countries as passive 
bystanders in the nexus debate, reducing them to mere objects of the nexus and 
insignificant in shaping it. In contrast, this chapter demonstrates the way the security–
development nexus (in the form of the KLB Act) was a mutual creation of the PPP 
government in Pakistan and the Obama Administration, both of whom saw the Pakistan 
Army as a foe that needed to be contained. The US saw the Pakistan Army as a problem 
because of its failures in the war on terrorism. The civilian government of the PPP 
wanted to make its own space in an otherwise military-dominated state.  
6.2 Civil–Military: The Domestic Challenge 
The previous chapter argued that America’s geopolitical agenda during the Cold War 
gave rise to the Pakistan Army’s political dominance in the country. This section 
explores the civil–military imbalance as a domestic power struggle in which the local 
actors capitalised on the Cold War to strengthen their domestic position. In doing this, it 
gives both political conscience and agency to the Pakistani actors in the security–
development nexus debate, which is a useful base for exploring the politics of the nexus 
in the subsequent sections. For instance, right from its independence in 1947, Pakistan 
faced a ‘turf war’ between the political leaders, the civil bureaucracy and the armed 
forces, which continues to this day. Based on my interviews with the officials of civil 
and military institutions of Pakistan and reviewing the relevant literature,8 I identified 
this situation to be largely due to the structures of colonial power, the early history of 
security anxieties and the ‘elite bargain’ that placed the military at the helm of state 
affairs. This civil–military tension gives context and explains the agency exerted by the 
PPP through the KLB Act.  
 
8 See Hasan Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan: 1947–1997 (Lahore: Sange-e-Meel 
Publications, 2000); Ahmad Ishtiaq, Pakistan: The Garrison State, Origins, Evolution, Consequences 
(1947–2011) (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013); Ayesha Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan: A 
Muslim Homeland and Global Politics (Cambridge: Harvard Press, 2014); Ejaz Hussain, ‘Pakistan: Civil-
Military Relations in a Post-Colonial State’, Journal of Power, Conflict and Democracy in South and 
Southeast Asia 4 (2012): 113–46; Shafqat Sayeed, Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan: From Zulfikar Ali 
Bhutto to Benazir Bhutto (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997); Paul Staniland, ‘Explaining Civil-Military 
Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and Pakistan in Comparative Perspective’, Security 
Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): 322–62. 
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Ejaz uses the concept ‘praetorian oligarchy’ to explain the colonial power structures that 
are the root of this civil–military tussle in Pakistan. The praetorian oligarchy consists of 
a landed feudal class and a civil–military bureaucracy that served with loyalty under the 
British Raj.9 Given that the military is a colonial phenomenon, Ejaz argues, ‘In post-
partition Pakistan the military intervened in politics due to its structural understanding 
with the pre-partition praetorian oligarchy to perpetualise its politico-economic 
interests’.10 Essentially, what he and other notable scholars on the subject suggest is that 
Pakistan is a praetorian state that inherited the praetorian oligarchy from British India, 
which continues to operate as it did more than 70 years ago, during British colonialism. 
Therefore, in that context, the domestic power struggle in the country can be understood 
through Staniland’s conceptualisation, based on three indicators: military threat 
configuration, civilian legitimacy and political institutionalisation.11  
In terms of military threat configuration, from the first day, Pakistan faced a threat from 
both India and Afghanistan, based on territorial issues. Hence, in the early years over 
65% of the budget went into defence. 12  This placed the military at the centre of 
Pakistan’s policy and governance decisions because of the militarisation of the state, 
and the foreign policy of the country was a reflection of the state’s internal need for 
security and stability.13 Aligning with the US during the Cold War and presenting itself 
as the front-line state against ‘communism’ meant that Pakistan could provide its 
geostrategic location and a well-organised military institution at the service of the US.  
The civil–military balance could have been saved from tipping in favour of the military 
if the All-India Muslim League (AIML), the main political party that led the Pakistan 
movement, had been able to consolidate its power and demonstrate democratic 
tendencies after independence.14 Lawrence Ziring rightly argues that unlike the Indian 
National Congress (INC), which evolved into a full-time mainstream political party, 
‘the inability of the Muslim League to transform itself from a movement to a vibrant, 
unified, and coherent political party … unleashed the divisive forces that, more than 
 
9 Ejaz, ‘Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations’, and Staniland, ‘Explaining Civil-Military Relations’. 
10 Ejaz, ‘Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations’, 121. 
11 Paul Staniland, ‘Explaining Civil-Military Relations in Complex Political Environments: India and 
Pakistan in Comparative Perspective’, Security Studies 17, no. 2 (2008): 322–62. 
12 Rizvi, The Military and Politics. 
13 See Ishtiaq, Pakistan: The Garrison State; Jalal, The Struggle for Pakistan.  
14  In its early months of independence, the founder of Pakistan, MA Jinnah, retained the office of 
Governor General and used the authority to dismiss the democratically elected assembly in NWFP and 
Sindh, setting a wrong precedent of ousting the governments.  
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India, threatened the survival of the young nation’.15 Sumit Ganguly writes on a similar 
note, ‘The League arrived in the newly independent state ill equipped to form any type 
of representative government’.16  This was partly because the Muslim League never 
really formed a government nor had any governance experience before it took on the 
gigantic task of running the national government of Pakistan—a country that was split 
into two halves, East Pakistan and West Pakistan, with India in the middle.  
In addition, the AIML was elitist17 and rather undemocratic, with one charismatic leader 
(MA Jinnah) ruling over the other lesser known political figures.18 This hindered its 
ability to develop political credibility, and therefore, it struggled to establish itself as a 
voice for all of the Muslims in India across every Muslim-majority province. For 
instance, in places like NWFP (now KPK), AIML lost the 1937 elections to the INC led 
by Bacha Khan, a Pashtun nationalist who had been opposed to the decision to create 
Pakistan. Similarly, in Balochistan, the Muslim League had no political presence and, 
instead, allied with the princely states and feudal landlords to establish the government. 
The Muslim League had won elections in Punjab, Bengal and Sindh. In Punjab, 
however, the Muslim League was not able to make a government since the INC, 
Unionist Party19 and Akali Dal20  all joined against the Muslim League to form the 
government. This led the Muslim League to boycott the democratically elected 
government and call for a ‘Direct Action Day’, which led to a series of protests all over 
Punjab and Bengal, resulting in hundreds of deaths. Essentially, Pakistan was born 
through this bloodshed, violence and deals with feudal landlords and princes, rather than 
through purely democratic means and support for the idea of Pakistan. Thus, while the 
AIML was able to secure the independence of Pakistan, it was not able to secure its 
power over the territory altogether and, more importantly, over the population, 
 
15 Lawrence Ziring, Pakistan in the Twentieth Century: A Political History (Karachi: Oxford University 
Press, 1997), 146. 
16 Sumit Ganguly, ‘Pakistan’s Never-Ending Story: Why the October Coup Was No Surprise’, Foreign 
Affairs 79, no. 2 (March/April 2000). 
17 Maya Tudor, The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan 
(New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2017). 
18 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2014). 
19 The Unionist Party was a secular party from Punjab consisting mostly of Punjabi aristocracy, a mix of 
Muslims, Sikhs and Hindus with a large patronage structure and vote bank.  
20 Akali Dal was a Punjabi Sikh political party led by Master Tara Singh, allied to the Indian Congress 
Party, which opposed the partition of Punjab and was politically against the AIML. After partition, the 
AIML and Akali Dal engaged in bitter violence against each other.  
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especially the power brokers and institutions that resulted in the clash of institutions that 
we now call the country’s civil–military divide.  
The third problem was the weak and corrupt civil institutions, which were neither able 
to deliver nor able to maintain stability in the country, contributing to the poor 
credibility and legitimacy of the civilian government.21 In 1953 against the backdrop of 
anti-Ahmadi agitation, the civilian government invited the first martial law that was 
enforced in Lahore, confirming the place of the military in domestic political affairs.22 
In essence, within the first decade of Pakistan’s existence, three pillars of power had 
emerged: the political leaders (mostly feudal), the civil bureaucracy and the Pakistan 
military. Since then, Pakistan has been in a state of perpetual power struggle, with 
repeated coups and short, broken spells of democracy. As Ejaz asserts, in the newly 
independent Pakistan, the military became the dominant force within this praetorian 
oligarchy. 23  However, the struggle with other stakeholders of the state and society 
continued.  
From the perspective of civilian political leadership, the internal struggle faced by 
Pakistan and the global political climate under the Cold War benefited the Pakistan 
Army in consolidating its power in the country, identifying and utilising the need of the 
West, particularly the US, to have close military-to-military ties with Pakistan, which 
was located in a geostrategically important place. One senior political figure in the PPP 
commented:  
As a postcolonial state in a strategically significant region, especially at the time of 
the Cold War, the global powers, be it the US or the Soviet Union, were both 
interested in military-to-military relations. In such a situation, the Pakistan Army 
pitched itself as the local partner of the US in the Cold War and the US relations with 
Pakistan became Pentagon’s relations with the Pakistan Army. We can blame the 
Pakistan Army for military coups and crushing civilian supremacy in Pakistan, but the 
US is equally responsible for allowing it to happen under its watch.24 
While the view above of the PPP politician neglects the role of civilian political leaders 
in crafting the foreign policy direction of Pakistan that placed the military at a higher 
 
21 Ishtiaq, Pakistan: The Garrison State. 
22 Peter R. Blood, ed., Pakistan: A Country Study (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division, 1995). 
23 Ejaz, ‘Pakistan: Civil-Military Relations’, 129. 
24 Interview with a former member of the National Assembly of the PPP, Islamabad, 20 July 2016. 
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pedestal to serve in the Cold War leading to a domestic civil-military imbalance, it is a 
prevalent notion within the political establishment of Pakistan that the US had 
historically supported and preferred military dictatorships in Pakistan over civilian 
democracy. This, they argued, allowed the US to negotiate easily with a single military 
dictator behind the scenes,25 instead of going through the entire democratic process of 
parliamentary approvals and developing civil-to-civil relations with a partner such as 
Pakistan, which had no economic or trading value to the US but, instead, had only 
military value.  
Studying the US presidential visits to Pakistan during the periods of military and 
civilian rule offers a perspective on US interests, as there is a strikingly clear bias in 
favour of military rule. For instance, in the past 70 years there have been only five US 
presidential visits to Pakistan, none of them during a period of civilian rule. The first 
(1959) and second (1967) presidential visits were during Ayub Khan’s era. The third 
(1969) was during Yahya Khan’s tenure. The fourth (2000) and fifth (2006) were both 
during Musharraf’s rule. Despite all the talk of supporting the civilian government and 
democracy through the KLB Act in Pakistan, Obama did not make a single trip to 
Pakistan. The civilian political leaders saw this as damaging the civilian government’s 
credibility in a country that already felt isolated in the global community.  
Pakistan’s civilian political leaders believed the US disinterest in them stemmed mainly 
from the decades of Pakistan Army propaganda, which presented to the American 
policymakers a threatening image of Pakistan’s democracy and people, in the hope of 
securing strong American support for the military. For instance, one political leader 
from the PML-N said:  
Americans have long been fed a wrong image of the Pakistani people and civilian 
political leaders by our security establishment, on purpose. In the 1950s, 1960s, the 
image was that of left-leaning communist supporters that needed to be controlled by 
the West-leaning Pakistan Army. After 9/11, the image of the people and their leaders 
was that of anti-American Islamists radicals. The ‘liberal’ General Musharraf was 
 
25 Civilian political leaders give the example of General Musharraf’s unilateral decision allowing the US 
to conduct drone strikes on Pakistani citizens without any approval from the parliament or even his close 
military aides. This, they argue, represents the secret back-door deals between the US and Pakistani 
military dictators that never come to the public eye but, essentially, helped the US to have its way in 
Pakistan and helped the military dictator to either make money or gain concessions from the US.  
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presented as a shimmering hope in an otherwise dark tunnel.26 
US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice’s memoir echoed this view of the civilian 
leadership in Pakistan as being Islamist and anti-American when describing the way the 
US Government under GW Bush aggressively supported Musharraf, fearing that 
without him in power, the Islamist parties would take over the country, ending 
Pakistan’s support for the US war on terrorism. Essentially, Musharraf was hailed by 
US policymakers and Western media as a ‘liberal’ voice in Pakistan’s otherwise 
Islamist political landscape. This image of Musharraf as a Western liberal voice and a 
voice of the public, including the main political parties such as the PML-N, headed by 
Muhammad Nawaz Sharif, as right-wing, anti-war and sympathetic to the Taliban since 
the 11 September attacks, empowered Musharraf and legitimised his rule globally. The 
US became dependent on Musharraf for its war in Afghanistan and Pakistan against 
terrorism, while simultaneously giving his unconstitutional military rule a global 
endorsement.  
However, as noted earlier, the long period of US support and endorsement of military 
rule under Musharraf ended when the US became frustrated with his inability to deliver 
on the war on terrorism. The notions that ‘development and security go hand in hand’ 
and ‘democracy in Pakistan is essential to the security of the US’ became the dominant 
discourse in Washington power circles, giving the civilian political parties (including 
the PPP) an ideal opportunity to change the civil–military relations of Pakistan. The 
civilian political leaders exerted their agency, using one of the three A’s, America, 
against the Army, to correct the civil–military imbalance in the country through the 
security–development nexus, enacted in the form of the KLB Act.  
This brief discussion of the civil–military history gives agency to the local actors, 
demonstrating that they are not passive bystanders in their engagement with donor states 
but have political conscience and an ability to use their engagement with the donor 
states to draw political benefits in their own power struggles. This is shown in the way 
the PPP government capitalised on, and reinforced, the shifting US narrative on the 
Pakistan Army through the security–development nexus, pitching itself as the preferable 
partner in the war on terrorism, as is shown in the next section.  
 
26 Interview with a member of the National Assembly from the PML-N, Lahore, 18 July 2016. 
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6.3 Aligning the Discourse 
The Taliban was not the only beneficiary of American losses in Afghanistan. The 
civilian political leaders of Pakistan, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, who were in 
exile during Musharraf’s military rule, benefited immensely as well, in terms of both 
being able to return to Pakistan and in reducing the role of the Pakistan Army in 
politics. This was achieved mostly by reinforcing the anti-Pakistan Army narrative in 
the West through the security–development nexus at a time of growing US frustration 
with Musharraf’s government over its tacit support for the Taliban and Haqqani 
network. As discussed in the previous chapter, the American policy community had 
realised that the US had supported a military dictatorship in Pakistan at the expense of 
democracy for too long and that more development spending in Pakistan to support 
democracy would help to secure American security concerns in Afghanistan. This is 
reflected in a statement by Obama during his election campaign in 2007: 
It is in the interests of the Pakistani people and the United States to see our ally move 
toward democracy, as more authoritarian government will only mean more instability, 
more discontent, and more extremism in Pakistan. The United States must move 
beyond the Administration’s failed policies of promoting stability over democracy, 
which has undercut our efforts to root out terrorists in Pakistan. We must start with a 
serious review of our investments in Pakistan to make sure that U.S. assistance is 
supporting democracy, not repression.27 
The statement by then-presidential candidate Obama is insightful and reflects the 
changing US discourse on Pakistan and the emergence of the security–development 
nexus enacted later through the KLB Act. For instance, in the first sentence, Obama 
establishes the mutual interest of the US and the people of Pakistan in ending 
Musharraf’s military rule and bringing democracy back to Pakistan. He then criticises 
the Bush Administration for wrongly supporting a military dictatorship that he saw 
brought only short-term stability in Pakistan over long-term gains in ending terrorism 
through democracy. Lastly, he hints at his plans to reset the US ‘investment’ in Pakistan 
by ensuring that US assistance would be used to empower democracy, setting the stage 
for the development of the KLB Act in 2009, after he took over the White House.  
 
27 Barack Obama, ‘Obama Statement on State of Emergency in Pakistan’, The American Presidency 
Project, 5 November 2007. 
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This sentiment was echoed by US policymakers in 2006/2007, with the Democrats 
winning the 2006 US Congressional Elections and asserting the security–development 
nexus on Pakistan through the congressional committee on foreign policy. For instance, 
in his statement during the US Senate hearing on foreign assistance to Pakistan on 
6 December 2007, Senator Russell D Feingold of Wisconsin said: 
To begin, I’m very concerned that the administration support for President Musharraf 
is shortsighted and misguided. Obviously, serious questions remain about President 
Musharraf’s assistance in fighting al-Qaeda, which has strengthened and reconstituted 
itself on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the extraordinary 
and antidemocratic measures President Musharraf has taken are inconsistent with 
American values and likely to increase the appeal of extremist groups in that country. 
So I’d like to have, at this point, each of you address the impact of our support for 
President Musharraf has had on stability and democracy in Pakistan.28 
Senator Feingold was voicing the changing discourse of the US policy community, 
which saw Musharraf’s performance in the war on terrorism as questionable and raised 
doubts with regard to whether the US support for Musharraf was helping the US in the 
long term. Senator Joe Biden, the Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Affairs 
Committee of the time, had similar views. In his meeting with Asif Ali Zardari, Senator 
Biden said he disagreed with Bush’s policy on focusing on Musharraf and calling him a 
democrat. According to Biden, there was a ‘mood change in Washington’ with regard to 
the Pakistan Army and the US Government was willing to increase substantially its 
security and development assistance to Pakistan’s newly elected civilian government of 
the PPP.29 Shortly after the 2008 US Elections, the Obama Administration contained 
many of these voices in senior roles. They saw the Pakistan Army as not only the core 
reason for the US failure in Afghanistan but also a hindrance to democracy and stability 
in the region.  
The notion that the Pakistan Army is a foe rather than a friend and that the US must 
support the civilian democracy in Pakistan to achieve its goals in the war on terrorism 
did not emerge from a vacuum. Rather, it was promoted by the civilian political leaders 
 
28  US Assistance to Pakistan: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the International Development and 
Foreign Assistance, Economic Affairs, and International Environmental Protection, 110th Cong., 6 
December 2007. 
29  Embassy Islamabad, ‘Codel Biden’s Meeting with Asif Zardari’, 7 April 2008, 
https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/08ISLAMABAD1476_a.html. 
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of Pakistan, especially by Benazir Bhutto through a skilful use of the security–
development nexus. For the PPP under Benazir Bhutto, the growing US frustration with 
regard to the war on terrorism was an opportunity to shape the US discourse in favour of 
civilian rule in Pakistan. This was especially achievable at a time when the long tenure 
in the Congress of the US Republican Party, which had strongly backed Musharraf’s 
rule, ended and the White House was likely to go to the Democrats in the 2008 
elections. The most significant evidence of this is Benazir Bhutto’s strongly worded 
article in the Guardian, titled ‘The Price of Dictatorship’. 30  Building on the core 
assumptions of the security–development nexus, Bhutto argues that the primary reason 
that the West was vulnerable to terrorist attacks was ‘the West allowing the Pakistani 
military regimes to suppress the democratic aspirations of the people of Pakistan, as 
long as their dictators ostensibly support the political goals of the international 
community’. Her article clearly makes Musharraf’s military dictatorship in Pakistan, 
which the West had trusted and supported, the root of the problem. For instance, she 
writes: 
General Musharraf has played the West like a fiddle, dispensing occasional support in 
the war on terrorism to keep America and Britain off his back … while it presides over 
the society that fuels and empowers militants at the expense of moderates.31  
This is in complete alignment with the security–development nexus and the discourse 
emanating from the US policy community at that time, which targeted the Pakistan 
Army for playing a ‘double game’. Further, throughout the article, Benazir Bhutto 
pitches herself and the civilian democracy as being different on the issue of terrorism, 
arguing that she ‘spent years dismantling’ militant networks that ‘flourish and grow 
under the military dictatorship’. She conveniently ignores the fact that Pakistan’s policy 
to support militancy in Afghanistan was first devised during the civilian rule of her 
father (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) in the mid-1970s. Her conclusion, however, explains the 
level of agency she exerted in shaping the security–development nexus and the US 
discourse on the Pakistan Army: 
Democratic governments do not empower, protect and harbour terrorists. Democratic 
societies largely produce citizens who understand the importance of law, diversity and 
 
30 Benazir Bhutto, ‘The Price of Dictatorship’, Guardian, 22 August 2006, 
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31 Benazir Bhutto, ‘The Price of Dictatorship’ 
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tolerance. A democratic Pakistan, free from the yoke of military dictatorship, would 
cease to be the Petri dish of the pandemic of international terrorism … During both of 
my tenures as Prime Minister, my government enforced the writ of the state there 
through the civil administration and paramilitary troops.32 
Benazir Bhutto’s article indicates the policy and position of the PPP and its 
conversations with the international community and policymakers with regard to 
Pakistan, the essence being that the US must support and forge a partnership with the 
PPP if it wants to achieve the desired policy changes in Pakistan with regard to the war 
on terrorism. This showed that she not only co-produced and reinforced the salient 
features of the nexus but also used it to advance her interests to establish civilian 
supremacy in Pakistan.  
My interviews with the political leadership of the PPP, especially with one of their 
senators, offered insights into the various ways that Benazir Bhutto seized this moment 
to shift the country’s balance in civil–military relations, which eventually resulted in the 
emergence of the KLB Act. According to the PPP senator, Benazir Bhutto 
communicated with the highest levels of the US policy community to help her return to 
power in Pakistan and to support democracy in the country, even if that required a 
compromise with Musharraf, who was strongly backed by the Bush Administration. 
Bhutto met the foreign policy heavyweights in the US, including Condoleezza Rice, 
Senator Bob Corker, Senator John Kerry, Senator Joe Biden and many more. In 
addition, she hired a lobbyist in the US to persuade the US Government to broker a deal 
between herself and Musharraf.  
After years of negotiations, a deal was brokered by the US between Musharraf and the 
PPP for Benazir Bhutto to return to Pakistan and take over the power, while Musharraf 
continued as the President. 33  While there was growing frustration over the role of 
Pakistan Army in the war on terrorism, GW Bush, because of his personal friendship 
and liking for Musharraf, was reluctant to abandon the US support for Musharraf 
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completely.34 The prevalent view within the Bush Administration was that moderate-
minded Musharraf was needed in power in Pakistan, with the liberal and pro-US PPP as 
his political support in the parliament. Hence, a Musharraf–PPP arrangement could help 
the US to steer the national security policies of Pakistan in the right direction. Evidence 
of this argument is found in the memoirs of Condoleezza Rice, which describe her 
central role in the two years of negotiations between Musharraf and Benazir Bhutto that 
finally paved the way for her to return to Pakistan to run for election.35  
Jaffrelot suggests that in return for US support, Benazir Bhutto promised to eradicate 
terrorist safe havens inside Pakistan, allow increased US oversight over Pakistan’s 
nuclear program and improve ties with India by curbing the role of the Pakistan Army.36 
Interestingly, all of these items were included in the KLB Act that the PPP government, 
under the leadership of her husband, President Asif Ali Zardari, signed. However, 
according to the PPP leader that worked closely with Zardari, the KLB Act was not 
something dictated by the US but more of a mutual agreement between PPP and the US 
Government, which wanted to reduce the role of the Pakistan Army in national security 
policy. For the PPP, an alliance with the US was essentially built on the philosophy of 
‘your enemy is my enemy’.37 
In December 2007, Benazir Bhutto was assassinated just a few months before the 2008 
elections, allegedly on the orders of Musharraf, who saw her as a threat to his rule. 
However, her assassination probably helped the PPP to win the elections, albeit 
narrowly, against the PML-N, and Musharraf became the President, as per the 
agreement. A few months later, the PPP, now led by Bhutto’s husband, Zardari,38 and 
the PML-N launched an impeachment campaign against Musharraf.  
While the PPP and PML-N were historically arch-rivals, the PPP (led by Benazir 
Bhutto) and PML-N (led by Nawaz Sharif) had signed the ‘charter of democracy’39 in 
2006 in London, pledging to work together to end Musharraf’s rule. By 2007-08, 
 
34 See Condoleezza Rice, No Higher Honor: A Memoir of My Years in Washington (London: Simon and 
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York: Columbia University Press, 2016). 
37 This phrase was used by the former member of the National Assembly of the PPP in my interview on 
21 July 2016 in Islamabad.  
38 Asif Ali Zardari is the widower of the late Benazir Bhutto.  
39  ‘“Democracy Charter” for Pakistan’, BBC News, 15 May 2006, 
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Musharraf had low approval ratings in Pakistan because of the lawyer’s movement 
against his declaration of emergency in the country and his actions of deposing Chief 
Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry. In addition, he no longer had the support of the military. He 
resigned on 18 August 2008. According to the party leaders of the PPP that I 
interviewed, the return of democracy and the poor approval rating of the Pakistan Army, 
both domestically and globally (made worse by the 2008 Mumbai attacks), made it 
possible for the PPP to attempt to establish civilian supremacy in the country. The KLB 
Act, as an enactment of the security–development nexus, was a ‘Soft, Civilian Coup’ 
against the Pakistan Army, which PPP co-produced and used in its own favour. This is 
discussed in detail in the next sections.  
6.4 The Soft Civilian Coup 
The previous chapter described the terms and conditions of the KLB Act, as related to 
civil–military affairs, as a clear case of American neocolonial and hegemonic design, 
challenging Pakistan’s sovereignty to serve the American strategic interests. However, 
even though the military establishment and opposition political parties created an outcry 
against the US over the KLB Act at the state level, at the local level they were agitated 
primarily over the role of the PPP government in co-producing the KLB Act. The state 
officials in Pakistan that I interviewed were overwhelmingly convinced that the KLB 
Act was not a standalone American conspiracy, but rather, it reflected clear signs of the 
PPP involvement in some of the very harsh and anti-Pakistan Army language. For 
instance, in his parliamentary speech on the KLB Act, Nisar Ali Khan criticised the 
government for signing the KLB Act as follows:  
I have no complaints against the US; it is doing what it is in its best interest. My only 
complaint is with the PPP government that has signed up for the KLB Act with such 
terms and conditions attached to it. We must ask, ‘who does the government serve?’40 
The Pakistani state officials echoed this resentment that I interviewed, who believed the 
KLB Act was an extension to a secret deal between Benazir Bhutto and the US 
Government. The only difference they saw was that as a product of the Obama 
Administration and PPP government collusion, it included more hawkish demands in 
relation to containing the Pakistan Army.  
 
40 See Nisar Ali Khan, leader of the opposition (speech, National Assembly, 21 August 2009). 
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This argument is tested for validity on three levels, which reveal the role and agency of 
the PPP in co-producing and using the KLB Act as a soft coup against the Pakistan 
Army, in the hope of establishing civilian supremacy in the country. First, as discussed 
in the last section, the terms and conditions that appear in the KLB Act are an exact 
reflection of the security–development nexus discourse that civilian political leaders, 
especially Benazir Bhutto, had promoted in articles, meetings and lobbying with 
American policymakers for many years before the KLB Act. As noted earlier, Bhutto’s 
central argument was that the US support for military dictatorships was the core reason 
for the US failure in the war on terrorism and the only way to change these results was 
through US support for civilian democracy and development in Pakistan. The premise 
that the KLB Act was founded on this very notion is validated in the wording of the first 
section of the Act:  
The purposes of assistance under this title are— 
(4) to help strengthen the institutions of democratic governance and promote control 
of military institutions by a democratically elected civilian government.41 
Further evidence can be seen in President Zardari’s meeting with the US delegation led 
by Senator Joe Biden and Senator John Kerry, in which Zardari raised the issue of the 
Pakistan Army and other institutions working in their own space and that the civilian 
government should be allowed to appoint its own military commanders. This aspect was 
prominent in the KLB Act, one year after that meeting, which required insurances that: 
(3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the 
political or judicial processes of Pakistan.  
(15) An assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises 
effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which 
civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military 
budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, 
civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in 
civil administration.42 
 
41 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), § 201. 
42 Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act, Pub. L. No. 111-73, 123 Stat. 2060 (2009), § 203.  
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Perhaps the most important evidence to triangulate this is that the US policymakers who 
met with Zardari were the very people (e.g., Biden, Kerry and Berman) that Benazir 
Bhutto had been lobbying for years before her death, and they became the key officials 
that championed the KLB Act during the Obama Administration.43 Therefore, it can be 
argued that the strict clauses against the Pakistan Army in the KLB Act did not appear 
out of nowhere but reflected the PPP concerns about the Pakistan Army’s double game 
in the war on terrorism. This argument was further validated in my interview with a 
senior PPP minister, who argued that to change the balance of civil–military relations in 
Pakistan, the PPP wanted the US, through the KLB Act, to send a clear message to the 
military establishment that it backed the civilian democracy in the country. Particularly, 
this included matters of foreign and security policy, which were historically the domains 
of the military.44 Second, the PPP government wanted, through the KLB Act, to have 
control over military appointments and promotions, which would mean that military 
officials would have to seek the approval of the civilian government with regard to 
promotions. Thus, the civilian government could control the military officials down to 
brigadier level and promote only those that demonstrated loyalty to the civilian 
supremacy. Lastly, the civilian government wanted to ensure that security aid was 
conditioned upon the military respecting civilian supremacy and authority. Comparing 
the discourse of the PPP before it came into power and its conversations with US 
delegations against the eventual terms and conditions of the KLB Act show just how 
much of the KLB Act was directly co-produced by the discourse set by the PPP 
government. One former senior military official from that time said, ‘the KLB Act reads 
more like a wish list of the PPP government than [of] the Americans.’45 
The idea that the KLB Act was a conspiracy of the PPP to bring the Pakistan Army and 
ISI under civilian control was echoed across the military and intelligence community 
that I interviewed. One major reason for this was PPP’s early attempt to rein in the ISI 
as soon as it formed the government. For instance, Yousaf Raza Gilani, the Prime 
Minister of Pakistan at that time, ordered the ISI to be put under the control of the 
Ministry of Interior as a way to reduce the powers of the spy agency. However, in less 
than four hours, the Prime Minister’s office reversed its decision after strong pressure 
 
43 The KLB Act was a mastermind of Senator Joe Biden that wanted to triple the US foreign assistance to 
Pakistan to support democracy. It was supported in the Senate by Senator John Kerry, Senator Richard 
Lugar and Senator Howard Berman.  
44 Interview with a former minister of the PPP, Islamabad, 20 July 2016. 
45 Interview with a former brigadier of the Pakistan Army, Rawalpindi, 14 May 2016. 
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from the Pakistan Army and opposition political parties, who believed the PPP was 
doing the bidding of its American backers. One civilian official said: 
The message from the GHQ [General Headquarters of Pakistan Army] was very 
clear: we might be weak but we are not weak enough to be bullied like this. The PPP 
government tried to rein in ISI but it failed partly because they miscalculated the 
public perception. People disliked Musharraf; they did not dislike the institution of 
Pakistan Army or its role in Pakistan. Moreover, the PPP did not have the 
parliamentary support behind its back, with PML-N sitting in the opposition 
benches.46 
The fact that a year later the KLB Act essentially aimed to achieve civilian control of 
the ISI provides evidence of the PPP’s collusion in adding specific clauses on military 
control to the KLB Act, which it was otherwise unable to achieve on its own. The 
Pakistan Army therefore saw the KLB Act in this context. While the Pakistan Army 
lashed out against the US over the KLB Act, two of the officials that I interviewed, who 
were involved in the discussions on the subject within the Pakistan Army, recalled that 
the main concern was the role of the PPP government in using the US and the KLB Act 
as a way to attack the Army. Both officials noted that the mood in the Pakistan Army 
was very tense and the actions of the PPP government were seen as being treasonous.  
Second, the secrecy involved in the US manner of putting forward the KLB Act to 
Pakistan, as well as the speed with which the PPP government embraced it as a ‘pro-
democracy’ bill without negotiating or contesting some of its aspects, suggests a level of 
collusion between the US and the PPP government. Usually, strategic bilateral 
engagement at this level requires input from across civil–military quarters and it is 
discussed in the parliament with the opposition parties. However, in the case of the KLB 
Act, there was no procedure followed nor any consultation within the party nor the 
parliament. My interview with a former senior senator of the PPP revealed that even the 
most senior cabinet members were kept uninformed about the exact nature of the KLB 
Act. The Act was discussed in the parliament only after it had been put to the vote in the 
US Congress, creating a political crisis for the government in Pakistan over its role in 
developing the KLB Act. A review of the debate in the parliament revealed that the 
opposition political parties and the military establishment rejected the KLB Act as a 
 
46 Interview with an official of the Ministry of Interior, Islamabad, 18 July 2016. 
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‘conspiracy’ against Pakistan and its Army. The fact that the civilian government lied in 
parliament over the exact terms and conditions of the KLB Act, hailing it as a ‘pro-
democracy’ bill, suggests its incentives in the passage of the Act. This was pointed out 
in my interview with the then Director General of the ISI:  
When the KLB Act was presented to us, it came as a shock. Not only because of the 
terms and conditions but mostly because it was accepted by the PPP government as it 
is and without a formal approval of all the stakeholders in Pakistan. This only meant 
two things: 1) the PPP government had prior knowledge and it did nothing to 
negotiate the terms and conditions or 2) the PPP government had a hand in 
formulating the clauses of the KLB Act. We later found out that it was the latter.47 
This fact that the government accepted the KLB Act, in spite of its unusually negative 
language, terms and conditions, without negotiating with the US or consulting with the 
Pakistani parliament or military establishment, was raised in almost every interview 
with the civil, military and political leaders of the opposition political parties. It was 
seen as the foremost evidence of the PPP’s conspiracy to launch a soft civilian coup 
against the Pakistan Army through the KLB Act. Prominent opposition political leaders, 
including Nawaz Sharif, rejected it as a direct challenge to Pakistan’s sovereignty and 
dignity, holding the PPP government responsible. 48  The officials I interviewed 
suggested that in the original KLB Act, there were no clauses regarding civilian 
oversight of the Pakistan Army nor conditions attached to civilian control over the 
military; rather, they were all later added on the request of the government. The two 
senior US State Department diplomats that I interviewed,49 one of whom was directly 
involved in the formation of the KLB Act, confirmed these allegations. My interlocutors 
suggested that the US Government was wary that the KLB Act might be 
counterproductive and anger the Pakistan Army, but the PPP government was insistent 
on including clauses that gave the civilian government control over military affairs. It 
seems that the PPP government had convinced the Americans that it was time for them 
to support the civilian government in Pakistan in its quest to establish civilian 
supremacy and reduce the role of the Pakistan Army. This was supposed to be in the 
 
47 Interview with a former director general of the ISI, Islamabad, 10 August 2017. 
48 Nisar Ali Khan, the Federal Minister of Interior, Government of Pakistan (National Assembly speech, 
Islamabad, 30 August 2017). 
49  Interview with a former US president’s envoy to AfPak, Washington, DC, 19 September 2016. 
Interview with the US State Department official of the Pakistan desk, Washington, DC, 28  October 2016.  
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interests of both the US and Pakistan against a common threat, the Pakistan Army and 
ISI, who were seen as a problem in the region.  
Lastly, the controversial appointment by the PPP government of Husain Haqqani as the 
Pakistani Ambassador to the US provides further evidence of the high degree of agency 
that the PPP exerted in co-producing the KLB Act and using it in its favour in the 
domestic civil–military power struggle.50 One former director general said: 
We had information that our Ambassador in the US was cooking something up 
behind our backs without the knowledge of the relevant quarters. We were not exactly 
sure what, though.51 
In most of my interviews on the KLB Act across the civil and military officials, the role 
of Pakistan’s former Ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, as being similar to that of 
Mir Jafar was mentioned. As one of the most sought-after government positions, only 
given to loyalists, Haqqani was a strange choice for the PPP government’s appointment 
of Pakistan’s Ambassador to the US. Haqqani had been a scholar at the Hudson 
Institute, a conservative think tank in Washington, DC, with deep connections in the US 
political and military establishment. He was a resourceful individual who had 
previously worked with all the political parties and military dictatorships in Pakistan. 
The New York Times profiled him as being a ‘quick change artist who cozies up to 
whoever is in power’.52 One senior PPP official that I interviewed explained: 
Husain Haqqani was not very well liked within PPP and was not a member of the 
political party. However, given his deep connections with the US policymakers, State 
Department, Pentagon, and his role in lobbying for Benazir Bhutto in the US, a few 
top leaders in the political party saw him favourably. However, the most important 
reason why Haqqani was appointed as the Ambassador was because President Zardari 
needed someone with critical views on the Pakistan Army who could manoeuvre in 
Washington DC to help the PPP government establish civilian supremacy in the 
country and push back the military.53 
 
50  The Pakistani Ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, and even the Pakistan President’s house 
officials were under surveillance, according to the intelligence officials.  
51 Interview with a former director general of the ISI, Islamabad, 10 August 2017. 
52  Mark Landler, ‘Adroit Envoy States Case for Pakistan’, New York Times, 8 May 2009, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/09/world/asia/09envoy.html. 
53 Interview with a former member of the National Assembly of the PPP, Islamabad, 20 July 2016. 
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For a job that required lobbying for the PPP government in the US, seeking help in its 
power struggle with the Pakistan Army, Husain Haqqani was perfect. He had written a 
book, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, critically exploring the role of the 
Pakistan Army with Islamist organisations. This had angered the military but had been 
very well liked within the US policy community. His personal connections to the 
American policy community allowed the PPP government to approach the Americans 
secretly, without following diplomatic and political protocols. Given that Haqqani, the 
PPP and the US policy community all saw the Pakistan Army as a hindrance in the war 
on terrorism and the stability of Pakistan, he was the ideal choice for PPP. Although his 
appointment as Pakistan’s envoy to the US was not appreciated within the security 
establishment of Pakistan, which saw him as a potential threat in Washington, DC, the 
Pakistan military was in no position to challenge an appointment by a newly elected 
democratic government after a decade of military rule by Musharraf.  
Haqqani’s time as an ambassador was plagued by controversies, from his role in 
producing the KLB Act to the Memogate scandal, as discussed in the next section. The 
key issue was that Haqqani served as a secret, back-door channel between the political 
leaders and their American counterparts, which presented a constant source of anxiety 
for the military establishment in Pakistan.54 According to the Pakistani state officials, 
the specific clauses with regard to the civilian control of military appointments and 
oversight were included in the KLB Act at the behest of Ambassador Haqqani through 
private interlocutors. For years, there was no tangible proof about his exact role in 
producing the KLB Act, as he lived in exile in the US, but his 2019 article in the 
Washington Post suggests his collusion with the Americans when he makes a candid 
confession about facilitating the American strategic interests in Pakistan. He writes: ‘ 
The relationships I forged with members of Obama’s campaign team … enabled the 
United States to discover and eliminate bin Laden without depending on Pakistan’s 
intelligence service or military, which were suspected of sympathy toward Islamist 
militants.55  
 
54 Civil–military tensions came to a critical juncture with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif pursuing peace 
talks with India through back-door channels with his friends in the Indian business community.  
55 Husain Haqqani, ‘Yes, the Russian Ambassador Met Trump’s Team. So? That’s What We Diplomats 
Do’, Washington Post, 10 March 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/ 
wp/2017/03/10/yes-the-russian-ambassador-met-trumps-team-so-thats-what-we-diplomats-do/?utm_term 
=.c95588c92865. 
175 
This was achieved by stamping hundreds of visas for CIA spies, under the guise that 
they were development aid workers, without due process. 56  This confession gives 
weight to the interviews that I had with several Pakistani military officials, who 
complained of Haqqani lobbying the US Senators to enforce the conditions on the 
Pakistan Army under the KLB Act.57 Haqqani’s role in shaping the KLB Act was so 
evident that Ayaz Amir, a former senior politician of the PML-N, writing for the 
Khaleej Times, mentions Haqqani as being ‘less our man in Washington than our 
suspect in Washington’.58 The view in wider public and policy circles was similar, 
mentioning Haqqani’s ‘treasonous’ role in giving the KLB Act an anti-Pakistan Army 
flavour to serve the PPP agenda of pushing the Pakistan Army out of politics.  
The fact that the Americans were caught completely off guard when the Pakistan Army 
reacted negatively over the KLB Act indicates how much of the KLB Act was being 
shaped by the PPP government, beyond even the comfort of the US Government. 
According to the military and some civilian officials, while America had its interests in 
aligning Pakistan’s national security policies with its own, it was actually the 
controversial clauses against the Pakistan Army in the KLB Act that backfired. The 
single most convincing piece of evidence about this is the joint explanatory statement 
issued by Senator John Kerry, to save the KLB Act from falling apart. The statement 
diluted the clauses regarding civilian oversight of the military and its promotions. It 
clarified to the military establishment and the public in Pakistan at large that: 
There is no intent to, and nothing in this act in any way suggests that there should be, 
any US role in micromanaging internal Pakistani affairs, including the promotion of 
Pakistani military officers or the internal operations of the Pakistani military.59 
The explanatory note essentially made redundant the key military-related conditions and 
clauses that the PPP had included in the Act. This clarification statement further 
convinced the Pakistan Army that the clauses were, indeed, a move by the PPP 
 
56 Haqqani, ‘Yes, the Russian Ambassador’. 
57 Interview with Pakistan Army and Intelligence officials, Islamabad, April–August 2016. 
58 Ayaz Amir, ‘A Document of Shame’, The Khaleej Times, 2 October 2009 
https://www.khaleejtimes.com/editorials-columns/a-document-of-shame 
59 United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, ‘Chairman Kerry and Chairman Berman Joint 
Explanatory Statement to Accompany Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009’, press release, 
October 14 2009, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/press/chair/release/chairman-kerry-and-chairman-
berman-release-joint-explanatory-statement-to-accompany-enhanced-partnership-with-pakistan-act-of-
2009. 
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government to bring the Pakistan Army under control, especially given the speed at 
which the US was able to change its position on the military-related conditions.  
Given the above evidence, it is clear that the security–development nexus, as enacted 
through KLB Act, was not a bill developed in isolation by the US and later forced upon 
Pakistan. It was as much a product of the PPP government as it was of the US 
Government, especially in terms of the aim to reduce and contain the role of the 
Pakistan Army in domestic politics. Having the PPP government hail the KLB Act as a 
‘pro-democracy’ bill, despite its language and conditions, made it obvious to the 
opposition parties in parliament (including the PML-N) and the military establishment 
exactly who the KLB Act was designed to serve. Interestingly, the political leaders of 
the PPP that I interviewed did not deny this perception, accepting the role of the PPP in 
shaping the KLB Act as a way ‘to push the Army back to their barracks’, as they put it.  
The next section further explores the agency of the PPP by examining specific cases of 
the way the nexus, enacted through the KLB Act, was used by the PPP government to 
make a further attempt to achieve civilian supremacy in Pakistan.  
6.5 The Second Attempt 
The attempt of the PPP government to achieve a ‘soft coup’ against the military 
establishment through the conditions under the KLB Act failed the moment the US 
backed down and published the joint explanatory statement to cancel the military-
related clauses in the KLB Act. In addition, Kerry and other US officials assured the 
Pakistan Army privately that the language and conditions including the waivers were 
only a formality.60 The PPP government had lost the opportunity to ‘cut the military 
down to size and bring it under the civilians’ command’, as one of the PPP leaders 
said. 61  However, with the anti-Army discourse in place through the KLB Act, the 
opportunity for the PPP to exert civilian supremacy was presented again when in 
May 2011, the US Navy Seals entered Pakistan and captured Osama bin Laden in 
Abbottabad, from a compound within metres of Pakistan’s Military Academy, the 
equivalent of West Point in the US.  
 
60 Interview with a former staff member of General Kayani, Islamabad, 21 November 2017. 
61 Interview with a former senator of the PPP, Lahore, 29 August 2016. 
177 
In Pakistan, especially within the Pakistan Army, this raid triggered deep shock.62 The 
fact that bin Laden had been found within Pakistan was a serious blow to the Pakistan 
Army in terms of its domestic approval and international standing. The local and foreign 
media went into a frenzy, putting the Army under a spotlight.63 While the Army denied 
playing a role or giving information to the US about the possibility of conducting a raid, 
my interviews with the civilian government suggested that the civilian leadership was 
aware of, and played a logistical role in, the capture of bin Laden, albeit unknowingly. 
The former Pakistani Ambassador to the US, Husain Haqqani, wrote: 
Among the security establishment’s grievances against me was the charge that I had 
facilitated the presence of large numbers of CIA operatives, who helped track down 
bin Laden without the knowledge of Pakistan’s army—even though I had acted under 
the authorisation of Pakistan’s elected civilian leaders.64  
The fact that the civilian government PPP issued hundreds of visas without approval 
from the relevant security agencies, providing the CIA with access and footprint in 
Pakistan’s tribal areas, angered the Pakistan Army and created a political storm. Given 
that national security falls under the domain of the security establishment, having 
Haqqani bypassing the agencies to help the Americans hunt for bin Laden and 
(according to the interviews of military officials) ‘humiliate’ Pakistan globally made the 
military highly suspicious of the civilian government. Senior officers in the Pakistan 
Army saw the PPP government flexing its muscle and exerting its agency, backed by 
the patronage it received through the security–development nexus, as enacted in the 
form KLB Act. One ex-government official that I interviewed said, ‘It was a perfect 
moment for the civilians to strike. The military was weak and had low approval ratings, 
so putting a leash around it would only require some support from the US’.65  
That support was sought through a controversial memo 66  by the PPP government 
requesting the US to assist in enforcing a civilian coup against the Pakistan Army, 
 
62 Karin Brulliard, ‘Pakistani Army’s Rank and File Seethes at US Over Bin Laden Raid’, Washington 
Post, 20 May 2011, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/war-zones/in-pakistans-army-anger-
simmers/2011/05/18/AFU8yB7G_story.html?utm_term=.06bcb10bbef5. 
63  M Ilyad Khan, ‘Pakistan’s Army Ridiculed After Bin Laden Raid’, BBC, 6 May 2011, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13311257. 
64 Husain Haqqani, ‘Yes, the Russian Ambassador’. 
65 Interview with an official from the Ministry of Interior, 10 August 2016. 
66 Josh Rogin, ‘Exclusive: Secret Pakistani-US Memo Offering Overthrow of Military Leadership 
Revealed’, The Foreign Policy, 17 November 2011, https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/11/17/exclusive-
secret-pakistani-u-s-memo-offering-overthrow-of-military-leadership-revealed/. 
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creating a political crisis in Pakistan. Within days of the bin Laden event, Haqqani 
drafted a memo and dispatched it to US Admiral Michael Mullen through Mansoor Ijaz, 
a prominent Pakistani-American businessman in the US, who handed it to his friend 
James Jones, the US National Security Advisor. The controversy began when Ijaz 
declared in the Financial Times that there was a memo that Haqqani wanted him to 
deliver personally to the Americans. While Jones and the PPP government initially 
denied the existence of a memo, Jones eventually confessed to being delivered a memo 
by Ijaz. Ijaz’s article created a civil–military political storm in Pakistan, giving life to 
the long-held suspicion of the Pakistan Army regarding Ambassador Haqqani’s 
activities.  
The contents of the memo showed the level to which the PPP government was exerting 
agency in offering the US full support on its national security interests if the US backed 
the civilian coup against the military in Pakistan. At a deeper level, the memo reflected 
the clear influence of the security–development nexus. For the officials I interviewed in 
Pakistan, the Memogate scandal, as it was called, was another attempt by the PPP 
government to exert its agency in Pakistan’s civil–military power equation through the 
KLB Act by requesting the US for help in achieving a civilian coup in Pakistan.  
In the memo, the Ambassador, speaking on behalf of Pakistani President Zardari, asked 
the US to help install a civilian coup against the military in Pakistan, against the 
backdrop of the bin Laden raid. The agreement was proposed as being beneficial to both 
the US Government and Pakistan civilian political leadership, as it would bring the 
Pakistan Army and ISI under control and would enable a shift in Pakistan’s national 
security policy that was aligned with US interests. The memo proposed that Pakistan, 
under its new leadership, would allow the US to conduct raids against al-Qaeda and the 
Haqqani network inside Pakistan; would disband the ‘S’ wing of the ISI, which had 
links with Afghan militants; and would cooperate with India and hand over the people 
including intelligence officials involved in the Mumbai attack. While it is not clear 
whether the US Government became part of the plan, what is known is that the US 
Government did entertain the memo, inquiring if it ‘had the relevant backing from the 
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civilian leadership’.67 However, no further action was taken on the issue by the US. In 
my interview with the former director general of the ISI, he said: 
The US wanted to support democracy in Pakistan but its national security interests 
trumps its principles. Hence, when the PPP requested help from the US through the 
controversial memo, the US military was reluctant to allow the civilian government to 
take charge of the Pakistan Army. This is because the US Army has historically 
shared deep ties with the Pakistan Army and relies on it to achieve its long-term 
security interests. Therefore, the memo was not just rejected, but the leak came from 
the Pentagon.68 
The Director General’s comments suggested that despite all the US Army’s issues with 
the Pakistan Army, they still held a favourable view of it and would not destroy the US 
investment in it by backing a civilian coup. This view was corroborated through my 
interviews with both the US State Department and Pentagon officials, who claimed that 
the PPP government miscalculated with regard to American policy in expecting that it 
would receive full support from the US against the Pakistan Army.  This expectation 
came out of the narrative set through the security–development nexus, enacted in the 
form of KLB Act. It was reflected in the parliamentary speech of the then Foreign 
Minister of Pakistan, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, who called on the US ‘to get used to a 
new relationship with the civilian government’, indicating that it was the civilian 
government that was in charge in Pakistan.69  
The sequence of the events—beginning with Benazir Bhutto building on the 
indivisibility of security and development to align with the US and establish the anti-
Army discourse, succeeded by the KLB Act, which aimed to curtail the power of the 
military, then the bin Laden raid and, finally, the Memogate scandal—provides a strong 
case that the KLB Act was not a single-sided American political construct to influence 
Pakistan’s national security policy, but rather, it was co-produced by the civilian 
government of the PPP to bring the Pakistan Army under civilian control, to the benefit 
of both the US and the PPP government. In a way, the Memogate scandal was an 
 
67  ‘Mansoor Says Mullen Wanted Zardari’s Clearance of Memo’, The News, August 2011, 
https://www.thenews.com.pk/archive/print/331849-mansoor-says-mullen-wanted-zardari%E2%80%99s-
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68 Interview with the former director general of the ISI, Rawalpindi, 23 May 2016. 
69 Shah Mahmood Qureshi (speech, National Assembly, 16 October 2009). 
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extension of the narrative set by the security–development nexus, as enacted through the 
KLB Act.  
The moment the memo was leaked into the mainstream media, the Pakistan Army 
berated the civilian government for what it saw as treason against the state. The civilian 
government was quick to distance itself from the scandal. Ijaz named Haqqani as the 
author of the memo, forcing him to remain in the US because of the ensuing court case 
of treason against him in Pakistan. The Memogate scandal had the opposite effect to 
what was planned, according to a senior PML-N leader, who said:  
it brought the military back into the lime light, gave it public sympathy and credibility 
that seriously damaged the civilian supremacy in the country—partly due to the 
civilian government’s own failed adventure against its own institution. 70 
The Memogate scandal reflects the deep civil–military divide, the roots of which can be 
traced to the security–development nexus, as enacted through the KLB Act, which set 
up the inevitable collision between the civil and military actors in Pakistan. This is 
evident in the fact that Memogate was not the only scandal that brought the Pakistan 
civil–military relationship to the brink. Another incident occurred in 2016 with the 
PML-N government in charge under Prime Minister Sharif. The civil government 
leaked the contents of a high-powered national security meeting, which alleged the 
civilian government and the military had had a confrontation over Pakistan becoming 
globally isolated because of the Pakistan Army’s support for the Haqqani network and 
other militant groups in the region. The news report suggested that the civilian political 
leadership exchanged heated words with the military and intelligence, as part of an 
orchestrated plan by the Prime Minister to stir the military to action against militant 
groups.71 In addition, it was intended to reassure the US that the civilian government 
would do all it could to take action against the security establishment that was held 
responsible for the losses in Afghanistan and cross-border terrorism in India under the 
KLB Act.  
The leak, published by Pakistan’s Dawn Newspaper, caused a furore in the military 
establishment, which saw the leak as a desperate yet treasonous act by the civilian 
 
70 Interview with a senior PML-N leader from Punjab, Islamabad, 28 August 2016. 
71 Cyril Almeida, ‘Act Against Militants or Face International Isolation, Civilians Tell Military’, Dawn, 6 
October 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1288350. 
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government of the PML-N to put pressure on the military to shift its strategic policies in 
the region.  
Looking closely, the contents of the Dawn Leaks bore a strong resemblance to the KLB 
Act and the memo sent by Ambassador Haqqani, which aimed to push back against the 
military by damaging its credibility and forcing civilian supremacy on matters of 
national security and foreign policy. It can be argued that the Dawn Leaks was a product 
of the discourse set through the KLB Act by the civilian government of Pakistan and the 
US, which saw the Pakistan Army as the root of all evil in the region and which must be 
stopped.  
This is not to say that the civil–military divide did not exist in Pakistan before the KLB 
Act. It certainly did. What changed was that the civil–military divide deepened because 
of the nexus enacted through the KLB Act, making it different from previous US 
attempts to influence civil–military relations in Pakistan. Secondly, it was the first time 
that a civilian government of Pakistan had presented itself as a ‘useful partner’ to the 
US, inviting it to help to resolve the civil–military balance in favour of the civilian 
democracy in the country, as well as helping to co-produce the terms and conditions that 
would dictate the power equation in the country. This indicates the level of agency that 
a local actor could exert through the security–development nexus. This entrenched the 
Pakistan Army’s perception of civilians as being untrustworthy and unpatriotic, who 
through the nexus in the form of the KLB Act, tried to wage war against its own 
institutions.  
Whether it is treason or a fight for civilian supremacy and democracy depends entirely 
on the lens you use to examine the civil–military debacle in Pakistan. However, what 
this study of civil–military relations in Pakistan reveals about the security–development 
nexus is very compelling. It shows that the nexus was not just a creation of the Western 
donor countries; rather, the actors in recipient countries such as Pakistan could co-
produce the nexus and exert their agency to use the nexus to achieve their own domestic 
political ends to secure civilian supremacy against the military establishment. This 
nuance, which explains the politics of the security–development nexus at a deeper level, 
is absent in the critical debate on the nexus, which neglects the role and agency of the 
local actors.  
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6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the politics of the nexus by examining the level of agency that 
the PPP government was able to exert in terms of co-producing the KLB Act and using 
it to establish civilian supremacy in the country. This has been demonstrated by first 
reviewing the domestic-historical context of the civil–military relations rooted in 
Pakistan’s colonial legacy and the early security anxieties of the country. With that as a 
framework, the chapter has argued across the discursive, policy and programming levels 
how the nexus helped the PPP to shape the discourse on the Pakistan Army and to 
influence the specific terms and conditions of the KLB Act in the hope of forcing the 
Pakistan Army out of politics. Using as evidence the direct interviews of Pakistani state 
officials and the role of former Ambassador Haqqani in the Memogate scandal, which 
resulted in bringing the civil–military tensions to the brink, the chapter has revealed the 
agency of the PPP government.  
The discussion has challenged the critical literature on the security–development nexus, 
which sees the nexus as a Western neocolonial political construct designed to serve the 
security and political interests of the global North. The discussion in this chapter has 
provided evidence to the contrary by exploring the way the civilian political leaders in 
Pakistan co-produced and used the security-development nexus to achieve their 
domestic political interest of establishing civilian supremacy in the country. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
 
 
America has its interests, we have ours. Sometimes those interests converge, other times 
they don’t. We have to foremost look after ourselves, just like the US looks after itself 
first. That is what nation states do.1  
—Senior Pakistan Army official 
 
The security–development nexus is a tool that the US uses to achieve its strategic 
interests in Pakistan beyond security and development. For Pakistan, it is how we can 
be part of this tool to shape it in a way that achieves our own strategic interests.2 
—Additional Secretary, Ministry of Interior 
  
 
1 Interview with a former joint chief of staff, Islamabad, 13 July 2016. 
2 Interview with a civil servant from the Ministry of Interior, Islamabad, 20 July 2016. 
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7.1 Summary of Findings 
Despite the security–development nexus being studied and discussed extensively in 
policy and academia for more than two decades, this study found the existing literature 
on the nexus, even from a critical standpoint, to be Western-centric. This finding 
became both, the starting point and the foundation upon which the entire thesis was 
developed. It was problematised through the literature review in Chapter 2, which 
fleshed out the deep Western-centrism in the literature on the nexus around context, 
actors and language, which are deeply rooted in the Western experience, culture and 
academic tradition, neglecting the co-constitutivity of the nexus. The findings in the 
chapter indicated that the literature on the nexus tends to exclude the voices of recipient 
countries, thereby reducing them to bystanders in the nexus debate, while granting 
overwhelming agency to donor states in shaping the nexus. In doing this, it neglects the 
co-constitutivity of the nexus and, therefore, falls short in explaining the politics of the 
nexus as present on the ground in recipient countries such as Pakistan.  
The findings in Chapter 2 allowed the development of a decolonial approach to study 
the nexus, which helped to substantiate the central argument of this thesis that the nexus 
is not simply a Western political construct limited to Western policy and programming 
concerns, with no contribution from the developing countries. Rather, the nexus was co-
produced by the actors in the recipient country, who used it to serve their own interests. 
The evidence of this was substantiated through the findings in the discussion chapters, 
which delved deeper into the questions of sovereignty and agency as a way to explore 
the politics of the nexus.  
For instance, Chapters 3 and 5 explored the nexus as a challenge to Pakistan’s 
sovereignty, meant to serve the US strategic interests in the region. Chapter 3 discussed 
this in terms of its effect on Pakistan’s national security policy, while Chapter 5 
examined the same question in terms of interference in civil–military relations. The 
findings in Chapter 3 demonstrated how the security–development nexus, enacted 
through the KLB Act, acted as a powerful discourse that allowed the US to influence 
Pakistan’s national security policy, challenging its sovereignty in the process. A key 
finding was that the indivisibility of security and development under the KLB Act gave 
US power over defining Pakistan through geopolitical cartography, which is essentially 
the colonial reconfiguration of geographical boundaries at the discursive level. The 
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participants of the research and review of the relevant US official documents revealed 
how Pakistan was moved away from South Asia to ‘AfPak’ bringing the country 
officially in the war zone through the fragility discourse. Such power of definition 
allowed the US to influence Pakistan’s national security threat perception and policy.  
Another key finding of the chapter was that through the ‘hearts and minds’ approach, 
the US shaped the discourse on Pakistan by funding NGOs, religious clerics, media 
houses and different political fronts. The chapter undertook critical discourse analysis of 
USAID and State Department projects in Pakistan that spent millions of dollars under 
the KLB Act on civil society in Pakistan buying influence according to the participants I 
interviewed on the subject for this study. Similarly, the chapter also found out that 
through certain conditions on Pakistan under the KLB Act including those related to 
nuclear safeguards, and Kashmir based militant groups, the US influenced Pakistan’s 
national security policy to serve American interests in the region. These findings in the 
chapter substantiate the evidence of US using the nexus to influence the national 
security decisions of Pakistan at the expense of Pakistan’s sovereignty. 
The question of sovereignty was also at the core of Chapter 5 that showed how the KLB 
Act influenced civil–military relations in Pakistan to serve the American strategic 
interests. This, the chapter found was through a shift in the US position on Pakistan in 
favour of its civilian government because of deep frustration with Pakistan Army on the 
war on terrorism and the Obama administration taking over the White House. Through 
the participants’ interviews and policy statements of key Obama administration 
officials, the findings in the chapter indicated a strong US interest to promote 
democracy and civilian supremacy in Pakistan between 2009-2013 as a way to cut back 
the power of Pakistan Army so to effectively re-shape Pakistan’s national security 
policy.  
A key finding from this chapter was the specific terms and conditions laid out in the 
KLB Act for Pakistan Army to respect civilian supremacy, report to the civilian 
authority, allow political interference in the promotion process and receive trainings on 
respecting civilian authority that were meant to force a change in the civil-military 
power balance inside Pakistan. This blunt projection of US interest to influence the 
civil-military relations in Pakistan reflects how the nexus enabled the US to exert its 
influence to challenge Pakistan’s sovereignty.  
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Another key finding from the chapter was the discussion on the funding of certain 
NGOs, and media houses in Pakistan to shape public opinion in the country with regard 
to democracy that allowed the US to influence the civil-military equation in Pakistan. In 
other words, the US spent millions of dollars to buy influence in Pakistani civil society 
by funding relevant think tanks to conduct seminars, trainings and talks on particular 
topics while simultaneously funding media houses to align with the US strategic 
interests in the country. These findings are important because the literature on the nexus 
has lacked such nuance to explain the way the actors in recipient countries such as 
Pakistan see the nexus as a challenge to their sovereignty.  
Thus, the findings in Chapters 3 and 5 has helped to expand the critical literature on the 
nexus by demonstrating the way the US used the indivisibility of security and 
development to influence Pakistan’s national security policy and civil–military 
relations, serving its own interests in the region and challenging Pakistan’s sovereignty 
in the process.  
However, the discussion in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 is incomplete in truly fleshing out 
the politics of the security–development nexus as present on the ground without also 
exploring the level of agency that actors in a recipient country such as Pakistan are able 
to exert. Therefore, the findings in Chapters 4 and 6 indicate the level of agency that 
local actors in Pakistan were able to exert in terms of co-producing the nexus and using 
it in their own favour from a position of relative weakness. Chapter 4 used the context 
of the national security policy while Chapter 6 delved into the question of agency in 
terms of Pakistan’s civil–military relations.  
The findings in Chapter 4 indicated how Pakistan reinforced and used its image of being 
a weak and fragile state, within the nexus discourse of ‘security and development go 
hand in hand’ and ‘the security of the global North is linked to the security of the global 
South’, to engage the US in a long-term relation in the form of the KLB Act. In other 
words, as the West led by the US created a reality of Pakistan as a state on the brink of 
collapse, Pakistan embraced and in many cases co-produced this discourse to force the 
US to compensate Pakistan both economically and militarily. The findings in the 
chapter through a critical discourse analysis of statements and interviews of Pakistani 
officials indicated how Pakistan exerted its agency against the US by using prevalent 
insecurity and terrorist threat to coerce the US.  
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Another key finding in this chapter that reflects the agency of Pakistan was how through 
fighting the American war on terrorism, albeit reluctantly, allowed Pakistan to benefit in 
terms of developing its armed forces and achieving its regional strategic interests with 
regard to India and Afghanistan. The American dependency on Pakistan allowed 
Pakistan to exert its agency by equipping itself with latest American military equipment, 
and receiving enhanced military to military trainings while also pursuing its goal to 
fence the Durand line with along the Afghan border and continue asymmetrical warfare 
against India. These findings are not only significant for the debate on nexus but also in 
developing a deeper understanding of how the Pakistani security establishment thinks 
and operates to serve its strategic goals.  
The findings in this chapter endorse the central argument of this thesis that Pakistan is 
not a passive actor under the security–development nexus. Instead, Pakistan plays an 
important role in co-producing the nexus, as enacted through the KLB Act. This is why, 
despite all the outrage against the KLB Act influencing Pakistan’s national security 
policy, the military establishment actually embraced it and used it to its own advantage.  
Chapter 6 went a step deeper to explore the security-development nexus as a domestic 
power struggle between the civil and military actors in Pakistan – a perspective that is 
missing in the prevalent literature on the nexus. One of the key findings of the chapter 
was how the civilian government of PPP exerted its agency against the military 
establishment through the nexus. The chapter found that this was done with PPP 
government capitalizing on the US frustration with the Pakistan Army over the Afghan 
War. The PPP took it as an opportunity to shape the discourse on the Pakistan Army as 
to be ‘double dealing’ with the US. Building on the discourse, the PPP aligned itself 
closely to the US as a better alternate to deliver in the war on terrorism while 
simultaneously influencing the US to help reduce the power of Pakistan Army.  
Similarly, through a critical discourse analysis of official US and Pakistani government 
statements and Wikileak documents of closed door meetings between the US and PPP 
government the chapter found how specific terms and conditions of the KLB Act related 
to civil-military relations were actually co-produced by some senior members of PPP as 
a way to exert civilian supremacy in Pakistan. Another key finding that came out of the 
analysis of the data was how the PPP used the American patronage attained through the 
KLB Act to take practical steps to reduce the power of the Pakistan Army. This is 
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evidenced by the Memogate scandal, PPP’s failed attempt to bring the ISI under civilian 
control, as well as the Dawn Leaks scandal that put the civil and military institutions in 
Pakistan on a collision course with each other.  
These and other findings of the chapter challenge the critical literature on the security–
development nexus, which sees the nexus as a Western neocolonial political construct 
designed to serve the security and political interests of the global North. The evidence in 
both Chapter 4 and Chapter 6 substantiate the central argument of the thesis that actors 
in recipient countries such as Pakistan are able to use the indivisibility of security and 
development to their own advantage in their strategic security issues and domestic civil–
military affairs.  
The findings of this study are significant because they demonstrate that the security–
development nexus activated a dialectical power struggle between the US and Pakistan, 
as well as between different actors within Pakistan, all of whom used the indivisibility 
of security and development to advance their own vested strategic interests. The next 
section will discuss the macro level implications of these findings.  
7.2 Implications 
This thesis has made three key contributions in its exploration of the politics of the 
security–development nexus. First, it has enriched the literature on the security–
development nexus by both expanding and challenging it, as discussed in the previous 
section. It has built on the works of Mark Duffield, David Chandler, Joanna D. Spear, 
Stephen Brown and many more, who have critiqued the nexus using a neocolonial and 
securitisation lens. This thesis used a decolonial approach to study the voices of the 
local actors in Pakistan, adding depth to the critical literature by investigating the 
politics of the nexus around the issue of sovereignty and agency. This helped to give 
both political conscience and subjecthood to the local actors in the nexus debate, 
allowing a nuanced study of the politics of the nexus. This is in contrast to the prevalent 
literature on the nexus, which has studied Western donor policy and programming 
aspects while neglecting the voices and agency of the actors in the recipient countries. 
Therefore, the evidence from this study with regard to the KLB Act helps to add value 
to both the academic debate on the nexus and donor policy and practice in the 
developing world.  
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Second, the thesis has contributed to the broader literature on US–Pakistan relations by 
providing a new vantage point for examining the complicated aid-related relationship 
between the two countries through the case study of the KLB Act as an enactment of the 
security–development nexus. The rich, in-depth interviews of civil–military officials in 
both Pakistan and the US have added significant value and perspective to the debate, 
which has been otherwise mired in political agendas and Western perspectives on the 
subject. Therefore, the discussion of the security–development nexus as a dialectical 
power struggle between the US and Pakistan, and its influence on the national security 
policy and civil–military relations of Pakistan, deepens the understanding of the 
constant ‘do more’/‘no more’ discursive struggle between the US and Pakistan. This 
study has aimed to strike a balance in the politicised debate regarding US–Pakistan 
relations. On one side, Pakistan is seen as a ‘victim’ of US imperialism,3 and on the 
other, as a conniving actor playing on the gullibility of the US. 4  This thesis 
demonstrates that the US–Pakistan relationship is not a ‘bad marriage’5 nor is it based 
on ‘magnificent delusions’.6 Rather, the US–Pakistan relationship is based on a complex 
interdependency through the nexus, with both partners in a perpetual struggle to make 
the most out of their relationship to serve their ‘other’ agendas. For the US, the 
relationship with Pakistan has been less about Pakistan and more about the war in 
Afghanistan. For Pakistan, the relationship with the US has been less about the US and 
more about the domestic civil–military power struggle, and about Afghanistan and 
India. In making this argument, the thesis has deepened the understanding of Pakistan’s 
delicate civil–military relations and national security policy decisions, as well as their 
link to US foreign aid through the KLB Act. Contrary to the mainstream literature on 
the civil–military issue in Pakistan, which accords overwhelming agency to the 
 
3  Adaner Usmani, ‘The Evolution of US-Pakistan Policy: US Imperialism in the Age of Obama’, 
International Socialist Review 78 (2012). 
4 Christine Fair, ‘How Pakistan Beguiles the Americans: A Guide for Foreign Officials’, War on Rocks, 
24 June 2015, https://warontherocks.com/2015/06/how-pakistan-beguiles-the-americans-a-guide-for-
foreign-officials/. 
5  Michael O’Hanlon, ‘US-Pakistan: Bad Union, No Divorce’, Politico, 3 May 2011, 
https://www.politico.com/story/2011/05/us-pakistan-bad-union-no-divorce-054091. See also Lisa Curtis, 
‘The Bin-Laden Aftermath: The US and Pakistan Are Still Stuck with Each Other’, Heritage Foundation, 
3 May 2011, https://www.heritage.org/asia/commentary/the-bin-laden-aftermath-the-us-and-pakistan-are-
still-stuck-each-other. 
6  Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of 
Misunderstanding (New York: Public Affairs, 2013). 
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military,7 this thesis has demonstrated that the civilian actors in Pakistan have not been 
passive victims of the civil–military tussle. Rather, they have been able to exert their 
agency to reduce the military’s excessive powers in Pakistan, in the hope of establishing 
civilian supremacy. The case study of the KLB Act has provided clear evidence of this 
claim. Thus, through the study of the local actors in Pakistan, this thesis has revealed as 
much about the US–Pakistan relationship and domestic civil–military turbulence in 
Pakistan as it has about the politics of the security–development nexus.  
Lastly, through its decolonial approach, this thesis has contributed by revealing the 
Western-centrism that prevails in the literature on international relations by examining 
the context, actors and language of the security–development nexus. The core argument 
of the thesis is that the security–development nexus (as enacted in the KLB Act) was 
co-produced by both the donor and recipient countries as part of the dialectical power 
struggle. This has added to the postcolonial literature that conceptualises international 
politics as being beyond the East–West binary, to be co-constitutive, with the East a 
significant actor in shaping modern society. This is a significant contribution and, to my 
knowledge, a unique scholarly work that helps to enrich our understanding of the 
security–development nexus and opens up new avenues for research.  
7.3 Future Research 
According to Stern and Öjendal,8 there is not a single security–development nexus but, 
rather, many nexuses that require empirical study to conceptualise and explore them in 
detail. This study is limited in its scope to a single case study of the KLB Act in 
Pakistan, offering one of the many ways to examine the politics of the security–
development nexus. It would be worthwhile to study, for further comparative analysis, 
the way the application of the nexus in Pakistan is similar to or dissimilar from the 
application of the nexus in a similar postcolonial state in a different region, such as the 
Middle East, Central Asia, Africa or South America. Such comparative study would 
help in both improving the conceptual clarity of the security–development nexus and 
adding empirical evidence to the study of it. The closest case study to undertake to test 
 
7 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2014). See also Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014).  
8 Maria Stern and Joakim Öjendal, ‘Mapping Security Development: A Question of Methodology?’, 
Security Dialogue 42, no. 1 (2010). 
191 
the results of this thesis would be Egypt, which has received a similar amount of 
security and development assistance from the US and has similar domestic and regional 
political challenges that require American assistance for the country’s survival.  
Second, given that this study takes the nexus as a discourse, using the decolonial 
approach to explore the politics of the nexus, it offers a new framework for further 
research on the subject. Taking the nexus as a powerful discourse that has the ability to 
shape events and realities in the developing world, together with studying the voices of 
the locals, is a useful way to help further research on the related fields of fragile states, 
nation- and state-building interventions in the developing world, and even other aspects 
of the nexus.  
Lastly, studying the politics of the nexus by incorporating the views of the local actors 
and according agency to them opens up avenues for further research on the security–
development nexus, especially with regard to furthering the interconnection between the 
nexus and civil–military relations, and between the nexus and national security in terms 
of the US’s conduct of covert wars. This aspect of the way the nexus interacts with 
national security policy, especially in terms of its role in the covert wars or civil–
military affairs of the developing world, is a potentially significant area of research that 
requires deeper attention.  
1.4 Conclusion 
As I write, in 2019, the US war in Afghanistan is drawing to an end. Zalmay Khalilzad, 
the US Special Envoy to Afghanistan and Pakistan, led a six-day talk with the Taliban, 
and the early reports from it indicate agreement over the ceasefire and US withdrawal 
from Afghanistan.9 Simultaneously, in Pakistan, US Senator Lindsey Graham, a close 
aide of US President Trump, held talks with Prime Minister Imran Khan. In a 
remarkable departure from US official policy to press Pakistan to ‘do more’ to curb 
terrorism in the region, Senator Graham lauded Pakistan’s role in the Afghan peace 
process, praising Prime Minister Khan for his unmoved stance of pursuing peace with 
the Taliban through dialogue instead of waging war.10 What is most relevant to this 
 
9  ‘Taliban Talks: Draft Framework for Afghanistan Peace Agreed’, BBC News, 28 January 2019, 
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-47028177. 
10 James Mackenzie, ‘Senator Graham Urges Trump to Meet Pakistan PM Khan’, Reuters, 20 January 
2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pakistan-afghanistan/senator-graham-urges-trump-to-meet-
pakistan-pm-khan-idUSKCN1PE0OI?feedType=RSS&feedName=topNews. 
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thesis is Senator Graham’s emphasis on the need to move US–Pakistan relations beyond 
their transactional nature around the war in Afghanistan to a more strategic relationship, 
based on trade ties.11 Senator Graham’s comments come at an interesting time, when the 
US–Pakistan relationship is deeply strained, with grievances from both sides regarding 
the 17-year US war in Afghanistan. Over the course of this war, the US–Pakistan 
relationship has been an interesting story of close partnership, back-stabbings, 
conspiracies and regrets—some of which has been covered in the discussion chapters of 
this document. The tumultuous relationship between the US and Pakistan is relevant to 
this thesis because it draws our attention to the security–development nexus, a powerful 
discourse that defines the transactional nature of the bilateral relations between the two 
countries. Taking a cue from Duffield that the nexus is still ‘under-researched’12 and in 
desperate need of empirical work, this thesis took a decolonial approach to investigate 
the politics of the security–development nexus through the study of the KLB Act in 
Pakistan, considering the question of sovereignty and agency. In doing this, it has 
enriched the prevailing understanding of both the nexus and the US–Pakistan 
relationship, through the rich empirical evidence gathered from interviews and the data 
of the government documents. Thus, this thesis serves as a small contribution to the 
diversity in the debate on the security–development nexus.  
 
 
  
 
11 Mackenzie, ‘Senator Graham Urges Trump’. 
12 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security 
(London: Zed Books, 2001), 9. 
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